A road less traveled: Investigating the outside directors of America's corporate boards by Lester, Richard H.
   
   
 
 
 
 
A ROAD LESS TRAVELED: INVESTIGATING THE OUTSIDE DIRECTORS  
 
OF AMERICA’S CORPORATE BOARDS 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation  
by 
RICHARD H. LESTER 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 August 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Major Subject: Management 
   
   
A ROAD LESS TRAVELED: INVESTIGATING THE OUTSIDE DIRECTORS 
 
 OF AMERICA’S CORPORATE BOARDS 
 
A Dissertation  
 
by  
 
RICHARD H. LESTER 
 
Submitted to Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of  
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
Approved as to style and content by: 
 
 
 
_______________________________  _____________________________ 
 Albert A. Cannella, Jr.    Dudley L. Poston, Jr. 
 (Chair of Committee)             (Member) 
 
 
_______________________________  _____________________________ 
      Trevis Certo       Richard Woodman 
        (Member)              (Member) 
 
 
_______________________________  _____________________________ 
     Angelo DeNisi         Angelo DeNisi 
         (Member)     (Head of Department) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
August 2003 
 
Major Subject: Management 
 
  iii 
  
ABSTRACT 
 
A Road Less Traveled: Investigating the Outside Directors of America’s 
 
Corporate Boards.  
 
 (August 2003) 
Richard H. Lester, B.S., Wright State University; 
M.B.A., University of Houston 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Albert A. Cannella, Jr. 
 
Using human capital theory and social capital theory, I develop a model to 
explain the circumstances surrounding outside director appointments, patterns of outside 
board affiliations and outside director exits. I investigate why individuals become 
outside directors, why they continue to serve as directors after appointment, and why 
they terminate their service on boards. I find that an executive’s home firm career and 
prestigious affiliations predict the likelihood and patterns of outside directorship service. 
Outside directors are critical to effective corporate governance, and to understand the 
board-governance process we need a better understanding of outside director service.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
  Board service, particularly when associated with large public corporations, is a 
highly visible endeavor. While directorships of the largest corporations are widely 
considered prestigious (D'Aveni, 1990), service inures to its participants risks as well as 
benefits. At stake is the director’s reputation, affiliation with the home institution, and 
web of network contacts. Consequently, the individuals who choose to join the 
directorship ranks are a particularly interesting subset of the corporate upper echelon. 
Why is it that certain officers of corporations become outside directors while others do 
not? This study investigates the phenomenon of corporate officers of large public 
corporations who serve as outside directors of other firms. 
I selected corporate officers as the focus of this study because they represent a 
majority of the outside directorships held in public corporations and they bring to board 
service a set of unique capabilities (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). One of the reasons that 
officers of large firms are highly recruited for board service is their ability to contribute 
quickly based on previous experiences as a member of a corporate elite. Moreover, 
securing corporate executives for outside directorship signals a firm’s ability to attract 
quality executive talent. For the directors, outside board service also provides benefits. 
Service broadens the individual’s range of influential and prestigious contacts, increases 
exposure to different business situations and conditions, and increases the linkages 
available to the home institution. Therefore, studying corporate officers who also serve 
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as outside directors provides a setting whereby I am able to more definitively focus on 
the motives for both the firm and the individual.  
Research on corporate governance is dominated by the view that the separation 
of ownership and control leads to interest conflicts between those charged with 
managing the firm (i.e. executives) and the residual risk bearers (i.e. shareholders) (Berle 
& Means, 1932; Fama & Jensen, 1983b; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). A frequent 
assumption in the literature is that unless constrained by large, independent shareholders, 
CEOs will strongly influence the outside director selection and replacement process, and 
through that influence, exert substantial control over the entire governance process. 
Further, much empirical evidence supports this view (see Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 
1996, for an excellent review). However, evidence suggests that certain individuals see 
outside directorship service in ways that prove beneficial to their own personal interests, 
such as the ability to secure board positions after retirement (Brickley, Linck, & Coles, 
1999) or as a means of expanding one’s network of influential individuals (Mizruchi, 
1996). This recent work opens to further contention the notion that directors are merely 
in place to do the bidding of the CEO or act as “rubber stamps” (Herman, 1981). Outside 
directors bring to board service their own individual egos, reputations, and histories. It is 
illogical to presuppose these individualized influences will not come into play during 
board service. This leaves open the question as to why certain persons serve on corporate 
boards outside their home affiliation. 
This study takes the perspective of the individual outside director and seeks to 
understand why individuals seek service as outside directors and how they secure board 
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positions. Another focus of this research is to investigate multiple board appointments. 
Why is it that some individuals serve on only one outside board while others obtain 
multiple directorship positions, or alternatively, some obtain none at all? Once a board 
position is secured, why would we expect service to continue, expand, or end? The 
ultimate objective of this research is to further our understanding of those individuals 
who choose to serve as outside directors of firms other than their own. In order to 
develop this understanding, we must know more about the characteristics and influences 
that surround outside directorship appointments and terminations. By better 
understanding why individuals seek outside directorships and what factors are pertinent 
to their service, we can better understand the entire governance process. It is my 
contention that an important way to improve our knowledge about the corporate 
governance process is through a detailed understanding of the individuals who comprise 
boards. 
I draw upon two theories – human capital (e.g. Becker,1993; Davenport, 1999) 
and social capital theory (e.g. Bourdieu, 1983; Coleman, 1988; Lin, 2001a) – to frame 
the discussion. Human capital theory argues that investments made by individuals are 
rewarding in the sense they allow individuals to reap the benefits of their investments. A 
human capital explanation for individual accomplishment rests upon the notion of 
differences in individual ability, knowledge, skill, or talent. In the past, this explanation 
has been offered as a way to differentiate between those who succeed and those who do 
not. However, Burt (1997: p. 339) argues that while “human capital is surely necessary 
to success, it is useless without the social capital of opportunities in which to apply it”. 
  4   
  
Social capital is a quality created between people whereas human capital is a quality of 
the individual (Burt, 1997). Social capital therefore comes about through relations 
among individuals, in particular, relations that facilitate action. 
Through an examination of corporate officer’s human capital and social capital, I 
seek to improve our understanding of those who serve as outside directors. While others 
have examined corporate boards from perspectives such as board composition and broad 
director demographics, little work has been directed at understanding the individuals 
who make up the board. I argue that attention should be paid to the characteristics of 
individuals who comprise boards, in addition to their ability to fit into various typologies 
of roles and / or responsibilities. 
Purpose 
Recent research on boards of directors found ambiguous relationships between 
various measures of board leadership, structure, composition, and performance (Dalton, 
Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998). I argue that part of past failures to identify outcome-
oriented relationships is the paucity of work directed at understanding the complexities 
of the board / outside director alignment process. Firms desire certain individuals to 
serve, but those chosen and who accept outside directorships also expect to gain from the 
relationship. Put differently, when we observe a person joining a board we can conclude 
two things directly: that the person was identified as a desirable outside director; and that 
the person concluded that service on this particular board was in his or her best interest. 
 Moreover, according to Pettigrew (1992), the inability to identify an 
unambiguous relationship between board composition and important firm outcomes is 
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largely because the influence of the board is complex and indirect rather than simple and 
direct. The present study argues that to better understand the governance process we 
must gain a fuller understanding of the persons who achieve directorship status. As such, 
I examine why they serve, what makes them attractive as outside directors, what do they 
gain from service, and what do they contribute to the firms they serve? 
Contributions 
This study makes several contributions to research on corporate governance in 
general and strategic leadership in particular. First, it improves our understanding of the 
relationship between the firm and the director. Previous work (Westphal & Zajac, 1995) 
has argued that the CEO largely influences new director selection and that, by and large, 
directors are beholden to the person who supported their nomination (Westphal & Zajac, 
1997). This leaves unanswered questions such as why, if corporate boards prefer sitting 
CEOs (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989) would these individuals be willing to submit 
themselves to the direction of another? In this study, I analyze directorships over time 
and investigate the logic surrounding director appointments and exits.  
Second, I seek to redirect board of director research focused on finding an 
unambiguous relationship between board and firm. Dalton et al. (1998) argue that further 
research examining the relationship between board composition, board leadership 
structure, and financial performance is unlikely to be fruitful. Further, they find little 
evidence that there are significant moderating influences yet uncovered. In addition, as 
noted by Daily (1994), attempting to account for firm outcomes by examining the full 
board does not capture the subtle and complex nature of the board process. Much of the 
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previous research in strategic leadership has attempted to identify outcomes in terms of 
executive’s economic or non-social resources (Castanias & Helfat, 1991; Hambrick & 
Finkelstein, 1987) or their demographic characteristics such as group size, age, 
functional background and formal education (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987; Kesner, 
1988; Smith et al., 1994; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). I argue that we must investigate the 
alignment between director and firm to better grasp how the board affects the firm. To 
do this I take a fine-grained approach to understanding the governance process and those 
individuals who reside at the pinnacle of corporations.  
Third, I contribute to a limited but growing body of research that examines the 
career success and career mobility of executives. While the career of business executives 
has garnered considerable interest in the public press, little empirical work has been 
extended to the boardroom. Why are some executives more successful than others? 
Examination of the executive career literature reveals that researchers have predicted 
success using a few variables in piecemeal fashion (Gattiker & Larwood, 1989; Judge & 
Bretz, 1994; Judge, Cable, Boudreau, & Bretz, 1995). Jaskolka, Beyer and Trice (1985) 
argued that career success is an evaluative concept, meaning the outcome (success) 
depends upon who does the judging. However, others have evaluated career success 
more objectively through metrics such as pay and promotion. Because a career 
encompasses a sequence of positions throughout one’s lifetime, identifying the key 
events that occur throughout this sequence and the impact upon the executive’s career 
because of those events is of theoretical and empirical interest. Additionally, service on 
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corporate boards potentially extends an individual’s career because directorship does not 
necessarily end with retirement from the home institution (Brickley et al., 1999).  
Fourth, I extend executive succession research to the boardroom. Previous work 
focused on understanding power relationships between board members and the selection 
of new directors (Westphal & Zajac, 1995), board tenure following CEO succession 
(Farrell & Whidbee, 2000; Ward, Bishop, & Sonnefeld, 1999) and board membership 
following firm distress (Daily & Dalton, 1994b, 1995). Much of the prior work has 
revolved around the relations between the CEO and his or her governance team. I 
investigate directorships from the perspective of the individual executive irrespective of 
his or her relationship to the firm’s CEO. This permits me to establish human capital and 
social capital rationales for directorship appointments, losses, and prestigious 
affiliations. Additionally, using a longitudinal study to examine board succession helps 
to identify how organizations staff boards with new directors. 
Fifth, this study contributes to the small body of research investigating the 
accumulation of directorships (Maman, 2000). Most prior research examining persons 
who serve on multiple boards has focused on understanding the phenomenon of 
interlocking directorates and their impact on a firm or an industry (Barringer & Harrison, 
2000; Haunschild & Beckman, 1998; Lang & Lockhart, 1990; Richardson, 1987; Stearns 
& Mizruchi, 1986; Zajac, 1988). Little work has focused attention on the directors 
themselves and how multiple appointments are secured (Kesner & Sebora, 1994). One 
aim of this study is to identify those who achieve their first directorship and then 
subsequent to that event join multiple boards. The underlying reasons for why some 
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accumulate directorships and others do not is an intriguing question that has received 
little attention in the literature. Additionally, directorships are lost as well as gained, and 
I investigate the events surrounding these occurrences. The antecedents to director 
appointments and director mobility within elite circles remain a largely unexplored 
phenomenon. 
Unit of Analysis 
While human capital is rooted in analyzing resources at the disposal of the 
individual, social capital is explained in relationships between and among individuals. It 
is possible to investigate social capital relationships at various levels (Bourdieu, 1983; 
Burt, 1997; Coleman, 1988; Lin, 2001b). By focusing on the individual, social capital 
takes the perspective of how individuals access and use resources embedded in social 
networks to achieve gains.  
This study focuses on the individual corporate officer. This is done for two 
reasons: first, evidence obtained by examining the relationships between the board and 
the firm as collectives has been shown to be ambiguous; and second, by focusing on the 
individual officers of large public firms, I examine the dynamics of director selection 
and retention from that group of directors who represent the largest contingent of those 
who serve. 
Research Questions 
As noted, the present study examines the movement of corporate executives 
regarding directorships, focusing on human capital and social capital assets as both 
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antecedents and consequences of appointments. A model is created to explain how an 
individual is likely to receive his or her first board appointment and to additionally 
predict the factors important to continuing service. Additionally, the model examines the 
notion of director / firm prestige alignment. The overarching questions this research 
investigates are threefold: 
 
1. What human capital and social capital characteristics affect the likelihood that 
corporate executives will accept outside directorships?  
 
2. What is the pattern (the sequence of directorships acquired and the linkages 
among the sequential directorships) of outside directorships observed over a 
corporate officer’s career?  
 
3. What factors (from the perspective of either the firm or the individual) affect the 
likelihood that corporate officers who sit on outside boards will end their service 
on those boards?  
Overview of the Research Method 
The theory and hypotheses developed in this dissertation are tested by using a 
sample of corporate executives and directors obtained from Fortune 1000 companies. A 
base year of 1990 was chosen to provide a sufficient window from which to analyze 
executive movements. Information about each officer and director came from the firm’s 
annual reports and various proxies for the years 1988 through and including 2001, 
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making the study period window 14 consecutive years. I also relied upon Compustat and 
CRSP for firm financial data. After deleting firms with missing values (either not a 
public corporation, or not reporting for at least five years of the study window) the 
sample contained 871 useable organizations. 
Human capital and social capital variables were primarily obtained from the Dun 
& Bradstreet’s Reference book of corporate managements (Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 
1990). The reference book provides, by firm, a listing of each officer and a biographical 
sketch of that person’s career. Typical listings include both the executive’s educational 
and work experience.  
I analyzed the data by estimating a discrete-time event history analysis (Allison, 
1984; Yamaguchi, 1991). Event history models treat tenure as survival time, which 
allows me to analyze those individuals who stay, leave, and accept multiple 
appointments.  
Organization of the Dissertation 
Chapter II examines previous literature on boards of directors, human capital and 
social capital theories. Chapter III develops the theory and hypotheses. Chapter IV 
discusses the methodology. Chapter V explores the results from the empirical analysis. 
Conclusions and discussion are included in Chapter VI.  
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This research study investigates important events that occur during the lives of 
corporate executives, which affect their ability to secure outside directorships. These 
events are proposed to shape and influence the individuals as well as their firm. The 
focus is on individual human and social capital and firm performance. To support the 
theory developed in Chapter III, the following sections provide an overview of the 
relevant literature on boards of directors, human capital, and social capital.  
Boards of Directors 
All public companies have boards of directors, presumably to oversee the 
workings of the firm. Although there is no definitive answer as to what the proper role of 
the board should be, there are some generally accepted guidelines. According to state 
incorporation laws in the United States, boards have overall legal responsibility for the 
management of a company. Directors are therefore required to uphold generally 
accepted principles as described by a duty of diligence, a duty of loyalty, and a duty of 
obedience (Conger, Lawler, & Finegold, 2001). This mandate opens up directors to a 
host of potential liability claims.  
While each board member has a fiduciary responsibility to serve the best 
interests of investors, individual board members influence the firm in different ways. For 
example, key activity areas requiring board involvement include giving strategic advice, 
overseeing strategy formulation and implementation, monitoring performance, 
preventing and managing crises, and securing needed resources. Therefore, directors are 
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likely to undertake various board roles through the experiences and expertise they bring 
to the board. While their role seems straightforward, researchers have raised numerous 
questions regarding not only the effectiveness of boards but also their value to the firm 
(Daily & Dalton, 1997; Dalton et al., 1998; Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999).  
Research on Board and Firm Influence 
Research reviews (Dalton et al., 1998; Johnson et al., 1996; Zahra & Pearce, 
1989) have consistently found equivocal relationships between boards and firm 
outcomes. For example, Zahra and Pearce (1989) found unclear relations between what 
boards actually do, how they are evaluated, and the nature of their strategic role. 
Moreover, Johnson et al. (1996) could not find consensus on how boards measures are 
operationalized regarding director dependence or independence, performance, or roles, 
and Dalton et al. (1998) could not identify clear empirical consistency between board 
composition or board leadership structure and firm performance. Pettigrew (1992) 
observed that, in many studies of boards, great inferential leaps are made from input 
variables such as board composition to output variables such as board performance with 
no direct mechanisms which presumably would link the inputs to the outputs. He further 
suggests that research on boards should supplement our knowledge of what boards look 
like with what boards actually do. The conclusion to be reached by the empirical 
inability to consistently demonstrate a strong relationship is likely because the influence 
of the board on performance is not simple and direct, but more likely complex and 
indirect. 
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Corporate boards are assigned an important role in the governance of firms. 
There is growing pressure from investors, regulators, employees, communities, and 
consumers. Often there is a tension between maximizing shareholder value and the 
demands of the firm’s other stakeholders. Similarly, debate heightens regarding the 
board’s effectiveness when the popular press reports governance failures (e.g., Enron, 
see Goldberg, 2002). Critics then analyze board structure and composition in an effort to 
understand the links that allow bad performance to go unaltered. Conversely, good 
performance suggests the governance structure is functioning effectively and the top 
management team gets just rewards for a job well done. It is in the intersection of these 
two paths that the trail becomes murky. There is often very conflicting information that 
emerges when research on firms and boards is aggregated. While it is relatively easy to 
identify a board packed with cronies of the CEO in a single firm, it is a much more 
difficult task to attempt this over a broader range of firms. 
Additionally, research has often used multiple and at times conflicting theoretical 
bases that investigate the board / firm relationship. Agency theorists emphasize the role 
of the board in monitoring the behavior and performance of executives (Fama & Jensen, 
1983b; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Resource dependence theorists (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978) view boards through their member networks with other organizations, which 
assist the firm in obtaining key resources such as capital or influential contacts. Legal 
scholars focus on the role of the board in fulfilling its responsibilities as the overseer 
representing shareholders. Other scholars argue that the board must provide the firm 
with leadership to ensure improvements in firm effectiveness and provide strategic 
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advice to promote the company’s reputation externally (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). 
Social class theorists have focused on managerial elites and board interlocks (Mizruchi 
& Stearns, 1988; Useem & Karabel, 1986). Yet, directors often see themselves 
differently. Korn / Ferry, in their annual survey of corporate directors (1996) found 
differences in role expectations between inside and outside directors and differences in 
their degree of attention to shareholder interests. Insiders saw themselves as responsible 
to the board while outside directors felt more beholden to the firm’s investors. 
Therefore, not only do researchers differ as to director responsibilities and obligations, 
but so do the directors themselves. 
Director Roles and Responsibilities 
In a review of board research, Johnson et al. (1996) developed a typology of 
director responsibilities consisting of three roles: (1) control - which entails directors 
monitoring managers as fiduciaries of stockholders, hiring and firing executives and 
determining executive pay; (2) service- involves advising executives on administrative 
and other managerial issues as well as actively initiating and formulating strategy; and 
(3) resource dependence- which views the board as facilitating the acquisition of 
resources critical to firm success. The following briefly summarizes these roles. 
The Control Role. The control role has received the largest relative volume of 
scrutiny from researchers. Since Berle and Means (1932) first discussed the separation 
between ownership and control, scholars have been interested in the relationship 
between owners and managers. However, for directors to exert the control responsibility 
they must be separate from management influence. The issue then involves director 
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independence and the degree to which the director is obligated and beholden to the CEO. 
Director independence research has relied largely on classifying directors based on 
affiliation such as insider, outsider or gray. Insiders serving on the board are questioned 
regarding their effectiveness as directors primarily because of a perceived inability to 
properly monitor firm activities, or in essence their ability to monitor themselves 
(Johnson et al., 1996). However, agency theorists (Fama & Jensen, 1983b) envision a 
limited role for a few insiders by providing to the balance of the board valuable 
information that assists in monitoring the affairs of the firm and the CEO. Without such 
insider information outside directors are disadvantaged due to the information 
asymmetry of the CEO. 
Outside directors are believed to be the most effective monitors of firm 
management, but research suggests that their independence from influence remains 
questioned. Those with personal or professional affiliations to the CEO (commonly 
referred to as gray) are suspected of being less effective than those without such 
relationships (Davis, 1991). Another proxy for independence is whether the outside 
director was hired during the tenure of the current CEO, which might engender social 
exchange and feelings of reciprocity (Wade, O'Reilly, & Chandratat, 1990). Kesner 
(1987) reported a positive relationship between the proportion of outsiders and firm 
performance while others concluded that no such relationship existed (Daily & Dalton, 
1995). An opposite relationship was found by Pearce and Zahra (1992) when they 
concluded that poor performance leads to more stringent oversight, as outsiders were 
added during periods of poor performance. However, Boeker (1992) identified that in 
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poorly performing firms powerful CEOs were not dismissed and Boeker and Goodstein 
(1993) found that firms with more insiders were less likely to elect outsider CEO 
replacements thereby leading to the notion that insiders attempt to resist change. Another 
force in the control role is the institutional investor who represent over 50% of the 
outstanding shares in the U.S. (Useem, 1993). Activism on their part has lead to more 
reform-minded boards aimed at improving the monitoring of management. In sum, there 
does not seem to be any assurance that an independent director would be an effective 
director and vice versa.  
The Service Role. Support for the service role comes primarily from accounts of 
directors and managers that a key role of the board is to give advice and counsel to the 
CEO (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). Agency theorists (Fama & Jensen, 1983a) argue that it 
is precisely because directors are experts that allow them to effectively evaluate 
management proposals. Several studies have supported this argument (Lorsch & 
MacIver, 1989; Mace, 1971), concluding that directors are actively involved in the 
advice and counsel role with a trend towards involvement in strategy formulation. Davis 
(1991) and Mizruchi and Stearns (1988) reported that diffusion of interlocking 
directorates affected director decisions. Additionally, Judge and Zeithaml (1992) found 
that board involvement in the strategic decision process was positively related to firm 
performance. Moreover, Pearce and Zahra (1992), based on survey data, found that more 
powerful boards, especially participative ones, outperformed weaker boards. It does 
appear that boards impact the strategic management process through their review of 
strategic initiatives and even in some cases, strategy formulation. 
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The Resource Dependence Role. The resource dependence perspective views 
the board as a means of securing access to resources critical to firm success. In this role 
directors secure resources through linkages to the external environment. Resource 
dependence theorists (Pfeffer & Salancik., 1978) suggest that corporate boards are a 
mechanism for managing external dependencies and reducing environmental 
uncertainty. Studies of directors serving in a resource role examined relationships with 
capital providers (Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988), competitor interlocks (Zajac, 1988), 
affiliated vs. non-affiliated outsiders and board size (Westphal, 1998), bankruptcy filings 
(Daily & Dalton, 1994a) and several notions of board interlocks (Lang & Lockhart, 
1990). A common thread in this perspective is director network affiliation. Ceteris 
paribus, those individuals with relatively more prestigious and influential networks will 
be in higher demand for board positions than those with lesser networks. The resource 
dependence role allows for two distinct perspectives regarding outside director impact 
on the firm: (1) the director assists the firm in meeting its current or projected resource 
needs; and (2) the director, by virtue of the resources that he or she possesses, may be in 
a position to subtly alter the firm’s strategic direction.  
Overall, there is strong support for this perspective. Directors can and do add 
resources that firms consider important to their success. While it might seem that firms 
must then accordingly find and secure as many directors as possible, results of this are 
additionally equivocal. Pfeffer (1972) found that firms with greater external needs 
generally had larger boards. The larger board size arguably allowed for additional 
expertise to co-opt resources and reduce uncertainty. However, a meta-analytic review 
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(Dalton et al., 1999) found no consistent relationship between board size and firm 
performance. Moreover, it has been shown that co-optation strategies work both ways 
(Pfeffer, 1972). For example, a director who represents a bank or a law firm might be 
more inclined to recommend business that benefits their respective professions or 
companies than others. Thus, while directors can be a significant influence for the firm 
in reducing external uncertainty, there is also the possibility that serving as an outside 
director might fulfill their own personal needs and interests. 
Recent Attempts at Identifying Board Influence 
In the last few years there have been two more significant attempts aimed at the 
elusive board vs. firm outcome relationship. In 1998, Dalton et al. performed a meta -
analysis when they assembled all the studies dealing with board composition, board 
leadership structure, and firm performance. Two prior extensive studies were unable to 
identify significant or consistent relationships (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1995; Zahra & 
Pearce, 1989) and mixed results were the norm in the literature. The Dalton et al. (1998) 
study found no consistent relationships of a meaningful nature and additionally, by using 
subgroup moderators such as firm size, found no evidence of moderating influences.  
Another study (Bhagat & Black, 1999) examined the growing trend of supra-
majority independent boards- those with few insiders and dominated by nonaffiliated 
outsiders. Interestingly, firms with supra majority boards (mostly nonaffiliated outsiders) 
performed worse that those with a few insiders. The study did not control for industry, 
firm life cycle, or the context of board turnover. However, this study is intriguing 
because its results contradicts the current sentiment of institutional investors and the 
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popular press to install as many outsiders as possible on the board. The average firm in 
1997 had 80% outside directors, but this study reminds us that this trend may go too far. 
Dalton et al. (1998) conclude their meta-analysis of board composition and 
leadership structure by stating that they are not optimistic further research in the general 
area of board composition / leadership structure and firm performance would be fruitful. 
Nor do they feel that further investigations into moderating influences would be 
worthwhile. While the overall results of these studies are mixed and inconclusive, the 
area remains a favored topic. Researchers have been called to extend upper echelon 
theory to the board in an effort to provide a finer grained analysis of this complex and 
dynamic association (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). 
The Outside Director 
Outside directors, or non-executive directors, are believed to be more effective 
monitors of the CEO and the firm on behalf of the shareholders, because they are 
perceived as more independent. Outside directors with personal or professional 
relationships with the firm or its management may be less effective than those without 
such relationships (Johnson et al., 1996). The Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) has categorized the definition of an affiliated director as one who meets any of six 
criteria, and if so, requires disclosure in proxy statements. Additionally, beginning in the 
1960’s, both the New York and the American Stock Exchanges have required that all 
listed firms have a minimum of two outside board members. It has also become common 
practice in the United States and a requirement of the New York Stock Exchange 
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(NYSE) that the audit committee of the board be comprised of outsiders only, with the 
intention of reducing the influence of management.  
Daily and Schwenk (1996) speak of a board dominance configuration, which 
links the preponderance of insiders or outsiders to the strategic focus of the firm. In this 
model varying roles of the CEO, board chair, and top management team are mixed in 
order to provide the best fit with the organization’s environment. For example, large 
institutional holders might prefer that two different people hold the board chair and the 
CEO title. This, in their opinion, would maximize the board’s oversight role. An insider-
dominated board might be thought of as a homogeneous top management team while an 
outsider-dominated board would be the functional equivalent of a heterogeneous top 
management team (Daily & Schwenk, 1996). Studies of board dominance structure and 
its relationship to performance have been highly inconsistent. Some have reported that 
outsider-dominated boards are poorer performers (Vance, 1978), some have reported 
that outsider-dominated boards are better performers (Kesner, Victor, & Lamont, 1986) 
and one study reported no evidence of any systematic relationship between board 
composition and corporate financial performance (Chaganti, Mahajan, & Sharma, 1985). 
Some research has argued that the existence of social ties between the CEO and 
outside directors might diminish the effectiveness of directors by limiting their control 
over management in the decision making process. However, Westphal (1998) found the 
opposite conclusion is also possible. His study argued that social relationships actually 
increase involvement by encouraging collaboration between top managers and outside 
directors in strategic decision-making. The argument was that CEO-board collaboration 
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and control are independently and positively related to subsequent firm performance. 
Social ties between the CEO and outside directors can therefore be beneficial to effective 
firm performance through the collaboration and bonding that occurs. This effectiveness 
link should remain in place as long as the social connection remains effective or is 
broken through turnover. 
Additional research has investigated the outside director who is also a CEO of 
another firm. This may play a pivotal role in whether the board adapts a passive or active 
orientation (Westphal & Zajac, 1997). Through norms of reciprocity, these dual CEO / 
board members represent a social psychological barrier that hampers board 
independence. This implies a social obligation and empathetic attitude by the director. 
The CEO-director network is an arena likely to be characterized by generalized 
reciprocity among top managers and CEO-directors. Given that corporate CEO’s are a 
relatively homogeneous group (Useem, 1984) the CEO-director may have a tendency to 
support fellow CEOs in times of turbulence or strife.  
The next two sections describe two distinct forms of individual capital, human 
and social. Note that this study utilizes capital in the sense of an investment of resources, 
which will have an expected payoff. This payoff may come in various ways. One may 
reap the rewards of investments for a personal sense of accomplishment (e.g. investment 
in training to win an Olympic gold medal) or such an investment may be put to use in 
order to obtain additional payoffs (e.g. leveraging a gold medal into future opportunities) 
Thus, an individual’s capital is called upon for different reasons (Lin, 2001b). In the first 
sense, resources are being accumulated, produced, or altered as an investment for the 
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future (human capital) while in the second sense, these altered resources are offered for 
gain (social capital).  
Human Capital 
Human capital theory is based on the concept that people possess skills, 
experience, and knowledge that can be viewed as a form of capital (Flamholtz & Lacey, 
1981). The term human capital appeared in a 1961 American Economic Review article 
”Investment in Human Capital,” by Nobel Prize-winning economist Theodore W. 
Schultz. This focused on individual productive efforts and worker quality. However, the 
influence of human capital, even though not termed as such, dates back to at least the 
18th century and the writings of Adam Smith. In his popular work, Wealth of Nations 
(1776), Smith wrote at length about the influence of a worker’s knowledge, skills, and 
quality of output in the production process. For example, he wrote that for the 
determination of a worker’s wage one needs to consider education and learning as an 
investment. He therefore argued that higher earnings of skilled workers were justified 
because of these investments. 
The concept of human capital has gained prominence in recent years. Thompson 
(1967) describes how the human variable affected organizational actions while 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) put managers into a wider role with their discussion 
regarding the upper echelons. Therefore, the capital that resides in humans has taken on 
a heightened importance and is regarded as a critical ingredient in not only firm level 
success, but also individual-level success. The notion that humans possess capital has 
important implications for firms and individuals. For the firm, recruiting and retaining 
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individuals who possess high levels of human capital may serve as a source of 
competitive advantage. For the individual, accumulation of high levels of human capital 
can be a source of mobility and career advancement.  
The Contributions of Becker 
Various empirical studies during the 1960’s identified eight phenomena that 
either baffled investigators for lack of a theoretical foundation or were given ad-hoc 
interpretations. These were the following: (1) Earnings typically increase with age at a 
decreasing rate. (2) Unemployment rates tend to be inversely related to the level of skill. 
(3) Firms in underdeveloped countries appear to be more paternalistic toward employees 
than those in developed countries. (4) Younger persons change jobs more frequently and 
receive more schooling and on-the-job-training than older persons do. (5) The 
distribution of earnings is positively skewed, especially among professional and other 
skilled workers. (6) Abler persons receive more education and other kinds of training 
than others. (7) The division of labor is limited by the extent of the market. (8) The 
typical investor in human capital is more impetuous and thus more likely to err than is 
the typical investor in tangible capital (Becker, 1993: p.30). From these observations, 
Becker sought to formulate a theoretical argument. He summarized his thoughts in 
discussions regarding on-the-job-training, schooling, information, and health.  
It is common knowledge that workers attempt to improve their productivity by 
learning new skills and perfecting old ones while on the job. Becker’s thoughts on this 
are split in two general arenas: general training and specific training. General training is 
useful in many organizations beyond those who provide the training. For example, a 
  24   
  
doctor trained at one hospital will likely find his or her skills applicable to a wide range 
of other hospitals. While the marginal benefit of on-the-job-training improves the 
worker, it also presumably improves the marginal output of the firm. This assumed that 
the costs of general training are borne by the employee as they receive less in wages than 
available elsewhere during their training. The military establishment is a classic 
example. “Employees” are paid below market for the skills that are developed and 
“graduates” leave the organization in large numbers as their training is completed and 
their skills arguably reach their highest level. Firms are willing to provide general 
training as long as the benefit is at least as great as the cost of providing the training 
(Becker, 1993, p.34). 
However, completely specific training results in skills obtained by the employee 
that are virtually useless in another firm. In actuality, most on-the-job-training is neither 
completely specific nor completely general. As in the military example above, training 
in machining technology would have broad applications in the private sector. However, 
training dedicated to missile launching might find less broad applications in a non-
military environment. The willingness of workers or firms to undergo specific training 
depends closely upon the employee’s likelihood of turnover. As investment in specific 
training is lost when an employee leaves for any reason, it is logical to conclude that 
only those employees who the firm finds likely to continue employment will receive 
such training. Rational firms will pay employees who have received general training 
similar wages, but those employees who have received specific training will likely 
receive higher wages. 
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Schooling receives special mention in Becker’s work, as returns to education 
were an initial focus of his research efforts. A school is an institution specializing in the 
production of training. Some schools, like those that train welders, specialize in one area, 
while others, such as universities, offer a wide and diverse curriculum. Additionally, the 
type of training to be learned is dependent upon the type of knowledge that is to be 
mastered. For example, it is still commonplace for those in the construction industry to 
gain learning from on-the-job-training. In contrast, a scientist requires immersion in an 
intense field of study for a prolonged period. An additional consideration for schooling 
is the wage differential and cost. Schooling has direct and indirect costs. Direct costs 
such as tuition and books are only a portion of the real cost. Indirect costs such as 
foregone wages and lower on-the-job experience must also be considered. The impact of 
participating in schooling would steepen the age-earnings profile, introduce a negative 
relation between the permanent and current earnings of young persons, and implicitly 
provide for depreciation of invested human capital (Becker, 1993).  
Information is another way in which individuals are able to raise their potential. 
Becker envisions information gathering as an investment that potentially affects the 
returns to individual capital. By investing the time and resources to gather information 
individuals are able to improve their knowledge. Take for instance job hunting. A 
worker in search of new employment might invest in a recruiting firm, search the 
classified ads, or visit a potential employer. The point is that the attempt to gain this 
information is not without a cost. These expenditures constitute an investment with the 
hope of yielding a return.  
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Becker’s last way to invest in human capital is through improving emotional and 
physical health. A better diet improves strength and stamina, thereby improving earnings 
potential. Such workers have the capability to be more productive. This assumes that the 
productivity of a worker is dependent upon not only their ability and skill but also their 
motivation, intensity, and desire. 
What Is Human Capital? 
Human capital encompasses both innate abilities and acquired skills (Maman, 
2000). The former includes genetic differences affecting intelligence, health, and 
interpersonal attractiveness, while the latter includes education, job training, tenure, and 
work experience (Shanahan & Tuma, 1994). Much of the past research on human capital 
is the result of an attempt to explain the differences in income and productivity between 
individuals. Expenditures on education, training and health are seen as investments from 
which returns are expected to flow in the form of increased productivity and earnings in 
the future. There has been a consistent and strong correlation between education and 
earnings (Becker, 1993). The theory also attempts to explain why individuals choose to 
invest in themselves and how such investments affect their potential. Theory has also 
been extended from the individual to the firm. This allows researchers to predict 
differences in firm performance and firm growth rates as a function of the human capital 
of organizational participants. 
Understanding the Components of Human Capital 
Davenport (1999) depicts human capital by analyzing what he terms as its key 
elements: ability, behavior, effort and time.  
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Ability in his model means proficiency in a set of activities or forms of work, 
which comprises three components. The first is knowledge, defined as a command of a 
body of facts required to do a job. Knowledge is a broader concept than skill as it 
represents the intellectual context within which a person performs. Second, to become a 
successful corporate executive requires a specific skill in the business. However, that 
same individual must also compliment his or her skills with a general knowledge of the 
other business functions such as management, marketing, engineering, and accounting. 
Skill then is the means and methods of accomplishing a particular task. Skills may range 
from physical strength and dexterity to specialized learning. Most executives have 
acquired the ability to analyze financial statements and accurately assess the firm’s 
abilities to undertake declared goals and objectives. And third, besides knowledge and 
skill an individual must possess the talent to put the two together. Talent is an inborn 
faculty for performing a specific task. The executive must exhibit a talent for not only 
understanding a firm’s competitive advantage, but must also have the talent to 
communicate a vision and follow through to achieve desired results. 
The second component of Davenport’s model is behavior. Behavior is described 
as observable ways of acting that contributes to the accomplishment of a task. This 
combines inherent and acquired responses to situations and situational stimuli. The way 
we behave indicates our ethics, beliefs, and reactions to the world in which we live. An 
executive who displays confidence and achieves objectives is exhibiting behavior 
employees consider relevant to the organization. 
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The third component is effort, which is the conscious application of mental and 
physical resources toward a particular end. Effort is the epitome of work ethic. Effort 
activates skill, knowledge, and talent through behavior to call forth the individual’s 
investment in human capital. Without effort, the investment in human capital has no 
meaningful contribution. 
Lastly, human capital requires the context of time. Time refers to the 
chronological element of human capital investment as in hours per day, years in a career, 
or any unit in between. The most talented, skilled, knowledgeable, and dedicated 
executive will produce little without investing time into the endeavor.  
Therefore, the combination of ability, behavior, effort, and time produce 
performance, which is the result of personal investment. The elements described are 
displayed below in Figure 1, reproduced from Davenport (1999: p19). 
 
Fig 1   Human Capital Process 
         
 Ability        
 Knowledge        
 Skill + Behavior  X Effort X Time 
 Talent        
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A point worth noting is that without corresponding effort and time, the 
investment in ability, knowledge, skill, and talent are worthless. This is important in 
considering those individuals who join outside boards as certain human capital assets 
require different investments from the individual in order to be mobilized for 
directorship seats.  
Human Capital and Corporate Executives 
Human capital of a manager derives from their experience, education, and tenure 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). Additionally, leveraging this into individual advantage 
requires investing their effort and time. For example, the best education, intelligence, 
and training will allow an executive to progress only so far.  
Most past research that considered human capital and executives focused on 
compensation. Human capital becomes important in pay issues to the extent that it is 
recognized and valued within the firm. Research on human capital and compensation, 
however indicates little evidence of a strong correlation.  Finkelstein and Hambrick 
(1989) found some evidence that general managerial skills were linked to  compensation 
while Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) found a significant relation between job related 
experience and pay. Additionally, Fisher and Govindarajan (1992) reported that years of 
education were important in the consideration of compensation for business unit heads. 
However, human capital endowments are important to the sorting of positions in 
corporations (Leonard, 1990). This finding is evidence that individuals are slotted into 
the corporate hierarchy according to human capital attributes, which then purportedly 
manifests itself into performance. While human capital attributes are important to 
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obtaining positions within the corporate hierarchy, there is a dearth of work offered 
whether this same sorting of executives and attributes might be important in obtaining 
outside directorships. 
In sum, human capital is created by changes in persons that bring about skills and 
capabilities that make them able to act in new ways (Coleman, 1988). For human capital, 
the person who invests the time and resources in building up this capital will likely reap 
at least some benefits. 
Social Capital 
A human capital explanation for individual accomplishment rests upon the notion 
of differences in individual ability, knowledge, skill or talent. In the past, this 
explanation is a way to differentiate between those who succeed and those who do not. 
For example, versus others in the firm, those executives who make it to the upper 
echelons might be considered smarter, better educated or more experienced. However, 
Burt (1997:p.339) argues that while “human capital is surely necessary to success, it is 
useless without the social capital of opportunities in which to apply it”. Burt (1997) 
further argues that it is possible to distinguish human capital from social capital in both 
its etiology and its consequences.  
With respect to its origin, social capital is a quality created between people 
whereas human capital is a quality of the individual (Burt, 1997). As the term capital 
implies, social capital is a resource, available and at the disposal of the individual. Like 
other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of 
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certain ends that in its absence would not be possible (Coleman, 1988). It therefore 
comes about through changes in the relations between individuals that facilitate action. 
Differing Research Perspectives 
Social capital is a relatively recent development in theory and research. Most 
attention to the subject arose as a result of sociologists including Bourdieu, Coleman, 
Burt, and Lin (Seibert, Kraimer, & Liden, 2001). Scholars typically examine social 
capital from one of two camps; the individual or the group. Focusing on the individual, 
social capital takes the perspective of how individuals access and use resources 
embedded in social networks to achieve gains. Here social capital is depicted similarly to 
human capital in that the relationship is an investment made by the individual. Studies 
examine how individuals invest in relations and how this investment is mobilized to 
initiate a return. 
Lin (1982) distinguished between personal resources and social resources and 
argued that social resources far outweigh personal resources in usefulness to the person. 
Meanwhile, Flap (1991) contended that social capital includes mobilized social 
resources. He argued that there are three elements of social capital: (1) the number of 
persons within one’s social network who are prepared or obliged to help you when 
called upon to do so; (2) the strength of the relationship indicating readiness to help; and 
(3) the resources of these persons. Burt’s (1992) analysis furthered the concept of 
individualized networks through a discussion of location. Network locations of 
individuals became ways to achieve competitive advantage through structural holes. The 
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person occupying that position gained valuable capital by means of providing 
information and access otherwise unavailable to other participants in the network.  
A perspective of social capital that focuses on group relations seeks to 
understand how groups develop as a collective asset and how this asset, once created, is 
able to affect group members. Bourdieu (1983) argued for the existence of capital in 
three forms: (1) economic capital; (2) cultural capital; and (3) social capital. He 
described social capital as consisting of social obligations or connections and argued that 
its meaningfulness is dependent upon the size of ones connections and the volume or 
amount of capital these connections possess. Therefore, social capital is considered a 
collective asset shared by members of a defined group with clear boundaries, obligations 
and expectations, and mutual recognition. Additionally, Coleman (1990) sees social 
capital as consisting of two elements: (1) as an aspect of a social structure; and (2) as a 
facilitator of actions by individuals within the structure. In order for an individual to gain 
from the relationship, he or she engages in exchanges and transfers of resources. Thus 
for Coleman and Bourdieu, dense or closed networks are the means by which social 
capital is maintained and reproduced.  
While the perspectives seem contradictory, they all share a commitment to the 
view that it is the interaction of individual members that makes social capital possible. 
They additionally share the view that resources are embedded in social relations and 
social structure, which may be mobilized as the individual desires when seeking 
purposeful ends. Like human capital, participation in social relations is an investment, 
which is undertaken as a way to increase the likelihood of success in purposeful action. 
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But unlike human capital, social capital is created by relationships, through which the 
resources of other members may be accessed and borrowed (Lin, 2001a). The notion 
then has two important components: (1) it represents resources embedded in social 
relations rather than individuals; and (2) access and use of such resources resides with 
individuals.  
It is also possible to distinguish human capital from social capital in another way. 
For human capital, the person who invests the time, effort, and resources to accumulate 
these human capital assets is expected to reap the benefits. Those who expend the effort, 
go to the best schools, work the hardest, or seek additional training will achieve a higher 
degree of success than others. However, such is not the case with social capital. Because 
social capital consists of relations among persons, a disruption in these relations affect 
not only one individual who severs ties but also all who had previously associated with 
that individual.  
The Additive Value of Social Capital 
While the premise behind social capital is fairly straightforward (investment in 
social relations with expected returns) and consistent with scholars who have contributed 
to the theory (Bourdieu, 1983; Burt, 1992; Burt, 1997; Coleman, 1988; Flap, 1991; Lin, 
2001ba; Portes, 1998), the lines between human capital and social capital are easily 
blurred. Is it the familial connections (social capital), which lead to an individual’s 
likelihood of becoming a corporate director, or is it the individual’s investment in him or 
her self (human capital)? For instance, it is relatively easy to find examples of persons 
from modest means that through hard work and perseverance achieve phenomenal 
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success, yet we are also able to find persons born into prestigious families who seem 
advantaged largely because of family connections. 
Recent research has generally found four main explanations as to why resources 
accruing from social capital enhance the outcomes of actions beyond that expected from 
human capital (Lin, 2001b). First, the flow of information is facilitated throughout the 
network. Connections located in certain spots in the network are better informed and 
able to provide useful information. This information flow is able to reduce the 
transaction costs for the individual by virtue of easier access thereby leveraging the 
potential of other human capital resources. 
Second, social capital and its associated ties are able to provide influence over 
members or other actors who play a role in important decisions. Some ties in the social 
capital network are able to provide strategically more important influence than others 
(Burt, 1992). Such influence is able to not only empower holders of social capital but 
will also serve to constrain their behavior through norms and sanctions emanating from 
the association. 
Third, an individual’s ability to call upon social capital resources provides the 
person with a set of social credentials, which reflect an ability to access a certain 
network. The credentialing that comes from social capital allows the individual to 
present him or her with resources beyond their individual ability to muster. The social 
capital network is “standing behind” the person, which serves to reassure relevant 
audiences of the person’s capability to add resources beyond their immediate human 
capital. 
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Fourth, social capital is expected to reinforce the person’s identity and 
recognition. Being able to call upon social capital provides both emotional support and 
public acknowledgement of ones capabilities. By virtue of access to social capital, one is 
able to lay claim to certain resources unavailable to others. 
Analyzing Social Capital 
Social capital has been previously defined as resources embedded in a social 
structure that are accessed and or mobilized in purposeful action (Lin, 1982). This 
definition provides for three distinct phases: (1) resources are embedded in a social 
structure; (2) social resources are accessible by individuals; and (3) resources are used or 
mobilized in the pursuit of purposeful action. However, this seemingly straightforward 
list masks some of social capital’s more controversial subjects. 
The divergence of analyzing social capital at both the group and individual levels 
has created theoretical and methodological confusion (Lin, 2001a). For example, 
Bourdieu (1983) aggregates group size to determine the amount of social capital 
available to its members which makes sense only if one assumes that all members share 
similar ties in the network. Yet Bourdieu, in the same study, describes how individuals 
interact and reinforce mutual recognition in purposeful action. Coleman (1990), while 
emphasizing how individuals use resources to obtain favorable outcomes, also devotes 
discussion to the collective nature of social capital through norms, sanctions, and trust. 
Some of the more revealing controversies surrounding social capital theory are 
summarized by Lin (2001: p.26) and are presented in Appendix E, Table 1. 
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The first controversy deals with whether social capital is a collective or 
individual good. It appears that most scholars agree it is both; that is, institutionalized 
social relations with embedded resources are expected to benefit both the collective and 
the individual. The difficulty seems to arise when social capital is examined in context 
with trust, norms, sanctions, or other collective resources.  
The issue surrounding the type of network is whether the network should be open 
or closed. Bourdieu (1983) sees the network engaging in mutual recognition and 
protection and Coleman (1990) additionally views network closure as a distinct 
advantage in enhancing social capital. However, to argue that closure is most 
advantageous is a narrow and potentially misleading approach. Much work has shown 
the benefits of open networks in facilitating information and influence (Burt, 1992; 
Granovetter, 1973). A blend of the two appears most relevant depending upon the 
circumstance of the network or the individual. For preserving or maintaining resources 
regarding interpersonal influence over decisions, a denser network might be the most 
advantageous, while if the objective were to search for and obtain resources, then an 
open network would be preferable.  
The third controversy deals with Coleman’s assertion (1990) that social capital is 
defined by its function and it is not a single entity but a variety of different entities 
having different characteristics. This functional view is why Lin (2001) characterizes the 
statement as tautological. The potential cause of social capital can only be captured by 
its effect. Whether it is an investment depends upon the return for a specific individual in 
a specific action. This should not argue that a functional relationship does not exist in 
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social capital, for example, social networks embedded in resources enhance job 
opportunities, but the concepts become murky when not segregated. 
Coleman (1990) additionally questions whether social capital will become a 
useful quantifiable and verifiable theory. To become viable, researchers must be able to 
distinguish cause from effect or the theory would lose parsimony and predictability 
quickly. 
While the potential for investigating various treatments of social capital is 
problematic, I follow the research of Lin (2001a) and investigate social capital as the 
private good of an individual. Lin redefines social capital by arguing for individual 
treatment. He argues that social capital is best described as an investment in social 
relations. Therefore, individuals gain access to embedded resources, which enhance 
expected returns of instrumental or expressive actions.  
Social Capital and Corporate Executives 
The basic argument of social capital and corporate executives revolves around a 
core principle: individual social capital may be utilized to secure better positions. While 
I have discussed the notion that human capital is important in sorting people into 
hierarchical positions, this study argues that social capital is used to obtain the most 
prestigious positions. Individual social capital is most valuable to the uppermost levels in 
the organization because social capital expands interactions with the external 
environment, links to powerful influences, and channels to key information resources 
(Erickson, 2001). 
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Parsing of social capital assets from other individual level assets has proven 
difficult for researchers. While the use of social capital assets is accepted as influential in 
obtaining employment (Granovetter, 1995), how this affects executives in particular has 
undergone little treatment. Recent research identified the relevance of integrating social 
capital theory with research on careers (Seibert et al., 2001) through emphasizing 
network structures as a way for individuals to access information, additional resources, 
and career sponsorship.  
I examine in detail two linkages between corporate executives and social capital. 
Interlocking directorate studies focus on how social assets facilitate the diffusion of 
corporate policies and structures such as: poison pills (Davis, 1991); charitable donations 
(Galaskiewicz & Burt, 1991); and multidivisional structures (Palmer, Jennings, & Zhou, 
1993). However, this research mainly focuses on firm outcomes rather than the 
individual antecedents and how interlocks form in the first place. Additionally, executive 
prestige (status bestowal beyond hierarchical title) is a social capital asset, which may be 
leveraged to an individual’s advantage (D'Aveni & Kesner, 1993). Prestige is formed 
through affiliation with a prestigious institution or other such relation. 
Interlocking Directorates as a Source of Social Capital. Director interlocks 
have received a great deal of attention. Early work focused on their anticompetitive 
potential as an instrument of communications between competitors. Attempts to address 
interlocking behavior resulted in passage of the Clayton Act Section 8 (1914), which 
prohibits interlocks among competitor firms. As a result, a sharp decline in the number 
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of competing interest interlocks was observed in the years following the act’s passage 
(Herman, 1981).  
Director interlocks are classified as either direct or indirect. A direct interlock 
occurs between two companies when a single individual is on the board of both. An 
indirect interlock exists when two directors of two different firms both sit on the board 
of a third firm. In an indirect interlock the director meets only with the other indirect 
director whereas in a direct interlock a director meets with the entire board. A special 
case of interlocks is one that includes the officers of corporations. Whether direct or 
indirect, officer interlocks are likely to be more significant in terms of benefits to the 
firm or the individuals than those interlocks mediated by outside directors who are not 
officers of other corporations. An officer interlock means a more direct connection 
between the powerful interests in the two firms. 
Studying director interlocks has produced ambiguous results. Their effects have 
been studied as a way for firms to: cooperate and collude (Burt, 1983; Koenig, Gogel & 
Sonquist, 1979); reduce dependencies or control others (Mizruchi & Stearns, 1994; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978); promote upper class cohesion or enhance personal careers 
(Zajac, 1988); promote legitimacy (Selznick, 1957); or become a source of information 
about business practices (Davis, 1991; Useem, 1984) (for a complete overview see 
Mizruchi, 1996). More germane to the present study is the influence potential of 
interlocks at the individual level. 
 Zajac’s (1988) analysis argued that interlocks, as an interorganizational strategy 
to improve firm performance, are not supportable. Moreover, he suggested that previous 
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work had obscured rather than illuminated the potential of interlocking ties because of 
misspecification. He went on to suggest two viable explanations: (1) class alliance in 
which board members use interlocks to further their elite class interests; or (2) as a way 
for personal advancement. In a personal advancement model the individual desires the 
rewards of interlocks such as economic advantages, furthering ones career, and a desire 
for prestige (Zajac, 1988). In this way the corporate officer enriches his or her social 
capital asset stock as a result of membership in corporate boards. 
Executive Prestige as a Social Capital Asset. Prestige has been used in the 
sociological literature to represent both the status of structural affiliations (e.g. Harvard, 
Chairman of the Board) and the status of individuals (e.g., being a Rockefeller) (Lin, 
2001b). A socially regarded structural position bestows upon an individual prestige by 
his or her association in that high status group. Social capital theory assumes that an 
uneven distribution of resources will flow to those considered prestigious, of high status, 
or of high reputation. An occupant in a position of high standing with respect to one 
resource is also likely to occupy a relatively high position with respect to other resources 
(Lin, 2001a). 
Previously, I discussed that actors access social capital through interactions to 
promote purposeful actions. Thus, an actor when motivated for action seeks two paths, 
gaining resources and maintaining resources. Attendance at a prestigious university, 
arguably, does not substantially add human capital to an individual beyond that 
obtainable from a slightly lesser considered institution. However, both perceived and 
direct access to the social resources from a prestigious affiliation likely expands relations 
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in elite circles. Additionally, promotion to the upper echelons widens the circle of 
potential relations from which the individual is able to draw. An important source of 
prestige is the ability of the individual to influence other’s perceptions of his or her 
influence. In this way, association with prestigious individuals serves to legitimize 
(Meyer, Scott, & Deal, 1983) those who associate with the individual. Preferred partners 
for interactions are those occupying slightly higher social status (Laumann, 1966) and 
those in possession of prestigious credentials are sought out for association. 
D’Aveni (1990: p.121), who defines prestige as the “property of having status”, 
argues that prestige helps to maintain an illusion of competence and control through 
influencing interpersonal reactions to the individual. Moreover, D’Aveni and Kesner 
(1993) suggest that prestigious individuals are viewed as competent, credible, and 
trustworthy. Being prestigious then is a multidimensional construct, which is generally 
associated with membership in some elite network. While human capital describes ways 
in which actors position themselves (e.g. acquiring education), social capital describes 
the way in which human capital is mobilized for action. Prestige is a way for actors to 
present themselves as those with whom it would be rewarding to associate (Homans, 
1958). The reciprocity nature of prestige likely serves the interest of both parties as those 
who associate with prestigious individuals seek to gain prestige from that association for 
themselves (Lin, 2001b). 
Research on social capital and managerial elites investigating board composition 
depicts a capitalist class emerging from the interactions amongst directors (Useem, 
1984). A class hegemony approach assumes that only the most influential and 
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prestigious individuals are invited to sit on boards (Mills, 1958; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
Through exclusion of lesser-prestigious individuals, the dominant class is perpetuated. 
Being considered prestigious and inclusion into a corporate board is a way of 
establishing and maintaining contact with other influential persons (Mariolis & Jones, 
1982). Inclusion into a web of corporate boards provides intangible rewards and prestige 
important to those in the business elite (Davis, 1993; Mizruchi, 1983). Membership in 
the managerial elite is an indication of success and implies that the person is someone 
with whom it would be rewarding to associate (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). 
Therefore, elites who associate with poorly performing firms may threaten their own 
position. This idea is consistent with Fama and Jensen (1983b) who argued that a 
primary motivation of directors was to protect and build their reputations. 
Prestige as a mechanism for accumulating social capital is also consistent with 
the resource dependence perspective given that prestige provides the individual with 
power (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Thompson, 1967). At the firm level, Thompson (1967) 
argued that increased levels of power enable firms to negotiate terms that are more 
favorable with key organizational constituents such as suppliers and customers. In fact, 
Thompson (1967: 33) suggests, “acquiring prestige is the ‘cheapest’ way of acquiring 
power.” Moreover, at an individual level, prestigious managers are better able to attract 
personnel, suppliers, and customers (Perrow, 1961; see alsoSchoorman, Bazerman, & 
Atkin, 1981). 
In sum, prestige at an individual level depicts the person as someone who is 
desirable in interactions. As well, individuals gain a halo effect by association with 
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prestigious structural affiliations, such as attendance at the best universities or 
acceptance into the corporate elite of the most highly valued corporations. 
Summary 
The relationship and differences between human capital and social capital 
theories, especially in the context of corporate executives, is theoretically important. 
Certain scholars (Bourdieu, 1983; Coleman, 1988) have proposed that social capital 
assists in the production of human capital. A wealth of family connections and social ties 
enhances the opportunities for individuals to obtain better education, training, skills and 
knowledge credentials. Alternatively, it is also clear that human capital assists in the 
acquisition of social capital. Better-educated, better-trained, and more skilled individuals 
tend to move in social circles that are rich in improved social resources. The intriguing 
question then becomes which one is more important. 
Several studies find that social capital is more important than human capital (Lin, 
Ensel, & Vaughn, 1981; Marsden & Hurlbert, 1988) while others show the opposite (De 
Graaf & Flap, 1988). These studies have examined different stages of industrialization 
and education systems with no clear results. Contrasting explanations from different 
contexts still are unresolved. 
Another intriguing situation is the potential interaction effects between human 
capital and social capital. Boxman, De Graaf, and Flap (1991) found that human capital 
had its greatest effect on income when social capital was high. In a further study of the 
same Dutch managers, Flap and Boxman (1998) found that for top managers, social 
capital leads to higher income at all levels of human capital, but the returns on human 
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capital decrease at higher levels of social capital. This appears to suggest that human 
capital supplements social capital in status attainment. Therefore, when social capital is 
high, resultant status is high, regardless of human capital attainment; and when social 
capital is low, human capital exerts a stronger influence on status attainment. However, 
it is conceivable that given certain minimal levels of both human capital and social 
capital, social capital would be the more important factor in accounting for status 
attainment (Lin, 2001b). 
Human capital is resources in the possession of an individual who can make 
decisions about their usage and disposition. Alternatively, social capital is resources 
attached to other actors, and interactions with these others allows for the possibility that 
their resources may be borrowed. Borrowed resources must be returned, replaced, or 
reciprocated. Additionally, human capital is accumulated by actions of the individual. 
Each action taken generates an amount of human capital that is subsequently available 
for use. 
Meanwhile, social capital is generated by creating and maintaining social ties. 
The extent of access to social capital depends upon what resources are at the disposal of 
the network ties and network members willingness to share those resources. As the pool 
of social ties expands, the potential for additional social capital expands as well. Thus, 
by networking, access to resources is able to grow rapidly. 
Identifying the effects that human capital and social capital have on the ability of 
corporate executives to secure outside directorships is the heart of this study. On the one 
hand, successful investments in human capital assets are important way for executives to 
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secure their position in the corporate upper echelon (Leonard, 1990). However, on the 
other hand, there is wide and observable differences between individuals in the corporate 
upper echelon, especially in the context of those who accept outside directorships and 
those that do not. Legally directors are chosen when incumbent directors nominate a 
director who is then elected by the firm’s shareholders. Practically however, selecting 
directors oftentimes is left to the CEO (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). It is generally 
acknowledged in directorship research that the fastest way to obtain an outside 
directorship is through social network contacts with powerful influences at that firm 
(Davis, 1993; Zajac & Westphal, 1996). While research finds strong support for this 
conclusion, how executives are placed in the potential pool and subsequently chosen 
remains largely unexplored. 
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CHAPTER III 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS BUILDING 
As noted earlier, I use human capital and social capital theories to develop a 
model of outside director service on boards. I selected social capital theory, because an 
overwhelmingly prominent view in the literature is that CEOs dominate boards of 
directors, and that they use a social mechanism to do so (Johnson et al., 1996). The 
social capital lens will help us to understand what individual outside directors gain in 
this exchange relationship, i.e. the accumulation and mobilization of social capital assets. 
I selected human capital theory because it helps us to understand why outside directors, 
as individuals, make some of the decisions they do regarding their investment in human 
capital assets. It is important to set the context for the model – the corporate board 
setting and the probable motivations of those involved in boards.  
From the corporation’s standpoint, there are three overarching objectives in the 
selection of outside directors. First, the board serves as a reflection of the corporation to 
outside observers. Therefore, all else equal, corporations will select those individuals 
with the highest visibility, best reputations, and most prestige as outside directors 
(Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). Second, those in powerful positions in the firm are 
concerned about establishing and/or maintaining a social exchange relationship with 
outside directors, and will strive to select directors that facilitate this process (Westphal 
& Zajac, 1995). Third, directors provide important resources to the firm. (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). Well-connected individuals and those with the ability to reduce 
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important uncertainties or provide important resources to the firm will be preferred to 
those with fewer such contacts or capabilities (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000).  
From the outside director’s standpoint, there are similar overarching objectives. 
First, directors are concerned with their external visibility and reputations (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983b). Therefore, individuals provided with several opportunities to serve as 
outside directors will select those with the highest visibility and prestige, as this will 
further their own reputations and careers. Second, directors are also concerned about the 
social exchanges deriving from their board service, and they are likely to look for 
opportunities where they feel comfortable and at ease. It is important to remember that 
directorships are voluntary in the sense that an individual director can both refuse an 
opportunity to join a board or and resign from a board if desired. Due to data availability 
limitations I am unable to ascertain whether or not a person was asked to join a board 
and refused. Therefore, this study focuses only on those individuals who serve as outside 
directors and the relationships that affected their likelihood of serving and exiting. 
I turn now to the development of a model of outside directorship, which includes 
three key phases: (1) Likelihood of Joining Outside Boards, where human capital and 
social capital assets affect the likelihood that certain individuals will become outside 
directors; (2) Patterns of Outside Directorship, investigates observable differences in the 
lives of those serving on outside boards that affect the likelihood a directorship seat will 
be added or lost; and (3) Likelihood of Outside Directorship Exit, examines events likely 
to create a reassessment of service. This reassessment may come from either the 
individual or the firm. I propose that an alignment or matching process occurs between 
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firms in need of outside directors and the pool of potential candidates. After joining a 
board(s), as change occurs with the outside director individually, or as a reassessment of 
needs inside the firm for outside directors, a reevaluation of the firm-director 
relationship will periodically occur.  
The three phases of service condense into the following. Personal investments in 
human and social capital legitimate the individual as a potential director. As directorship 
opportunities arise, a matching and alignment occurs between the individual and the 
firm. Over time, successful matching and alignment may afford an individual the 
opportunity for additional appointments. Conversely, investments in human and social 
capital that do not match a prospective firm reduce the likelihood of a directorship at that 
firm. Below, Figure 2 illustrates an alignment model between firm and individual 
regarding outside director appointments. 
 
Fig 2  An Alignment Model of Outside Director Service 
 
Investments in Human 
and Social Capital
Individual
No Directorships
Alignment First Directorship
Multiple Directorships
Firm Prestigious Directorships
Prestige
Environment
Resource Dependence
Power Relationships
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In Figure 2, director service is the result of a matching process between the firm 
and the individual. The individual makes investments throughout his or her life in terms 
of both human and social capital. These investments potentially legitimize a person for 
directorship. Alternatively, possessing the right credentials or networks of contacts is 
worthless in the pursuit of a directorship without the benefit of an opportunity a firm 
provides. An important ingredient in this model is the matching or alignment process. 
The individual and the firm must both be motivated to enter into a directorship 
relationship. The individual must see service as rewarding in the sense that his or her 
goals for the future will be met through this association (Beach, 1998). Alternatively, the 
firm must see extending directorship offers as beneficial to its interests. These interests 
may manifest themselves through overall firm needs or because of powerful interests in 
the firm, which at times may be at odds with each other. Powerful CEOs for example, 
may want directors willing to assist them in consolidating their positions (Westphal & 
Zajac, 1995). This might lead to the appointment of one director whereas if examined 
from the perspective of another influential stakeholder it might lead to a very different 
decision regarding whom to appoint. 
Accordingly, the following sections develop theory around corporate outside 
directors. In the first section, I discuss the likelihood of becoming an outside director and 
argue: (1) home firm affiliation is important in gaining outside directorships; and (2) 
prestigious executives are more likely than others to become outside directors. The 
second section investigates the influence of two main patterns of outside directorships: 
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(1) the impact of important life changes in the director; and (2) how prestige affects the 
accumulation of directorships. In the third and final section, I examine the likelihood of 
outside director exit. This section focuses on significant changes in the director, which 
create a reassessment of tenure and increase the likelihood of discontinued board service. 
Likelihood of Joining Outside Boards 
The model in Figure 2 implies that individuals considering an outside 
directorship evaluate opportunities in terms of anticipated benefits to themselves. The 
notion here is that those individuals who are likely to consider directorship opportunities 
are those who have the requisite human capital and / or social capital to do so. Further, 
opportunities to serve as an outside director will not arise randomly but will involve 
situations in which individuals evaluate potential opportunities in terms of these 
anticipated benefits to themselves. I utilize human capital and social capital contextual 
factors considered important to outside directorship. These are antecedents to outside 
directorship and serve to legitimate certain individuals, thereby placing them in the pool 
of potential candidates for board service.  
Additionally, events occur in firms, which over time make it amenable to certain 
types of prospective board members. In order to examine the importance of both the firm 
and the individual the following section is broken into three categories: (1) home firm 
career; (2) gender and specific business expertise; and (3) prestigious external 
affiliations.  
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Home Firm Career 
Appointment to a corporate board in part rests on the notion that human capital 
and social capital investments are often rewarding in the sense that such investments are 
recognized and mobilized for gain. These investments may come from an individual’s 
career, education, network contacts, or skill set, and as such manifest themselves in the 
ability to climb the corporate ladder. Therefore, ascension to, and success in, the upper 
echelon signals to others that a person’s achievements are worthy of being recognized 
and that the person is someone with whom it might be rewarding to associate. 
Home Firm Career-Title. An executive’s career is marked by choices that 
create paths along which come their progress, success, and rewards. Differential career 
choices demonstrate that an individual is actively engaged in activities that change and 
shape their career paths. Once an individual has begun a particular career path, their 
progress is largely determined by their abilities, skills, and behavior, which affect how 
far they progress and which deviations they may take (Melamed, 1996). Those 
individuals who choose paths not conducive to their skills and abilities or choose 
organizations incongruent with their expectations or needs are prone to turnover and / or 
job dissatisfaction (Bretz & Judge, 1994). Therefore, individuals who make it to the 
corporate upper echelons may be considered products of successful investments. 
Past research investigating the careers of directors has relied upon arguments that 
typically emphasize education and background. In particular, research has focused on 
demographic characteristics where alignment occurs between the directors (Useem & 
Karabel, 1986) and between the chief executive officers and the board (Westphal & 
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Zajac, 1995; Zajac & Westphal, 1996). While the firm-director alignment is important, 
another way to assess directorship potential in executives is their current position. 
Ascendancy to the upper echelons implies that the individual has been rewarded for past 
investments and success.  
A good indicator of executive potential and desire is hierarchical standing in the 
home institution. Special recognition from the home firm signals that the individual has 
been accepted into a narrower group of elites. Additionally, promotion to the home firm 
elite signals competence and credibility to others outside the firm. The theory of human 
capital implies that the process of sorting individuals into executive positions is 
significantly influenced by their accumulation of human capital stocks (Leonard, 1990). 
Executives are rewarded for their experience and education. Therefore, the premise that 
individuals sort into positions through human capital assets leads to the conclusion that 
there will be observable differences between executives.  
Research investigating these differences is often directed at understanding pay 
differentials. The most widely used theoretical perspective regarding pay differentials is 
the tournament model (Lazear & Rosen, 1981). The tournament model for top managers 
translates into an expectation that as one rises through the hierarchical level of an 
organization, rewards will increase thereby motivating the person to work hard and 
perform better, vis-à-vis their peers. For example, Mann, O’Reilly, and Wade (1993) 
found that the number of vice-presidents (an indication of tournament scope and 
intensity) was positively associated with CEO compensation. Each successive step in the 
organizational hierarchy is rewarding not only through pay differential, but also 
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recognition among others that the individual is successful and competent. The ultimate 
attainment of winning the tournament is the title of chief executive officer. The CEO 
title is the pinnacle of most organizations and one with an expectation of the greatest 
reward (Rosen, 1986). To some extent, winning a tournament at each successive stage in 
the hierarchy is also a signal of the shifting nature of the power distribution within the 
firm (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). However, titles do not always provide a clear 
indication of those who are regarded as the most powerful influences in a firm. 
Finkelstein (1992) argued that power among executives is often distributed 
unequally. His notion is similar to that espoused by Thompson’s (1967) proposition that 
the inner circle of a company often includes only a subset of top executives. Research on 
power is important because those with the most power have the greatest likelihood of 
affecting strategic choice (Child, 1972). Strategic decisions are often unstructured and 
ambiguous (Mintzberg, 1983) and those able to execute effectively such decision-
making capabilities are highly sought for outside directorships (Conger, Lawler, & 
Finegold, 2001). 
Active CEOs are the most widely sought after individuals for outside 
directorships (Conger et al., 2001). However, firms are finding it increasingly difficult to 
recruit all the CEOs they require (Conger et al., 2001; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989) due to 
the time requirements and demands of board service. This has left open opportunities for 
non-CEOs to join outside boards. A prominent position in the corporate hierarchy is one 
expected to ascend to the title of CEO. Vancil (1987) found that heirs apparent virtually 
always hold the position of president or chief operating officer. Additionally, the 
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placement of an individual into one of these positions sets up an expectation of 
ascendancy (Cannella & Shen, 2001), thereby increasing the visibility of the heir 
apparent.  
One way to differentiate members of the firm’s upper echelons is to identify 
those with the most prestigious titles and the greatest overall power to affect the strategic 
direction of the company (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). An individual’s title (top 
positions such as heir apparent- in line to succeed CEO, chief operating officer (COO), 
president, chief executive officer (CEO) and / or nomination to the home firm’s board of 
directors) represents a visible demonstration of power and recognition (Finkelstein, 
1988). This has the potential of demonstrably influencing the executive’s career 
potential and standing. By virtue of accepting a top title and / or home directorship, the 
executive becomes experienced in corporate affairs and is visible to outsiders. In 
particular, the same human and or social capital attributes that sorted individuals into 
positions within the corporate hierarchy (Leonard, 1990) will be useful in obtaining 
outside directorships and accordingly predict that an executive’s career at the home firm 
is influential in obtaining an outside directorship. 
Hypothesis 1a: Holding the titles of Chairman of the Board, Chief 
Executive Officer, President, or Chief Operating Officer will 
increase the likelihood of joining an outside board. 
Hypothesis 1b: Serving as an inside director on the home firm’s 
board will increase the likelihood of joining an outside board. 
 Hypothesis 1c: Promotion to Inside Director, Chairman, Chief 
Executive Officer, or President / Chief Operating Officer will 
increase the likelihood of joining an outside board.  
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Conversely, just as the impact of promotion and / or nomination to the board 
within the home firm should have an additive effect upon the individual’s human capital 
and social capital, loss or perceived deterioration of human capital is expected to have 
the reverse effect. While human capital encompasses both innate abilities and acquired 
skills (Maman, 2000), I argue that one’s perception of human capital stock is largely a 
function of one’s current position. For example, consider the CEO of a firm who rose to 
that position due to superior performance in previous positions. Such performance was 
presumably a result of education, job training, tenure, work experience (Shanahan & 
Tuma, 1994) and the executive’s acquired network contacts. Yet, when performance 
deteriorates, the impact on an executive’s human and social capital is less certain. 
The most consistent predictor of CEO turnover is poor firm performance 
(Boeker, 1992; Wagner, Pfeffer, & O'Reilly, 1984). However, human capital theory 
(Becker, 1993) would argue that there should be a loose coupling between firm 
performance and CEO dismissal, as those in power should take into consideration the 
potential loss of the CEO’s human capital to the firm. Therefore, a CEO terminated 
because of poor performance implies that the value of their capital asset stock was not 
considered sufficient to remain in spite of the performance issues. I hypothesize that this 
perceived loss of human and social capital will result in diminished opportunities for 
outside directorships. The investments made in capital over a career manifest themselves 
through ones position. However, if that position is lost for non-voluntary reasons, a 
portion of the capital stock aligned with that position is also lost. 
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Hypothesis 1d: CEO dismissal decreases the likelihood of joining 
an outside board. 
 
The Role of Gender and Home Firm Type 
Resource dependence theorists assert that an outside director provides specific 
resources to the board such as expertise, advice, legitimacy, and experience (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). Through an observation such as gender or business expertise, I can 
make predictions as to the kinds of resources that an individual will bring to board 
service and the types of firms that would be desirous of such resources. 
Gender. Women’s routes to career success are different from those of men. They 
are characterized by differences in job specialization, interrupted careers, and more 
radical career changes (Melamed, 1996). Past research has attributed this to cultural, 
social, legal, and practical gender-specific barriers that women must overcome to 
achieve the same relative career success as men (Adler, 1993; Burke & McKeen, 1992; 
Melamed, 1995). 
Women are also represented differently in their home firms than men. Women 
are more likely to be found in service industries whereas men are more likely to be 
found in manufacturing industries (Central Statistical Office, 1994). Melamed (1996) 
suggests that women seem to gravitate more to service industries because their policies 
are more sensitive to women’s career paths. Additionally, it has been reported that even 
when women make the “right” career choices by obtaining equal education or other 
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appropriate qualifications, their careers still lag behind their male counterparts regarding 
salary and promotion (Stroh, Brett, & Reilly, 1992). 
In 1973, approximately 10% of corporate boards had at least one woman serving 
as director, whereas in 1998 their representation had grown to 72% (Korn Ferry, 2000). 
Some research has identified that this explosive growth in representation has come from 
non-business environments such as law and academics (Hillman, Cannella, & Harris, 
2002). However, little if any work has been directed at investigating women business 
executives and their path to corporate boards (for an exception see Daily, Certo, & 
Dalton, 1999). Theoretically, a resource dependence role (Johnson et al., 1996) speaks to 
overall director differences regarding expertise, legitimacy, and ties to external 
contingencies. It does seem reasonable to expect that women will bring different 
resources and expertise to outside directorship than men. 
One initial resource women are expected to bring to board service is legitimacy. 
Most organizations are under pressure from outsiders to conform to the diversity of the 
culture in which they participate. This call for diversity has led to more women sitting on 
corporate boards, as Korn Ferry (2000) reports. Adding women to the board also signals 
sensitivity in the firm that it is responsive to women’s issues (Suchman, 1995). 
However, if legitimacy were the only reason for adding women to the board it would be 
easy for a firm to comply. Resource dependency arguments also involve other resources 
directors bring to the board, such as expertise.  
Common demographic characteristics of an executive expertise is typically 
occupation, career path, functional background, or occupation (Daily & Dalton, 1994b). 
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While the existence of executive women is a relatively recent phenomenon, their 
representation is still small in comparison to white males (Daily et al., 1999). Research 
on women and promotion patterns in organizations has concluded that the “glass ceiling” 
does exist and limits their upper mobility (Daily et al., 1999; Judge et al., 1995; Kanter, 
1977), and therefore those few who do make it to the top are unique. Because directors 
are overwhelmingly chosen from executive ranks (Conger et al., 2001; Lorsch & 
MacIver, 1989), those few women who achieve top executive positions are expected to 
be in high demand. This demand should be especially evident where gender plays a 
crucially important role.  Firms who have women as important influential stakeholders 
will in all likelihood attempt to recruit executive women to outside positions on their 
boards. 
It is likely that firms looking to fill outside directorships will highly value those 
individuals able to serve in multiple director roles. Accordingly, women executives are 
expected to fill both a resource expertise and a legitimacy role as an outside director. 
Thus, I argue that women executives are more likely to serve on boards where their 
expertise in corporate governance and as women has value. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Women executives are more likely to serve on the 
boards of firms that have women as important stakeholders. 
 
Business Expertise. Just as the human or social capital of each executive 
contributes in a unique way to their home firm, so does an outside director bring to an 
  59   
  
organization a unique set of attributes and capabilities (Kesner, 1988; Kosnik, 1990). 
This reasoning is similar to Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) contention of a linkage 
between executive characteristics and their decision-making capabilities. Additional 
evidence by Westphal and Zajac (1997) discovered that the personal experiences of 
executives may be used to predict what kinds of initiatives they will support in their role 
as outside directors. 
In a resource dependence role, outside directors connect the firm to external 
factors, which creates a sense of uncertainty or dependency. Theory suggests that 
survival is dependent upon the organization dealing with these sources of uncertainty or 
dependency (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Thompson, 1967). Therefore, having directors 
able to bridge this gap is important. However, outside directors also bring their own 
resources to any given board situation. Each director has a unique set of human and 
social capital assets such as education, experience, skills, access and an individualized 
set of network contacts. These unique bundles of assets and capabilities serve in 
different ways. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) asserted benefits that arise from the 
existence of a board’s environmental linkage (e.g. outside directors), for example 
provide resources, channel communication, aid in obtaining resource commitments, and 
legitimacy. In this vein, firms obtain these resources through their board members. Co-
opting the board through outside directors will likely result in additive expertise to the 
board through both the affiliation and experience of the individual director. In some 
firms, functional expertise might be extremely valuable while in others a connection 
through legal or financial channels might be more appropriate. Regardless, it is logical to 
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assume that incumbent boards will attempt to recruit new members who are able to add 
needed resources. 
I suggest one way an incumbent board will assess a potential director is their 
ability to add resources and increase the board’s scope of potential opportunities, or 
reduce contingencies that the firm might face in its environment. In this way, there is a 
balance between the interests of the firm and that of the individual. Outside directors 
from corporate executive ranks fill a business expert role (Hillman et al., 2000). They are 
able to do this because of investments made in their industry and firm specific training, 
education, and tenure (Becker, 1993).  
Additionally, business experts provide expertise to the board on competition, 
decision-making and problem solving. Individuals in this role also assist in strategy 
formulation and may well serve as a legitimacy vehicle demonstrating the firm’s ability 
to attract corporate executives. To fulfill this role as an outside director, the business 
expert must be familiar with the firm’s basic business model. Theories of human capital 
argue that investments in firm specific activities raise the specificity of an employee’s 
human capital. All else equal, such investments should result in a closer fit between the 
needs of the firm and the unique capabilities of the individual (Phan & Lee, 1995). 
Translated into obtaining outside directorships, I expect executives with specialized 
knowledge and expertise to be more highly valued in their own business sector than 
others. Since the road to success is dramatically different between service firms and 
manufacturing firms, I expect that executives who possess these specific capabilities will 
be most desired where they provide the greatest expertise.  
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Hypothesis 3a: Executives of manufacturing firms who join outside 
boards are more likely to accept directorships on manufacturing 
firms. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Executives of service firms who join outside boards 
are more likely to accept directorships on service firms. 
 
Prestigious External Affiliations 
D’Aveni (1990: p.121) defines prestige as the “property of having status” and 
argues that prestige helps to maintain an illusion of competence and control through 
influencing interpersonal reactions to the individual. D’Aveni and Kesner (1993) suggest 
that prestigious individuals are viewed as competent, credible, and trustworthy. Prestige 
represents a mechanism by which actors present themselves as those with whom it 
would be rewarding to associate (Homans, 1958). The reciprocity nature of prestige 
likely serves the interest of both parties, as those who associate with prestigious 
individuals seek to gain prestige from that association for themselves (Lin, 2001). 
Empirical work supports the notion that preferred partners for interaction are 
those occupying slightly higher social statuses (Galaskiewicz & Burt, 1991). This 
behavior has been coined the prestige effect (Laumann, 1966). The implication is that 
interaction with prestigious parties will enhance the prestige of the less advantaged actor. 
This halo effect is only applicable as long as the tie between the two actors is in place 
and there is no appreciable decline in prestige of the advantaged partner. While 
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preference in association may be quite different from interactions arising from those 
associations, Laumann’s principle does explain why individuals tend to pursue 
association with individuals of similar, or slightly higher socioeconomic status.  
It is not uncommon for the upper echelons of corporations to be defined as 
having elite status. Giddens (1972) defined elites as those individuals who occupy 
formally defined positions of authority at the head of a social organization or institution. 
However, it is readily apparent that not all members of the corporate upper echelons are 
the same. Significant differences are found between members based not only on titles, 
but also previous work experience, educational experience, and other affiliations. The 
following sections examine the influence of three types of prestige that may be 
distributed unequally among various executives: educational prestige, home firm 
prestige, and family prestige. 
Educational Prestige.  D’Aveni (1990) additionally argues that individual 
prestige may contribute to the legitimacy of firms by influencing social exchanges on 
three levels: interpersonal relationships; interorganizational transactions; and societal-
level (intra-class) interactions. This contributes to the belief that association with 
prestigious individuals is to be trusted and that actions taken will conform to acceptable 
standards of behavior.  
While extensive research has investigated the impact of educational quantity on 
careers (Becker, 1993), other work has established the link between educational prestige 
and service as an outside director. As noted by Useem and Karabel (1986), an 
educational institution may bestow three distinct types of capital upon its graduates: (1) 
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scholastic capital (e.g. the amount of knowledge accumulated); (2) social capital 
(network ties, personal contacts); and (3) cultural capacity (the value society places on 
symbols of prestige).  
Research on social class theory and business elites suggests that the composition 
of the board is reflective of a class of individuals that develops from interactions among 
directors (Useem, 1984). The directorship is a way for influential individuals to keep in 
contact with each other and perpetuate their elite status. The implication of this is that 
directors may be appointed to boards because of their personal connections in a 
community of individuals (Mintzberg, 1983).  
The prestigious nature of an educational institution is important in determining 
the extent of an individual’s connections and status (D'Aveni & Kesner, 1993). 
Individuals graduating from elite educational institutions often develop important social 
contacts, which are part of that individual’s social capital for life. D’Aveni (1989) 
argued that individual prestige (enhanced from the educational institution attended) 
represents a valuable resource because of the elite social contacts made available to 
organizations.  
 
Hypothesis 4a: Executives with prestigious educational credentials  
are more likely to join an outside board. 
 
Home Firm Prestige. As mentioned earlier, corporate boards are visible 
reflections of the corporation’s ability to attract prestigious and important people, and all 
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else equal, directors who bring more prestige to the board are preferred to those who 
bring less prestige. Of course, individuals who are seeking board appointments also see 
their directorships as reflections of their own capabilities. That is, all else equal, 
individuals will seek out service on the most prestigious boards that they can. As Blau 
notes, “The reason that one person will associate with another is that he has impressed 
others as someone with whom it would be rewarding to associate” (1968:20).  
Moreover, Fama and Jensen (1983b) argue that directors are motivated to uphold 
shareholder interests because their reputations are important to them. This logic also 
suggests that directors will be very concerned about the reputation and prestige of the 
firms with which they associate. For example, Mace (1986) reports that executives 
accept outside directorships to signal that their peers have accepted them. Poorly 
performing firms and those with histories of shareholder lawsuits or negative press 
reports bring a potential for stigma that may be transferred to the organization’s 
executives and directors. There is some evidence that executives of poorly performing 
firms are less likely to join outside boards than are managers of better managed, more 
successful firms (Kaplan & Reishus, 1990). Individuals who accept directorships for 
such firms do so at some risk, because their own reputations may suffer as the firm’s 
performance suffers. Conversely, firms with truly outstanding reputations will be more 
attractive to potential directors, and with a bigger pool of directors to choose from, will 
tend to select those who also have high prestige.  
Firm prestige will consist of various combinations of factors such as the size of 
the firm, its perceived market standing, the reputations of the firm’s executives, the 
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nature of the business, and the firm’s overall status or standing in the business 
community. Individual prestige will derive from such executive characteristics as the 
executive’s title, prestige of the executive’s employer, educational accomplishments, and 
additional affiliations. Just as individuals are protective of their reputations, so are firms. 
How executives see themselves coupled with the needs of firms for prestigious 
individuals will likely result in a search for compatible outcomes.  
 
Hypothesis 4b: Among executives who join outside boards, home 
firm prestige is positively associated with outside firm prestige. 
 
Family Prestige. Clearly, not all theorists agree with the interpretation that 
human capital is the result of hard work and self-determination (Bourdieu, 1983). The 
human capital (e.g., education) of some may be the cultural capital (e.g., attending 
Harvard) of others. A theory of cultural class or cultural capital defines culture as a 
system of symbolism and meaning (Jenkins, 1992). Bourdieu (1983) argues that a 
society’s dominant class imposes its culture by engaging in pedagogic action (e.g., 
proliferation of the elite family unit), which internalizes the dominant symbols and 
meanings in the next generation, thus reproducing the prominence of the next 
generation. The result is an internalized and durable reproduction of the cultural unit. 
The desire and need for status and prestige in one generation is likely to extend to the 
next. 
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I have noted that the top members of the largest companies in America have 
bestowed upon them a certain degree of prestige simply as a result of their inclusion into 
the corporate elite. However, while corporate executives have elite status, not all 
members share status equally. Some are afforded prestige due to their titles (Giddens, 
1972; Mills, 1958), and some because they are considered to be part of an inner circle 
even amongst the managerial elite (Useem & Karabel, 1986; Zeitlin, 1974). This 
differentiation is due in part to a social stratification within the elite (Allen, 1974). For 
instance, being publicly included in the Social Register clearly sets one apart from 
another. Thus, an individual corporate executive would be included into a select group 
that has as its historical tenants grounding in prestige and status. It is therefore likely that 
outside directorship is important to those individuals with elite family status as an 
additional means for prestige enhancement and / or maintenance.  
Organizational prestige is often depicted by a single explanatory variable. 
Fortune Magazine’s survey of The Most Admired Companies uses seven different 
criteria but develops reputation as a simple average of those. This assumes that all the 
criteria utilized are equally valuable. Sociologists perhaps have the richest tradition of 
identifying orderings in organizations dating to the works of Weber (1957) who 
suggested that social stratification also had a status dimension. Besides some 
institutional categorical determinant, another way of acquiring organizational prestige is 
through association.  
Empirical support has been received for the notion that preferred partners for 
interaction are those occupying slightly higher social statuses (Laumann, 1966). This 
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behavior has been coined the prestige effect. The implication is that interaction will 
enhance the prestige of the less advantaged actor. This halo effect is only applicable as 
long as the tie between the two actors is in place and there is no appreciable decline in 
prestige of the advantaged partner. While preference in association may be quite 
different from interactions arising from those associations, Laumann’s principle does 
explain why individuals tend to pursue association with individuals of similar, or slightly 
higher socioeconomic status.  
In sum, corporate elites have bestowed upon them a certain degree of prestige 
simply as a function of their inclusion into the corporate upper echelons. However, not 
all elites are equal. Differences in education, home firm affiliation, and family 
connection serve to segregate those at the pinnacle of corporations. Therefore, I 
hypothesize:  
 
Hypothesis 4c: Executives with elite family prestige are more likely 
to join an outside board. 
 
Hypothesis 4d: Among executives who join outside boards, elite 
family prestige is positively associated with outside firm prestige. 
 
The preceding section argues that certain individuals are more likely to become 
outside directors than others, and implies that if asked to join, the individual will in fact 
do so. In actuality and as previously noted, becoming an outside director is a voluntary 
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exercise. One may just as easily turn down an offer as accept. Unfortunately, due to the 
difficulty of observing both a request to join and a subsequent refusal, identifying the 
reason for refusal is beyond the scope of this research. I am only able to identify those 
who join from those who do not, and leave the reasons for not joining to future 
endeavors.  
However, I argue that holding and maintaining certain career credentials 
increases the ability to obtain outside directorships. Moreover, executives also become 
outside directors because they bring unique human and social capital resources to the 
firm’s board. Lastly, I investigated the importance of prestige as an asset in joining the 
directorship ranks. I consider the executive’s prestige as arising from the educational 
affiliations, the home firm and the family unit. All else equal, prestige factors should be 
influential in determining the outside directorship opportunity(s) an individual will be 
nominated for, and accept. 
Patterns of Outside Directorship  
Theory developed so far implies that outside board membership, when viewed 
from the perspective of a director, is influenced by a person’s human capital (career, 
gender, experience) and social capital (affiliations). However, once appointed as an 
outside director, not all outsiders will view service equally. For some the chance to serve 
on an outside board is recognition of accomplishment and provides the ability to nurture 
influential contacts. Conversely, others might view service as a large commitment of 
time, arguably a scarce commodity of the corporate elite. Estimates range from 100 to 
150 hours per year is required of a director serving on the board of a large public 
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company (Conger et al., 2001). Moreover, 60 percent of CEO’s responding to a recent 
Korn Ferry survey (2000) said that they had turned down a board invitation within the 
last twelve months largely because of the time commitment (Lear, 2000). Therefore, 
why is that we are able to observe some individuals serving on multiple boards while 
others serve on only one? Moreover, what are some of the precipitating events in 
director’s lives that lead them to different patterns of directorship than others? The 
following section investigates reasons why we observe differences between those who 
choose to serve as outside directors on corporate boards.  
There are three potential outcomes that may occur to a director once an initial 
directorship has been obtained. First, the director may come to value service and seek 
additional directorships. Second, the director may be content with one directorship and 
continue to serve at the pleasure of the firm’s incumbents. Finally, the director may 
reevaluate service and leave the board(s). Accordingly, I discuss the first scenario as the 
second is theoretically uninteresting and the third remains for the next section. 
Changes in Home Firm Affiliation 
Often and perhaps usually, the decision to join a board is a voluntary one, not 
importantly driven by financial need. Incumbent directors for large publicly traded 
companies have already distinguished themselves prior to obtaining a board seat (Lorsch 
& MacIver, 1989). Therefore, reasons for board service are varied and complex. 
Amongst those implied here: ability to gain future board seats; attributions of prestige; 
and recognition as an accomplished business professional. However, due to above 
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average age, it is likely that personal life changes will occur to this group in somewhat 
disproportionate amounts compared to the general public. 
As corporate executives progress throughout their careers opportunities for 
change occur. Some appear randomly while others appear more organized or planned. 
Whether the former or the later, the potential for change is likely to create a 
reassessment of where one is in their life and how they see themselves in the future 
(Beach, 1998). Individuals possess a core of principles, morals, and values, as well as a 
set of goals and plans that guide and constrain their decisions about (and therefore their 
behavior with respect to) forming, adapting, and terminating relationships (Taylor & 
Giannantonio, 1993).  Therefore, as one’s life evolves, it is logical to expect that 
reevaluations occur as the individual assesses the array of opportunities and trade offs 
that accompany them.  
As this study concerns sitting executives, the most observable life event deals 
with ones career at the home firm. Significant shifts which create the ability of an 
executive to refocus their time are likely to result in a evaluation of one of two 
outcomes: join another board; or leave a seat currently occupied. Similar to the previous 
discussion, significant changes in the executive’s home firm career are expected to alter 
that individual’s human and social capital stock and thereby alter their patterns of 
outside directorships.  
Important Life Changes-Retirement. Executive departures come in many 
different ways, each of them interesting in their own right. However, retirement from the 
home firm, whether voluntary or mandatory, provides an intriguing set of predications 
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when put in the context of its impact on the individual’s ability and desire to be an 
outside director. Early departures or retirements probably do not occur randomly. Some 
occur as the result of a personal desire to spend more time in other activities, some to 
join other organizations, and some even at the insistence of the board (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1996).  
Fama (1980) was among the earliest to argue that external career concerns are an 
important consideration for both the firm and the executive. He found that the external 
labor market was able to effectively reward and punish executive behavior. Those with 
better performance received higher rewards. However, others have found that the 
prospect of diminished careers will motivate executives to engage in opportunistic 
behavior (Butler & Newman, 1989) but these results do not hold up in all cases (Murphy 
& Zimmerman, 1993). The intriguing point is that most prior research has depicted an 
executive’s career as ending with retirement from the home firm. However, I suggest 
retirement from the home firm is but a continuing step in the career progression of 
certain executives. Continued patterns of outside board service have the potential to 
appreciably add to the executive’s human and social capital asset stock post retirement. 
However, the context of that person’s retirement from the home firm is important. For 
example, scandal, bankruptcy and the like will alter the executive’s capital stock to the 
degree their reputation becomes impacted by the event. To provide consistency with 
prior succession research I focus my analysis upon the firm’s CEO. Therefore, the 
context of an CEO’s retirement is important in determining their pattern of outside 
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directorship opportunities and the appreciation, or depreciation, of their human and 
social capital assets. 
Hypothesis 5a: A CEO retirement from the home firm increases the 
likelihood of changes in their outside board affiliations (both exits 
and entries). 
 
Vancil (1987) reports that in a normal succession (no evidence the CEO left due 
to performance issues) 44 percent of CEO’s shedding the title retain membership on the 
board as chairman. Sonnefeld (1988) argued that indeed it was the CEO who made the 
decision to stay on the board or leave. Additionally, he asserted as did Jensen and 
Murphy (1990), that in cases of forced departure from the CEO position, an executive 
may be allowed to remain as a face saving mechanism or because their vision was 
unfulfilled. These findings are in opposition to Brickley et al. (1999) who find evidence 
that home firm performance is important in obtaining post-retirement outside 
directorships.  
In theory, concerns about ones career potentially mitigate agency problems 
between managers and owners in the last few years of a career (Fama, 1980). This is 
because, as stated above, the external labor market provides a CEO with outside 
opportunities and the internal labor market determines how and on what terms the CEO 
moves through the hierarchy. Therefore, managers concerned about their post retirement 
careers understand that if they perform poorly, the number and quality of opportunities 
available to them after leaving the home firm will be limited. Post-retirement board 
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service has been identified as a source of managerial incentive (Brickley et al., 1999). 
Brickley et al. (1999) identified that both the likelihood that a retired CEO will serve on 
his own board and the likelihood of serving on outside boards is positively associated 
with his or her recent performance in the home firm. Furthermore, this study leaves open 
the question as to how the type of succession affects the ability of CEOs to gain outside 
directorships. 
In Vancil’s (1987) opinion the relay in an executive succession event is the 
healthiest for the firm. The typical process includes an heir apparent who is selected 
before the incumbent’s departure and is readied for transition to the number one spot in 
the firm. This process likely frees up the incumbent CEO’s time for other activities, both 
within and outside the firm. Additionally, a CEO who stays on the home firm’s board, 
post retirement, signals to onlookers that service as an outside director is desired. 
Healthy retirement processes, those with favorable attributions to the departing CEO, 
should allow them to leave with their reserve of human capital assets in place. This high 
reservoir of human capital might then be leveraged into directorship opportunities. 
 
Hypothesis 5b: A CEO retirement from the home firm when 
coupled with a relay succession increases the likelihood of joining 
an outside board. 
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Hypothesis 5c: Among CEOs who retire from their home firm, 
staying on as a director in the home firm increases the likelihood 
of joining an outside board.  
Prestigious Affiliations 
Human capital theory (e.g.Becker, 1993) and social capital theory (e.g.Coleman, 
1988) imply that board membership, when viewed from the perspective of a director, 
will continue as long as the associations of board service fit the investments made by the 
director and the director views service as being personally rewarding. As long as service 
is beneficial to the individual and to the firm, we might logically expect tenure to 
continue.  
Social capital is also interpreted as the standing one has in a social organization 
and the ability of an individual to draw upon that standing to influence the actions of 
others (Friedman & Krackhardt, 1997). From this perspective, individual attributes are 
not as critical to success as the way in which an individual is embedded in a web of 
relations that provide information and support (Brass, 1994). Therefore, the notion of 
social capital describes the likelihood of attraction between similar others (Tsui & 
O'Reilly, 1989).  
While there is strong evidence that human capital is important in obtaining a 
position (Becker, 1993), results have confirmed that social capital is important in 
obtaining better positions (Erickson, 2001). To understand this requires examining social 
capital from its dual sides. First, employers value potential employees with social capital 
because they can convert individual social capital into organizational advantage. Second, 
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employees with social capital see this asset as valuable because it increases the chance of 
getting a better position.  Hence, social capital might be more important in higher levels 
in the organization where the need to access social capital and its benefits is the greatest. 
Executive Prestige. Upper echelon business executives, particularly the CEO, 
are the most sought after outside directors (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). Executives serve 
as outside directors for various reasons such as: intellectual stimulation; a way to better 
serve their home firm; accumulate social and human capital; or prolong their careers 
(Conger et al., 2001). Many firms today require executives to leave the corporation at a 
mandatory retirement age, normally between 60 and 70. Post retirement service is 
important to corporate executives as research found that 88 percent of all retiring CEO’s 
hold at least one board seat and 42 percent hold three or more (Brickley et al., 1999). 
Additionally, Brickley et al. (1999) discovered that the prevalence of these opportunities 
was partially contingent upon home firm performance. 
While there has been some research on multiple directorships (Brickley et al., 
1999; Hillman et al., 2002; Maman, 2000), minimal effort has examined the 
accumulation of directorships among executives other than the CEO. Holding top 
positions in large public corporations implies the possession of a prestigious social 
capital asset. Moreover, recruiting individuals to boards from prominent executive 
positions signals to the relevant environment that the firm is able to attract individuals of 
high quality and gain access to additional needed resources (Mizruchi, 1996). 
Further research on multiple directorships is scarce but the few studies that do 
exist predict the likelihood of accepting multiple nominations depends upon the 
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individual’s human and social capital (Burt, 1992; Davis, 1993; Lorsch & MacIver, 
1989; Useem & Karabel, 1986). To answer who might accumulate multiple 
directorships, I utilize individual attributes. This implies that certain individuals are more 
apt to receive and accept multiple nominations than others. I have argued previously that 
individuals who accept outside directorships are likely to be those who view service as 
prestige enhancing and valuable for their accumulation of social capital. I continue in 
that vein by arguing that similar logic applies to the accumulation of multiple 
directorships, in that only those who most highly valued prestige and status will take the 
time and exert the effort required to serve multiple times. Accordingly, I hypothesize 
that the most prestigious individuals are the ones likely to accumulate directorships. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Among executives who join outside boards, 
executive prestige is positively associated with the likelihood of 
multiple directorships. 
 
A theory of human capital (Becker, 1993) argues that the human capital assets 
one accumulates are a reflection of education, experience and career. These are 
important in understanding, among other things, positions within the hierarchy (Leonard, 
1990). These positions may be a source of advantage or disadvantage depending upon 
context (e.g., way in which one departs their home firm career). Alternatively, social 
capital reflects the executive’s ability to draw upon a web of relations. I argue that both 
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of these capital asset stocks are influential in assessing the context of those who serve on 
outside boards. 
Likelihood of Outside Director Exit 
General models of employee turnover hold that three main components are 
involved in the turnover decision: (1) job dissatisfaction, (2) a search for alternatives 
before leaving the organization and (3) alternatives are processed using a subjective 
utility model (Lee, Mitchell, Wise, & Fireman, 1996). However, factors other than affect 
can initiate the turnover process, employees may or may not compare a current job with 
another, and a compatibility judgment is used rather than a subjective utility model 
(Beach, 1998). Once an occupational goal has been achieved (e.g. attainment of and 
tenure in an outside director position(s)) individuals will periodically evaluate their 
progress. When forecasted and desired outcomes diverge substantially, this discrepancy 
will trigger a search for alternatives. 
Outside directors differ from normal firm employees regarding exit. They usually 
have various options and are generally not concerned with their next employment 
opportunities. Additionally, dissatisfaction with the position may not be present. The exit 
of an outside director may come for various legitimate reasons such as death, illness, 
retirement, time pressures, or new position with competing firm. Further, the director 
may be requested to exit irrespective of any health, performance, or other issue. 
From a social capital perspective, an outside director is desirous of a board 
position as a means to profit from the relationship. Viewed from this lens, while the 
financial rewards may be attractive in board service in relation to other types of part time 
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work, the primary draw will come from the expected future rewards of affiliations, 
which lead to attainment of the individual’s future goals. To this end, a break in board 
service signals that continued tenure might be in conflict with where the director sees 
him or herself in the future. Poor performance, public displays of firm misbehavior, 
board conflict, and CEO dismissal, highlight events that might alter the impression the 
outside director has for continued service. Accordingly, the next two sections discuss 
social capital influences that might cause a director to reassess continued service: shifts 
in individual or firm prestige; and shifts in a firm’s internal power structure. 
Changes in Prestige 
Prestige Shifts. I previously argued that board positions are prestigious and 
desired. Given this premise, it is difficult to understand why irrespective of a natural or 
forced exit (death, illness, retirement, or request to leave) a director would vacate a 
directorship. Instances of directors serving long past a normal retirement age are replete 
in the popular press. In such instances, it is often the case that only failing health or 
forced graceful exits are the drivers that extricate these executives from their positions. 
Nevertheless, there are additional factors that may create an alignment mismatch and a 
desire to reassess board service. 
Instances of prestige enhancing or prestige reducing events may occur during the 
tenure of the outside director. Prestige enhancing might come as a result of being elected 
CEO, wealth accumulation, or family status. Conversely, the opposite might derive for 
prestige reducing events. The loss of a CEO position or officership, financial problems at 
the home corporation, or a family crisis might send negative signals. Therefore, the 
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characteristic of such an event will frame the episode into a positive or negative image. 
A CEO fired for poor performance will certainly engender different assumptions on a 
firm’s board than would a CEO who retired with a successful record of accomplishment. 
As has been suggested in this study, the association of networks is also a critical element 
in appointing board positions. Directors who serve on multiple boards will likely have 
linkages to other boards upon which they might sit. The reputations acquired from one 
board will logically transfer to other boards and influence prestige standing, which will 
likely affect current and future board opportunities. 
Research suggests that the rate of executive turnover is higher for poorly 
performing firms than for superior performing firms (McEarchern, 1977). Outside 
directors are also disciplined in the market, as those from financially distressed firms 
were found to hold fewer other outside directorships following their exit from displaced 
firms (Gilson, 1990). Bankruptcy filings also play a role in director exit as it was found 
that firms had smaller boards following the filing of a bankruptcy petition. It appears that 
some of the reduction in size is due to directors voluntarily leaving the firm to distance 
themselves from the risk and problems associated with financial crisis (Gales & Kesner, 
1994). Yet, outside directors are generally respected leaders in their businesses and 
communities whose reputations suffer when they are associated with failing firms. 
Outside directors thus have an incentive to ensure the effective running of the company 
because being directors of well-run companies signals their competence to the market 
(Weisbach, 1988).  
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A paradox for outside directors develops in the association of their personal 
prestige and that of the firm. In instances of failing performance, fraud, mismanagement, 
bankruptcy, or bad press, it is important for the director to attempt a disassociation 
between themselves and the circumstances. Yet, directors are acknowledged as the 
instrument of choice in attending to problems of a major magnitude. Therefore, they 
must attempt a disassociation of the stigma, but try to retain credibility as an effective 
leader. In such circumstances, it is likely that directors will assess the potential damage 
through continued association with their beliefs about the efficacy of that decision 
regarding personal future goals and plans. 
In large publicly held corporations, most items of note happen visibly and much 
of the popular press is keenly alert to changes that happen in the boardroom (ala Enron). 
Situations of both positive and negative news are generated for public consumption, with 
the result that director reputations are associated not only with their overall personal 
performance but also with that of the firm or firms with which they have aligned their 
interests. As outside directors serve, occasions of prestige change will create a 
reassessment of board service. When an out of alignment situation manifests itself, it is 
likely that board service will be reassessed. 
Mace (1971) argues that outside directors are chosen, in part, because of the titles 
and prestige of the candidates. Thus, by examining circumstances surrounding outside 
director exit, I am able to test the importance of human and social capital assets to the 
executive. First, directors covetous of their capital assets will, all else equal, align their 
interests with the most prestigious and ostensibly the most personally advantageous 
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firms possible. In this regard, employment with the firm is perceived as additive to their 
capital asset stock. Second, the firm attempts to gain organizational advantage through 
utilization of the executive’s social capital. However, social capital is fungible. 
Significant changes in the prestige of the executive of the firm will likely result in a 
reassessment of service. The alignment that originally occurred when the director was 
elected to the board is altered. Outside directors faced with the loss of capital that 
accrued to them through firm affiliation will likely reassess continued service in light of 
the potential impact upon themselves. Alternatively, firm advantage gained through 
association with a prestigious executive, which is altered will also result in a likelihood 
of outside director exit.  
 
Hypothesis 7: A significant decline in prestige, either on the firm’s 
side or on the director’s side, increases the likelihood of outside 
director exit. 
 
Internal Power Shifts. An additional influence on outsider exit will be a shift in 
the internal power structure of the firm. This shift may come from one, or a combination 
of any of these three factors: 1) CEO succession, 2) the emergence of powerful outside 
shareholders, and 3) an alteration of the board’s social network. The dynamics of these 
may be related, for example, a large institutional shareholder may be successful in 
replacing the CEO and reconfiguring the board with additional board members. This 
would certainly constitute a disruption in the social configuration of the board. 
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Alternatively, the board may take it upon itself to remove the CEO. Regardless of the 
specific circumstances, power shifts disrupt the existing cohesiveness (whatever the 
degree), and this will likely cause an outside director to reexamine his or her continuity 
of board service. 
A tendency for cohesiveness has been shown to relate to effective group 
interaction. Power shifts will likely result in moves from cohesion and toward 
uncertainty. It follows that a loss of cohesiveness will affect the attraction of members to 
the group. On boards with low levels of cohesiveness, members may choose not to stand 
for reelection or resign (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). Cognitive conflict refers to task 
oriented differences in judgment among group members. Such conflict can arouse 
negative emotions that serve to diminish interpersonal attractions among members. 
Many directors respond to high levels of cognitive conflict on the board by reducing 
their commitment to the board (Mace, 1986).  
Moreover, changes in board composition may motivate or precipitate changes in 
strategic direction. Of particular importance may be changes directed at altering the mix 
of insiders or outsiders on the boards. A reduction in outside directors may be seen as 
furthering the interests of the CEO in favor of shareholders, while an increase in outside 
representation might lead to a form of governance more in tune with the interests of 
stockholders. The board may also face the exit of the firm’s CEO. The characteristics of 
that exit will signal the market as to the type of change required. Regardless of the 
conditions surrounding CEO exit (forced, retirement, etc.), board composition has been 
shown to change dramatically following the exit. Ward, Bishop, and Sonnefeld (1999) 
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discovered that the greatest turnover in board composition came after a forced CEO exit, 
but that in all cases of a CEO exit, board turnover was in excess of the rate for average 
attrition. 
The process of executive succession additionally provides an important 
mechanism through which organizational inertia may be overcome (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). Turnover on a board will shift power dynamics and may lead to new ideas and 
interests which may reduce the risk of strategic myopia (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). As 
shown, this tendency for strategic stability is a result of board cohesiveness in 
combination with tenure. The characteristics of a CEO entry are likely to spur change. 
The new CEO, especially one from the outside, will attempt to consolidate power and 
influence by adding outside board members who will be in agreement with his or her 
new strategic direction. 
The exit of a CEO will also engender various social psychological feelings in the 
incumbent board members. Those who ascended to the board during the tenure of the 
CEO are likely to feel the loss of a confederate. The board is also likely to undergo a loss 
of cohesiveness. Various new factions or cliques will develop as the power balance has 
been disturbed and may reemerge in an altered form with a new coalition. Therefore, 
alterations to the status quo associated with disrupted shifts in power are likely to cause a 
reassessment of board service. 
Social capital is a function of brokerage opportunities available in a network 
(Burt, 1997). Most notable, Granovetter (1973) drew upon tie strength while Burt (1992) 
examined structural holes to explain how individuals seek to gain advantage through 
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associations. An individual’s position in this structure becomes a social capital asset and 
is dependent upon connections in the network. When one becomes disconnected through 
changes in network ties, there will likely be a search for alternatives.  
 
Hypothesis 8a: Changes in the internal power structure of either 
the home, or outside firm, increases the likelihood of outside 
director exit. 
 
Hypothesis 8b: CEO succession in either the home, or the outside, 
firm, increases the likelihood of outside director exit. 
 
Hypothesis 8c: Disruptive CEO succession in either the home, or 
the outside firm, (dismissal, forced retirement) increases the 
likelihood of outside director exit more than non-disruptive 
succession. 
 
The decision of an outside director to exit the organization voluntarily results 
from the normal occasions of death, illness, retirement, or through a process of selective 
matching that stems from a scan of the environment and processing those scanned 
images (Beach, 1998). Additionally, it has been argued that prestige enhancing or 
prestige-reducing events will likely influence the decision to stay. Therefore, the 
decision to exit a board position is not a decision undertaken lightly. To a certain degree 
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social and human capital will deteriorate as disconnections occur in the network. Social 
connections dissipate over time resulting in previously strong associations becoming 
weak ones (Granovetter, 1982). Disruptions will likely engender a reevaluation of 
motivations to serve because the previously important links to the executive’s human 
and social capital are disconnected. 
Summary 
The present chapter is organized around the guiding premise of the study. The 
likelihood of a corporate executive becoming, and serving, as an outside director is due 
to identifiable human capital and social capital assets. Accordingly, important 
characteristics of an executives human and social capital were investigated such as: 
education, career events, gender, home firm affiliation, educational prestige, and family 
prestige. 
I expect that human capital and social capital assets will affect outside 
directorships in three phases. The first is the ability of an individual to become an 
outside director. The second phase concerns those who are outside directors. Here I 
examine different patterns of outside directorships. Third, I look at the various contexts 
of outside director exit. Human capital and social capital are each influential in unique 
ways. 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
This chapter provides a description of the methodology used to test the 
hypotheses developed in chapter III. Accordingly, the following is organized into four 
sections: (1) sample description; (2) organization of the data sets; (3) measures; and (4) 
statistical methods. 
Sample 
The sample used in this study originated from the Fortune 1000 list in 1990. In 
1990 Fortune published two lists, the Fortune 500 Industrials and the Fortune 500 
Service. These were combined to establish the original candidate sample. I choose 1990, 
to provide a long window since the study concerned executive careers and directorships. 
Additionally, I use only publicly traded firms for the following two reasons: (1) 
information on officer and director characteristics is normally available for only the 
largest companies, and (2) research on boards primarily targets large publicly traded 
firms for data accessibility and comparison purposes. A listing of each company used is 
contained in Appendix A with its appropriate CNUM and PERMNO. Often companies 
go through name changes and this sample is no exception. During the twelve year 
window studied, I found firms with up to four name changes. For parsimony, I list only 
the first name. Additionally, Appendix A is sorted alphabetically by company name. 871 
firms began the data analysis in 1990. 
The sample was identified as follows. First, I obtained the text listing of the 1000 
firms that made the Fortune list in 1990. These 1000 firms are the candidates for the 
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duration of the study period. The Fortune list is comprised of both public and private 
firms as it utilizes size (assets and sales) for primary inclusion into that years report. For 
each public firm reported in 1990, I obtained officer and director data through publicly 
available corporate filings. Using the criteria described yielded 871 firms. 
Financial and management information was extracted from Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) filings. They include public companies that trade stock on 
the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, or over-the-
counter markets. To be included a firm must provide direct goods or services and file 
with the SEC. This effectively eliminates firms such as management investment 
companies, mutual funds, real estate limited partnerships, and oil and gas drilling funds. 
Companies are included only after appropriate registration filings have been made with 
the SEC. Data was extracted from various public corporate records such as 10-K, 20-F, 
10-Q, 8-K, Proxy Statements, Registrations Statements, Annual report to shareholders, 
and Williams Act filings.  
As mentioned, the original Fortune 1000 list became 871 firms after culling for 
the above criteria. Data was extracted on these 871 firms for all years between and 
including 1990 to 2001. This twelve-year window effectively provides the sample with 
all officers and directors reported over that timeframe for the sample firms. Due to 
mergers, acquisitions and the like, there are 549 companies in the data set at the end of 
the study period, 2001. The total number of firm years over the entire study period is 
10,112. 
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A second data source used in this study is COMPUSTAT. I used this source to 
collect industry segment and various market based or accounting based performance 
measures. Compustat, developed by Standard & Poors, is a database consisting of over 
10,000 active and 11,000 inactive U.S. companies. In addition, the data set includes 
financial ratios, growth rates, profitability, and relative market performance.  
Third, I utilized the 1990 Dun & Bradstreet’s Reference Book of Corporate 
Management to identify demographic variables for the various officers in the study. The 
1990 volumes list, by company, all officers and a biographical sketch.  A typical listing 
includes year of birth, universities attended, previous employment and positions, years 
with current firm, and previous executive titles. From this information I extract age, 
tenure, education achievements, and experience. 
Fourth, I consulted the Lexis-Nexus on-line data information system to assist in 
filling gaps in information from the previous sources. Additionally, firm proxy reports of 
all U.S. publicly held corporations were investigated to obtain additional board seats for 
officers holding outside directorships beyond those firms contained in the 1990 firm 
sample. 
Data Organization 
The present study is primarily concerned with the careers of executives and 
various factors that influence their ability and desire to serve as outside directors.  In 
order to test the hypotheses predicted in this research I employ a variety of methods. 
Accordingly, the testable analysis is presented in a way consistent with the methodology 
and the sample of data upon which that analysis was undertaken. The main difference 
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between the samples utilizing event history methodology concerns who is at risk during 
the sample window.  Additionally, the samples that are cross sectional in nature model 
relationships between a given executive and outside board positions and do not model 
likelihood functions in any way. Following are descriptions of the six data sets created to 
perform the tests as outlined in the theory and hypothesis chapter. I discuss each of these 
in turn plus a summary is located in Appendix B. 
Sample 1. This is the main hazard function dataset and is an  event-history 
dataset.  Each executive identified through Dun and Bradstreet will be included in the 
dataset each year between 1990 and 2001, unless I know of the death of the executive.  
All independent variables are updated each year, except those that are time-invariant like 
educational prestige or family prestige.  The key dependent variable is coded 1/0, and 
indicates whether the executive joined one (or more) outside boards in the following 
year.  This will establish temporal precedence.  For example, all independent variables 
for 1990 are coded as of fiscal year end 1990, but predict whether the executive joined at 
least one outside board in 1991.  Those who did not join an outside board during 1991 
are coded as censored. The variable denoting whether an executive joined a board in any 
given year was constrained between 0 and 4 to minimize the influence of outliers. 
Sample 2. This dataset includes one observation per Dun and Bradstreet 
executive, per outside board affiliation. It tests hypotheses about the kinds of boards that 
executives join, and does not model likelihood functions of any kind.  Conceptually, it is 
a cross-sectional dataset, covering the entire 12-year window of the dataset and only 
includes those executives who joined an outside board subsequent to 1990. 
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Sample 3. This dataset is a subset of sample 1 and consists only of CEOs who 
have served, or are serving, as an outside director. As in sample 1, this is set up as an 
event history data set. The dependent variable of interest is whether a given officer exits 
from his or her outside board position. The basic dataset, with one observation per 
executive, per year, matches only those executives that are reported in Dun and 
Bradstreet for which there is complete demographic information. This data set is a bit 
different from others in that the unit of analysis is the executive year and his or her 
outside firm. It is possible for the executive to have more than one outside firm 
affiliation in any given year so exit board can only be a 1 or a 0, for any given executive, 
outside board, year, pair.  
Sample 4. This dataset is a subset of sample 2 and is cross sectional in nature. 
Observations are collapsed over time representing one observation per executive. It 
establishes the maximum number of boards that any given executive served on in any 
given year over the entire twelve-year sample window. The number of boards was set to 
identify those who serve on multiple boards during any given year. An executive who 
served on either 1 board, or 0 boards, during the sample window is coded 0. Otherwise, I 
code as 1 those who served on more than one board during any given year.  
Sample 5.  Sample 5 investigates officers who joined and exited the boards of 
other firms included in the original Fortune 1000 sample. The original Fortune 1000 
sample consisted of those firms on the list in 1990. I subsequently tracked each firm for 
the next 12 years collecting all officer and director data. This afforded me the 
opportunity to model board exits in the context of changes that occurred to both the 
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home firm and the outside firm. Executives may be listed more than once in this sample 
if they hold more than one outside board position on another Fortune 1000 company. 
Sample 6. This dataset is designed to model CEO succession in the executive’s 
home firm. It contains one observation per CEO per year. When a succession occurs the 
departing executive is tracked to the end of the sample window noting his or her age at 
exit. Additionally, the new CEO is monitored until another succession event occurs or 
the observation is censored at 2001. The organization of this data set affords me the 
opportunity to model succession context such as retirements, dismissals, and whether or 
not the departing CEO remains on the home firm board. Certain variables such as 
staying on as director or board chair are investigated each year and will shift from 0 to 1 
as appropriate. Others like age, increment each year while variables denoting time 
invariant characteristics remain fixed (e.g. dismissal, retirement, age at which CEO 
exited as an officer). 
Measures 
Variables used in the analysis vary from sample to sample, particularly between 
those designed for analysis with event history and those that are cross sectional. Below I 
summarize the variables of interest as to the methodology utilized in their analysis. 
Accordingly, this section is divided into two main categories: (1) variables used in event 
history methodology, and (2) variables used in cross sectional analysis.  
Event History  
The event history data sets analyze the likelihood that a given executive will 
either join a firm as an outside director, or once serving as an outside director exit a 
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given outside directorship. There are four event history data sets and the differences 
between them regards the at risk population of each specific sample and the dependent 
variable. Two of the data sets (Samples 1 & 6) test hypotheses concerning the likelihood 
that a given executive will join as an outside director and the other two data sets 
(Samples 3 & 5) look at outside board exit. 
 For example, Sample 1 contains one observation for each executive listed in the 
1990 Dun and Bradstreet for every year of the sample window (1990-2001) (n= 57,776); 
Sample 3 is a subset of sample 6 and contains only those CEOs at the home firm who 
serve as outside directors (n=12,737); Sample 5 has as its unit of analysis a Fortune 1000 
firm and includes all officers and directors of the Home Fortune 1000 firm who also 
serve as outside directors on another Fortune 1000 firm. Their officerships and 
directorships are observed throughout the sample window (1990-2001) (n=9,704); and 
Sample 6 contains only those executives who are listed as being the top officer of their 
home firm and is carried for every year the executive’s firm is included in the sample (n-
9,734). Table 2 found in Appendix E contains a summary of the variables for each 
sample and the following section provides a description of each. 
Dependent Variables 
Join a Board indicates whether or not an executive joins a board as an outside 
director in the following year. As this study concerns executives who become outside 
directors, I am interested in identifying those individuals in the sample who achieve 
board appointments, accumulate multiple board appointments, lose board seats, as well 
as the associated time lag between these events if such an event exists. Accordingly, the 
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join a board variable represents a snapshot of each individual for each year and whether 
or not that executive attained at least one outside directorship during the following year. 
For example, every unique outside directorship will be scored as a 1 during the year an 
outside directorship is secured and 0 otherwise. This will allow me to include in the risk 
set those who hold no outside director positions as well as those who hold multiple 
outside directorships. Additionally, this affords me the opportunity to extract the 
corresponding time-periods that the directorships were obtained.  
Exit a Board variable is coded when I observe an individual who has attained an 
outside directorship leave that position during the next year. Exit a board is coded for 
those executives who serve on at least one outside board, represented by 1 or 0. 
Independent Variables 
Elite Family Ties (Social Register) is a dichotomous variable that measures 
whether the executive is included in the social register. The social register is an annual 
directory purporting to list the most prestigious members of society in the United States. 
It is administered and published by the Social Register Association since its founding in 
1887. 
Educational Prestige is a dichotomous variable that assigns a 1 to any executive 
that attended a prestigious university for any of his or her degrees and a 0 to all others. I 
use Finkelstein’s (1992) list of elite institutions to measure this component of prestige. 
The University list is detailed in Appendix C. 
Home Director denotes whether or not the executive is a director at the home 
firm. It is generally well established that the distribution of power within the top 
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management team is not evenly divided and therefore some members are more 
influential than others (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). This is a dichotomous variable 
represented by a 1 if the executive is on the home firm board and 0 otherwise. 
CEO / Chair and Pres / COO represents the title of the executive. Titles are 
represented as a dichotomous variable indicating 1 if the executive holds the 
corresponding title and 0 otherwise.  
Promotion to CEO/Chair or President / COO or Inside Director are a series of 
dummy variables indicating whether or not the executive was promoted to the 
corresponding position during the previous year. 
Dismiss is an indicator variable signifying whether or not he person was 
dismissed as CEO of the home firm. Only those CEO’s completely leaving the firm prior 
to age 63 were considered to be dismissed. If they retained a seat on the board, even as a 
non executive officer, they were reasonably considered to be still in favor with the firm 
and may be considered part of a healthy succession event (Vancil, 1987). If appropriate, 
this variable is carried with the executive until the censoring event occurs which is 2001. 
Stay on as Chair (Staych) comes from a sample of executives who previously 
held the title of CEO and subsequently relinquished that title during the sample window. 
This variable indicates that the executive has retained the chairman title and no longer 
serves as CEO of the home firm. This designation stays with the executive as long as the 
chairman title is held. All those who hold this designation are also directors in the firm.  
Stay on as Director (Staydir) additionally comes from the sample of executives 
who previously served as CEO in their home firm. The variable indicates that the 
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executive has remained on the home firm as a director but relinquished any officer 
position and is carried throughout the sample window as long as the position is held. 
This variable is coded as 1 or 0.  
Relay succession is coded 1 to indicate those successions in which the outgoing 
CEO remained on the board but not an officer, and 0 otherwise. The relay variable is 
specific to the type of transition and remains constant until the next succession event, if 
one occurs, rather than staych or staydir, which change as the executive’s position within 
the firm changes. 
Retired is concerned with if, and how, a CEO left the home firm. Most publicly 
traded firms have stated retirement policies for their executives. This typically occurs 
between the ages of 60 to 65. I utilize age 62 or greater as a signal of executive 
retirement. The categorization of this is dichotomous, 1 if retirement and 0 otherwise. 
An executive in this category must not remain as an executive officer but could retain 
the title of board chair or vice chair.  
Firm Prestige Change measures changes in prestige over the sample period. This 
is identified by observing variations in sales performance year to year. Firms 
significantly different from their industry are considered to have undergone a change 
that has influenced onlooker’s perceptions. An index score is calculated for each firm by 
comparing its sales vs. all other firms within its industry for every year the firm is in the 
sample window. A positive score reflects a favorable outcome for the firm and a 
negative value an unfavorable firm outcome. For example, Firm A is ranked in the 
bottom quartile (4) vis-à-vis its industry counterparts in 1991 and is ranked versus its 
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industry counterparts in the second quartile (2) during 1992. This is depicted as 
favorable to Firm A (4-2=2). 
Relative prestige is measured as an index constructed from observing the 
differences between the home firm and the outside firm. I subtract the outside firm sales 
industry quartile in year t from the home firm sales industry quartile in year t. A positive 
score signals that the home firm is more prestigious than the outside firm and vice versa. 
Succession is a characteristic measured for both the home firm and the outside 
firm. It indicates whether the firm has undergone a succession event in the last three 
years. It is a dichotomous variable represented by a 1 if there existed a CEO succession 
event in the last three years and a 0 otherwise. Three years was chosen for two important 
reasons: (1) new executives initially devote a great deal of time to initiating substantive 
action early in their tenure (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996), and (2) the typical term of 
an outside director is three years, so logically for turnover to occur it is most likely when 
the director’s term expires if not earlier. 
Ex-CEO Stay on as Chair (X-CEO Staych) is a firm level characteristic for both 
the home firm and the outside firm. It indicates whether the exiting CEO stayed on the 
board in the role of Chairman or not. This variable indicates that the firm’s former CEO 
has retained the chairman title and no longer serves as top officer at the home firm.  
Ex-CEO Stay on as Director (X-CEO Staydir) is similar to the X-CEO remaining 
as board chair except in this case the departing CEO remains on the board without any 
special designation other than director. This variable serves as an indication of the power 
distribution within the firm (Finkelstein, 1988) and an indicator of the type of succession 
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the firm has undergone. This variable is identified for both the home firm and the outside 
firm when applicable. 
Ex-CEO Retired is concerned with how an exiting CEO left the firm and depicts 
a characteristic of both the home firm and the outside firm. Most publicly traded firms 
have stated retirement policies for their executives. This typically occurs between the 
ages of 60 to 65. Previous research suggests that age is one way to differentiate between 
retirement and involuntary separation (Cannella & Shen, 2001; Ocasio, 1994; Puffer & 
Weintrop, 1991). I utilize age 63 or greater as a signal of executive retirement. The 
categorization of this is dichotomous, 1 if retirement and 0 otherwise. An executive in 
this category must not remain as an executive officer or as a director in the firm. This 
variable is identified for both the home firm and the outside firm. 
Ex-CEO dismissal is a firm level characteristic that identifies whether or not the 
previous CEO was dismissed in either or both the home firm or the outside firm. 
Previous research on CEO turnover has often relied upon the age of the incumbent in 
determining succession intent. This allows for a differentiation between a normal 
succession and one considered to be more contentious. Age 63 is often used as an 
indicator if deciding whether the incumbent left office voluntarily (Ocasio, 1994; Puffer 
& Weintrop, 1991). Only those individuals completely leaving the firm prior to age 63 
were considered to be dismissed. If they retained a seat on the board, even as a non 
executive officer, they were reasonably considered to be still in favor with the firm and 
may be considered part of a healthy succession event (Vancil, 1987). 
  98   
  
Control Variables 
Firm Size is calculated as the natural logarithm of the firm’s total sales during 
each fiscal year. Size has been found influential in performance (Porter, 1980) and this is 
included as a control. While several methods have previously been employed to measure 
size (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1994), I elected to 
use the log of sales due to the nature of my sample (Fortune 1000). This is, where 
appropriate, calculated for either or both the home firm and the outside firm. 
Executive Age is coded in years.  
Company exit is controlled, as approximately one third of the original Fortune 
firms in 1990 did not survive through to 2001 and is coded 0 or 1. Each executive 
though was retained throughout the 12-year window to identify any potential outside 
directorships. Therefore, it is important to identify any mitigating factors that might 
result in obtaining, or losing, an outside directorship due to the executive’s home 
company leaving the data set. 
Officer Tenure is a measure reflecting the years of service of an executive in their 
home firm. This equates to Becker’s (1993) notion of specific knowledge in that 
individuals who have spent the majority of their career in one firm or one industry are 
likely to have common experiences with other such experienced executives (Hitt & 
Tyler, 1991). Those executives who have largely remained at one firm are expected to 
have fewer social capital assets than those who have moved from firm to firm during 
their careers.  
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Executive exit measures whether and when an executive leaves his or her home 
firm. Outside directorships, if any, were tracked for all executives in the original 1990 
list. However, as to be expected with a 12-year window, I observed certain executives 
leaving their home firm, and executive exit measures that phenomenon.  
Home CEO Tenure and Outside CEO Tenure reflects the years of service that the 
current CEO of a firm has accumulated in their firm. This equates to Becker’s (1993) 
notion of specific knowledge in that individuals who have spent the majority of their 
career in one firm or one industry are likely to have common experiences with other 
such experienced executives (Hitt & Tyler, 1991).  
Return on Assets (ROA) is identified as an operating measure for firm 
performance (Boyd, 1994; Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Zajac, 1990) ROA was 
calculated by as annual income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations 
divided by net assets, calculated as a percentage. This measure is established for both the 
home firm and the outside firm. 
Cross Sectional Data Sets  
 The following data sets utilized cross sectional analysis and therefore are not to 
be interpreted as suggesting likelihoods, rather they represent relationships between 
various variables of interest. Table 3 found in Appendix E provides a summary of the 
variables included in Samples 2 and 4. 
Dependent and Independent Variables 
Female reflects the identification of each executive as male or female.  
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Outside and home firm type represents whether a given executive is associated 
with a predominantly manufacturing or service oriented firm. Home firm type is 
designated as a 1 if the executive belongs to a manufacturing oriented firm and a 0 
otherwise (representing a service oriented firm). The designation emanates from the SIC 
listing at a one-digit level. Firms with one-digit SIC codes between 1 and 4 inclusive are 
designated as manufacturing oriented and firms with one-digit SIC codes between 5 and 
9 inclusive are designated as service oriented. For a complete listing of SIC codes refer 
to Appendix D. 
Educational Prestige is the same variable as that used in the event history 
models. I measure the executive’s educational prestige through a dichotomous variable 
that assigns a 1 to any executive that attended a prestigious university for any of his or 
her degrees and a 0 to all others. I use Finkelstein’s (1995) list of elite institutions to 
measure this component of prestige. A specific listing of the universities used in listed in 
Appendix C. 
Home and Outside Firm Prestige assesses the alignment between the executive 
and the firms they represent, either as an officer or as an outside director. I argue that 
firms will attempt to match the prestige of the individual as represented by their home 
firm standing with the types of firms they join as outside directors. To establish a 
measure of firm prestige I first create a ranking of each firm in my sample to its related 
firms within a two-digit industry SIC as reported in Compustat. I then calculate in which 
quartile my sample firm lies within its industry. I create this measure for sales, 
employees, assets, and return on assets. For example, those firms with the highest sales 
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in its two-digit industry SIC code will be aligned in quartile 1 and those firms with the 
lowest sales in an industry will be aligned in quartile 4. A measure for both the home 
firm and the outside firm are calculated. 
Elite Family Ties (Social Register) is the same variable as used in the event 
history models and measures whether the executive is included in the social register. The 
social register is an annual directory purporting to list the most prestigious members of 
society in the United States. It is administered and published by the Social Register 
Association since its founding in 1887. 
Number of boards is a dichotomous variable represented by a 1 if the executive 
sits on more than one board during the year and 0 otherwise. Serving on multiple boards 
is a way for executives to increase their human and social capital. While service as an 
outside director is a time consuming proposition, I argue that only those most interested 
in advancing, or at a minimum, maintaining their personal prestige will serve on multiple 
boards. 
Sample Descriptives 
The following section provides a summary of the various data sets employed by 
this study and accordingly organizes the discussion around the data samples. Event 
history data sets and cross sectional data sets are discussed in turn and characterized by 
Pearson correlations, means, standard deviations, and ranges. 
Event History-Sample 1 
Table 4 found in Appendix E reports means, standard deviations, ranges, and 
Pearson correlations for the variables identified in sample 1.  This is a summary of all 
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observations for all years over the entire study period (1990-2001), which equates to one 
observation for each executive for each year.  As a reminder, Sample 1 consists of 
executives identified in Dun and Bradstreet Corporate Reference Book of Management 
in 1990 and who also served as an officer at a 1990 Fortune 1000 firm. These executives 
(n=5,185) were traced for 12 years to identify all public outside directorship affiliations. 
The resulting executive, year, outside directorship observations total 57,776. The table 
provides a summary of the individuals in our sample and should be interpreted with care, 
as executives are listed more than once in the sample. This is because any given 
executive may join any number of outside boards either multiple times in a single year or 
over the entire sample window (1990-2001). 
Given this reservation, the table suggests that the executive’s average age is 59, 
ranging from 31 to 102. In actuality, due to the large size of the sample, I did not 
discretely identify whether each executive was still living at the time of the observation. 
Therefore, I carry each executive throughout the sample window unless he or she was 
listed as deceased in the company proxy statement. Observing those in the sample listed 
as over the age of 80 suggests that they should not be influential in the final analysis. 
Thirty-three individuals covering 268 observations represent executives listed as greater 
than age 80. After reaching that age, only 3% joined a board and 27% continued to serve 
as a director at their home firm while 75% had previously exited their company. 
The dependent variable is this sample is join a board and is set to a 1 when I 
observe an executive join an outside board(s) during the following year and set to 0 
when no outside board affiliations occur during the next year.  
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Additionally, 2% of the executives are included in the social register, 35% 
attended a prestigious university, 20% attained the status of inside director, 10% held the 
title of CEO and / or Chair of the Board, 6% held the tile of President and / or Chief 
Operating Officer, and about 3% of the sample went through a promotion incident. I 
controlled for both the exit of the company and the exit of the executive from the home 
firm. While 59% of the executives were observed as leaving their home firm during the 
sample window, 17% of the firms represented by these executives also did not survive 
the sample duration. Lastly, those executives in the sample averaged almost 14 years of 
tenure at their home firm as officers. Company tenure was held constant if the executive 
left the home firm. 
Event History-Sample 3 
Table 5 located in Appendix E reports means, standard deviations, ranges, and 
Pearson correlations for the variables identified in Sample 3. This sample data set 
consists of executives who are the top officers (CEO) at their firms and who during the 
sample window served on an outside board. It was created to model CEOs who leave 
outside directorship positions. Overall, 17% of our sample CEOs exited a board during 
the sample window. The age of Sample 3 is a bit older (61) than Sample 1 owing to the 
limitation of using only a firm’s top officer. Additionally, these executives accumulated 
an average of almost 18 years of officer tenure at their home firms, 26% were involved 
in a relay succession and 74% left their firm after age 63.  
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Event History-Sample 5 
Table 6 found in Appendix E reports means, standard deviations, ranges, and 
Pearson correlations for the variables identified in Sample 5. This sample data set 
consists of executives who were officers of a 1990 Fortune 1000 firm in 1990 and 
additionally held a position as outside director at another of the Fortune 1000 firm 
during the sample window. This was done to establish a succession history for both the 
home firm and the outside firm since the data set included all officers and directors of 
these firms over a twelve-year period.  
Overall, 11% of this sample exited a board during the observation window and 
were on average approximately 62 years of age. Prestige change was measured by 
constructing an index of sales change vs. the relevant industry lagging the results for 
three years. As each of these firms were in the Fortune 1000 using sales as an indicator 
of prestige is relevant given the way each firm is ranked within the Fortune 1000 
system. For each year, for each firm, I rank the sales of a given firm with that of its 
rivals based on a two-digit SIC classification. I then developed the respective quartile for 
each firm in each specific year. Both the home and outside firm appear to be relatively 
stable on average. All three-year lags produced similar results. As the sample originated 
in the Fortune 1000 there is correspondingly a high percentage of these firms that are in 
the first quartile of their industry. Interestingly, when comparing the home firm to the 
outside firm (relative prestige) there is a slightly negative mean suggesting that 
executives tend to affiliate as outside directors with firms that are slightly bigger than 
their home firm. 
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Event History-Sample 6 
Table 7 found in Appendix E reports means, standard deviations, ranges, and 
Pearson correlations for the variables identified in Sample 6. This data set consists of the 
top officer for each firm and investigates those who join a board.  The top officer (CEO) 
was selected to provide consistency with prior executive succession research. Executives 
in this sample are typically listed more than once. As this data set models CEO 
succession, each CEO is modeled throughout his or her tenure as an officer. For 
example, if a given CEO remains CEO between 1990 and 2001 then there will be one 
observation per year depicting that CEO’s status in the firm. However, when and if a 
succession occurs, the predecessor is tracked to the end of the window with both time 
invariant variables such as dismissed or retired and time changing variables such as age 
or titles. Each succession event is tracked as it occurs.  Since this data set provides time 
invariant variables over multiple observations I am unable to interpret many of the 
means from Table 7.  
Cross Sectional -Sample 2  
Table 8 reports means, standard deviations, ranges, and Pearson correlations for 
the variables identified in Sample 2. This dataset includes one observation per Dun and 
Bradstreet executive, per outside board affiliation.  It tests hypotheses about the kinds of 
boards that executives join, and does not model likelihood functions of any kind.  
Conceptually, it is a cross-sectional dataset and includes 6,858 discrete executive / 
outside board affiliations. To be included the executive must be observed joining a board 
subsequent to 1990.  
  106   
  
A view of Table 8, found in Appendix E, suggests that most executives serve on 
firms which classify their primary SIC as manufacturing oriented. This is both for the 
home firm (77%) as well as any outside firm affiliations (66%). The original Fortune 
1000 (comprised of 500 industrial and 500 service firms) sample became 871 in 1990 
after culling for public corporations and 549 in 2001 owing to attrition due to mergers, 
acquisitions, and the like. The data suggests that more service-oriented firms fell off the 
list rather than their manufacturing counterparts.   
Home and outside firm prestige is measured through the firm’s sales rank within 
its industry. A 1 indicates that a particular firm is in the top quartile of its industry and a 
4 depicts firms in the bottom quartile. As expected, sample home firms are mostly in 
their top quartile (mean = 1.10; s.d. = .35) since the list originated from the Fortune 
1000. However, there is a much wider dispersion in outside firm affiliations (mean = 
1.82; s.d. = 1.07) suggesting more variety in terms of the types of boards executives of 
the Fortune 1000 join. Individual prestige as measured by educational prestige and 
inclusion in the social register also provides some interesting insight into those 
executives who join outside boards as 44% attended a prestigious university while only 
3% are included in the social register. 
Cross Sectional -Sample 4 
Table 9 located in Appendix E reports means, standard deviations, ranges, and 
Pearson correlations for the variables identified in Sample 4. This data set contains one 
observation per executive and identifies the maximum number of outside boards served 
on during the sample window.  It consists of 5,131 discrete executive observations.  
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Several measures were used to proxy executive prestige. Overall, 24% of the 
executives in this sample served on more than one outside board during the study period. 
Additionally, 2% of the executives were female, 34% attended a prestigious university, 
2% were included in the social register, and 20% were over the age of 63 at the time they 
served on more than one outside board.  
Statistical Methods 
In addition to general descriptive statistics, I employ two primary methods to test 
the hypothesis in Chapter III. The first is event history analysis (Allison, 1984; 
Yamaguchi, 1991) and is used to investigate data collected in Samples 1, 3, 5, and 6. 
This method is designed to analyze longitudinal data when the dependent variable is a 
discrete event and the timing of the event is of interest. The year of the observation is the 
underlying time-based variable.  The analysis was conducted using Stata 7.0, and the 
survival-time analytical procedures (stset and streg).  These provide maximum 
likelihood estimation of both monotonic and nonmonotonic parametric models of 
duration dependence (1999).  A parametric model is appropriate with the data used 
because time is of importance to the analysis. In other words, my origin of time begins 
with the sample window employed (1990) and therefore the likelihood of joining a board 
could not precede that date nor come after 2001.  
I additionally choose an exponential distribution because it assumes the baseline 
hazard is constant (Allison, 1984; Cleves, Gould, & Gutierrez, 2002). I therefore assume 
that each executive is at risk each year for either joining an outside board or exiting an 
outside board if serving on one. Additionally, I assume that the time period in question 
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(1990-2001) is a relatively short period in an executive’s overall career and that my 
variables of interest are more powerful in explaining outside directorships than the mere 
passage of time. 
The second method of analysis utilizes a series of significance tests compared 
against a theoretical Chi-square distribution. Significance testing in this study 
investigates Samples 2 and 4. Chi-square is a family of distributions commonly used for 
significance testing. This statistic is used to test the hypothesis of no association of 
columns and rows in tabular data. Chi square analysis is more likely to find significance 
to the extent that (1) the relationship is strong, (2) the sample size is large, and/or (3) the 
number of values of the two associated variables is large (Hamilton, 1992).  
I conduct hypothesis tests utilizing contingency tables in order to decide whether 
or not effects are present. Effects in a contingency table are defined as relationships 
between the row and column variables; that is, are the levels of the row variable 
differentially distributed over levels of the column variables. Significance in this 
hypothesis test means that interpretation of the cell frequencies is warranted. Non-
significance means that any differences in cell frequencies can be explained by chance. 
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first presents results of 
hypotheses tested with event history methods and the second discusses results obtained 
through cross sectional analyses. 
Event History Analysis 
I present evidence, which indicates the likelihood a given executive will join or 
exit a corporate board as an outside director. The section following begins with a brief 
overview of each sample. Thereafter, I discuss relevant hypothesis testing for each 
particular data sample in turn. 
Sample 1 
 This is the primary event history database and consists of one observation per 
executive per year for the entire sample window (n=57,776) (1990-2001). It was formed 
by identifying the officers of the Fortune 1000 firms in 1990 and then tracking their 
corporate career at their home firm as well as obtaining any outside directorship 
affiliations they might have during the sample window. If an executive left his or her 
home firm, I continued to collect outside directorship information and control for the 
firm exit up until 2001. Additionally, the 1990 total officer sample was reduced from 
11,397 to 5,185 executives. This is due to the lack of available executive demographics 
in the 1990 Dun and Bradstreet Reference Book of Corporate Management. 
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Sample 1 was constructed in order to test hypotheses concerning an executive’s 
home firm career and their prestigious affiliations to investigate whether these influence 
the likelihood a given executive will join a corporate board as an outside director. 
The results of hypotheses concerning the likelihood an executive will join a 
board are reported in Appendix E, Table 10.  Note that the coefficients reported are odds 
ratios.  It is relatively straightforward to interpret odds ratios represented by a dummy 
independent variable.  In that case, the odds ratio is the likelihood of the event for a 
person with the dummy variable equal to 1, divided by the likelihood of the event for a 
person with the dummy variable equal to 0.  For example, in Table 10, the odds ratio for 
the variable director is 2.32.  This means that an executive who holds the title director, in 
his or her home firm, is 2.32 times more likely to join an outside board in a given year as 
an executive who does not hold the director title.   
The evidence in Table 10 provides partial support for my arguments.  Hypothesis 
1a predicts that holding one or more of the top titles in the home firm will increase the 
likelihood that an executive will join an outside board.  The results for those holding the 
title of CEO or Chairman (odds ratio=3.03; p<. 001) support this hypothesis.  Moreover, 
the results for those holding the title of President and or COO are also significant but at 
approximately one half the rate (odds ratio = 1.43; p< .001) of those with the CEO or 
Chair title.  Therefore, Hypothesis 1a receives strong support for those in the uppermost 
positions in the corporate hierarchy.   
Hypothesis 1b predicted that officers who are insider directors are more likely to 
join outside boards.  This hypothesis also receives strong support from the evidence in 
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Table 10.  The odds ratio of 2.32 is highly significant (p<. 001) and suggestive that being 
on the home firm board significantly increases the likelihood that an executive will join 
an outside board.  
Hypothesis 1c predicted that the promotion to insider director, CEO, Chairman, 
and COO or President would provide a “bump” in the likelihood of joining an outside 
board.  The results in Table 10 are mixed.  An executive who relinquishes the CEO title 
but retains the Chair position does increase his or her odds of nomination to an outside 
board in the year of the title change (odds ratio = 1.25; p<. 05).  However, promotion to 
director (odds ratio= 1.02; n.s.) and promotion to president / COO (odds ratio=1.03; n.s.) 
although both positive are both not significant. Interestingly, the promotion to CEO / 
Chair (odds ratio= .83;p<. 05) significantly reduces the likelihood of accepting an 
outside board appointment in the year of the appointment, contrary to hypotheses H1c. 
Hypothesis 4a and 4c predicted the likelihood a given executive would join a 
board is influenced by the nature of their prestigious affiliations (educational and family, 
respectively).  Results from Table 10 provide mixed support.  Those who attended a 
prestigious university have an increased likelihood of joining a corporate board as an 
outsider (1.11; p < .01). Alternatively, those with elite family ties are significantly less 
likely to join a board as an outsider than others (odds ratio = .75; p=.01).  
As expected firm size, age of the executive, and tenure as an officer are also 
influential in obtaining outside directorship positions. Interestingly, an executive who 
leaves his or her home firm does change the likelihood that he or she will join a 
corporate board (odds ratio = 3.31; p < .001). In contrast, whether the executive’s 
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company remains viable (e.g. merger, acquisition, bankruptcy, take-over) throughout the 
sample window is not influential. This finding is likely more complex than tested here. 
However, it is interesting to note that executives who leave a Fortune 1000 firm improve 
their odds of joining a board, which stands in contrast to whether their home firm 
remains as a separate entity or not.  
To further explore the exit of an executive from his or her home firm, I analyzed 
various interactions, notably prestige and size. Interactions with the variables 
representing prestige and the exit of an executive were not significant. However, the 
interaction of firm size and executive exit was influential in obtaining board positions 
(odds ratio=1.25; p>.001). This suggests that those executives who leave the largest 
home firms significantly increase their likelihood of joining corporate boards. 
Sample 3 
This sample data set consists of those executives listed as the top officer (CEO) 
at their firm and who during the sample window served on an outside board. The data set 
is limited to top officers to model retirements consistent with prior research (e.g. 
Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993). It was created to investigate those who leave outside 
directorship positions and executives are listed more than once when they serve on more 
than one board. Table 11, found in Appendix E, presents the results of the event history 
models and models of outside director exit. Care should be taken when interpreting the 
results. Due to the presence of high multicollinearity between variables, Models 2, 3, and 
4 are run independent of each other.  
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Hypothesis 5a predicted that CEO retirements from the home firm would affect 
directorship opportunities. Additional hypotheses, tested in Sample 6, argue that the 
context of the retirement influence these opportunities. However, the retirement event in 
and of itself is worthy of investigation to ascertain the logical direction of effect. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 5a is divided into two sections: one in Sample 3 investigating 
retirement effects upon outside board exit; and one in Sample 6 investigating outside 
board entries. 
Hypothesis 5a-1 regarding outside board exit predicted that an executive 
retirement event would influence the individual’s outside board affiliations. In support of 
this, I found those executives who left their home firm and were 63 years of age and 
older are significantly less likely to join an outside board after that event (odds ratio= 
.60; p<. 001).  
While not specifically predicted, I investigated the impact of retirement context 
upon outside director exit. If a CEO is involved in a relay succession (coded when an 
executive relinquished their position as an officer and stayed on the board as either a 
director or as a director and board chair) the CEO is significantly more likely to exit 
existing outside boards than others (odds ratio=1.79; p<. 001). A relay succession 
indicates a normal and healthy transition in the firm (Vancil, 1987) and additionally 
identifies those CEOs predisposed to continuing board service, at least at the home firm. 
Further, noting the strong association between a relay succession and a retirement event, 
the interaction between the two was tested. In contrast to that expected, a CEO who stays 
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on the home firm board at retirement, significantly enhances the likelihood that he or she 
will exit other directorships (odds ratio= 1.40; p<. 01).  
Sample 5 
This data set has as its base Fortune 1000 firms in 1990, which are subsequently 
tracked for 12 years. Each firm contains observations for all officers and directors. 
Sample 5 models those executives who are officers at one Fortune 1000 firm and serve 
on the board of another Fortune 1000 firm during the observation window. The sample 
contains a unique observation for each officer / outside directorship and models their exit 
from that outside position. The executive observation period starts either in 1990 or 
when they join the outside board. The executive observation ends either through 
censoring in 2001, or when the executive exits an outside board. Therefore, each 
observation models a unique executive, home firm, outside firm, year match, as 
appropriate (many executives did not join the board of another Fortune 1000 firm). 
Table 12, located in Appendix E, displays the results of an event history analysis 
where the dependent variable of interest is outside board exit. Hypothesis 7 predicted 
that significant declines in prestige at either the home firm or the outside firm would 
increase the likelihood that a given executive would terminate their relationship with the 
outside firm. Although not reported separately, there is a significant tendency for those 
executives who are in the 2nd, 3rd, or 4th quartile of their industry to align themselves 
with outside firms who are in the 1st quartile of their industry (χ2= 48.95; p<. 001).  This 
suggests that outside directorships might serve as a means for executives who join 
boards to enhance their own prestige through alignment with prestigious outside boards.  
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Additional testing on Hypothesis 7 received mixed support. To further test 
prestige change, I analyzed the sample Fortune 1000 firms in three distinct ways, 
depicted by Model 2 in Table 12. First, home firm prestige change measured variations 
in a firm’s overall revenue generation, which is the foundation for inclusion into the 
original Fortune 1000 list. Each firm in the sample was lagged for three years and an 
index was created to assess differences. This index score was created to provide a picture 
of the firms overall profile in line with the Fortune ranking system (i.e. those with the 
most sales are highest on the list). The index I created measures the firm’s net sales as 
compared with its industry counterparts. It is then subsequently placed into its respective 
industry / sales quartile. Three years was chosen in order to provide a large enough 
window to gauge any fundamental changes in the firm’s revenue profile. A positive 
score reflects a favorable outcome for the firm and likewise a negative value signals an 
unfavorable outcome. Results of this analysis suggest that changes in home firm prestige 
are not influential in whether an executive would exit his or her outside board position 
(odds ratio=.92; n.s.). 
To further test prestige change, I preformed the same analysis on the outside 
firm. Interestingly, results contradict that predicted by suggesting that when outside 
firms significantly improve their prestige board exits increase (odds ratio= 1.52; p< .01). 
In contrast to that expected, instead of declines in prestige increasing the likelihood of 
board exit, increases in prestige increase the likelihood of exit. Prestige gains in the 
outside firm apparently suggest changes in their board composition. 
  116   
  
Third, I determined a relative prestige measure, which looked at the difference 
between the prestige levels of the home firm relative to the outside firm. I utilized the 
firm / industry quartile ranking system discussed previously. A positive score reflected 
that the home firm was more prestigious than the outside firm, while alternatively a 
negative score reflected the home firm was less prestigious than the outside firm. Results 
of this test reflect an insignificant relationship (odds ratio=.99; n.s.). This suggests that 
relative differences between the home and outside firm are not significant influences on 
executive exit from outside board positions. 
 Models 3 and 4 in Table 12 test Hypotheses 8a and 8b, which deal with power 
shifts in the upper echelons of the organization. I performed two separate tests of upper 
echelon changes through a CEO succession event. First, I analyzed the impact of a 
succession event at both the home firm and the outside firm. Models 3 and 4 provide 
mixed support for Hypotheses 8a and 8b. A home firm succession significantly reduces 
the likelihood that an executive will terminate his or her outside board position (odds 
ratio= .38; p<. 001). Conversely, a succession event at the outside firm significantly 
increases the likelihood that a given executive will exit his or her outside board position 
(odds ratio= 1.23; p. >01).  This may suggest that instability in the home firm creates the 
need to continue outside affiliation while instability in the outside firm initiates board 
changes as predicted.  Additionally, and contrary to what was expected, when the exiting 
CEO retains the position of board chair in the outside firm there is a significantly 
increased likelihood of board exit (odds ratio= 1.56; p<. 001). This does not hold if the 
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exiting CEO merely remains on the board as a non-executive director  (odds ratio=1.15; 
n.s.) or leaves the firm altogether and retires (odds ratio= 1.01; n.s.). 
Finally, Model 5 in Table 12 reports results testing Hypothesis 8c. In Model 5, I 
test the impact of a CEO dismissal upon board exit and find that neither a dismissal in 
the home firm (odds ratio= .92; n.s.), nor a dismissal in the outside firm (odds ratio= .92; 
n.s.), will significantly influence outside board exit. This seems to contradict the results 
regarding succession instability at the firm. However, the results might be indicating the 
influence of power shifts at the firm. It is likely that the board is becoming more 
influential and “taking charge” during a CEO dismissal thereby consolidating and 
enhancing its role in firm outcomes. 
As expected the age of the executive is influential in all 5 Models of outside 
board exit (odds ratio= 1.16; p<. 001). As the executive ages, he or she is more likely to 
leave an outside board position. However, the size of the home firm and size of the 
outside firm are not influential. Sample 5 additionally controlled for firm performance 
by measuring return on assets. This was done because of the unique nature of this 
sample and its use of firm characteristics vs. an individual level of analysis in the other 
event history models. In all models, home firm performance is insignificant in 
determining board exit (odds ratio= .99; n.s.), while there is some significant relationship 
between performance and the outside firm however, the influence appears slight (odds 
ratio=. 99; p<. 05). 
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Sample 6 
This sample data set consists of those executives who are listed as the top officer 
(CEO) at their firm and who during the sample window served on an outside board. The 
data set is limited to top officers to model retirements consistent with prior research (e.g. 
Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993). It was created to investigate those who accept outside 
directorship positions. Hypotheses 1d, 5a, and 5c predicted that exits from the home firm 
would affect future directorship opportunities. A companion hypothesis for retirement 
events is tested in Sample 3, which modeled outside directorship exits. In Sample 6, I 
model the likelihood that the context of a CEO exit from the home firm will be 
influential in the likelihood that CEO will obtain additional directorships beyond that 
possessed at the time of firm exit. 
Table 13, located in Appendix E, displays the results of an event history analysis 
where the dependent variable of interest is outside board entry. Hypotheses 1d, 5a, and 
5c predicted that a CEO retirement event would influence that individual’s outside board 
affiliations. 
Hypothesis 1d predicted that CEOs dismissed by their home firms would be less 
likely to join outside boards. Consistent with prior work (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; 
Ocasio, 1994) I identified those executives who served as the top officer of their firm 
(typically the CEO) and who left the firm before turning age 63. 63 has been shown as a 
break point between those exits, which are voluntary vs. those that are not. Contrary to 
my prediction, Model 2 in Table 13 suggests that CEOs who left the firm before age 63 
(traditionally accepted as a sign of dismissal) significantly enhanced the likelihood they 
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will serve on additional outside boards (odds ratio=5.36; p<. 001). It appears the 
dismissal event creates the need for external linkages to restore, to the degree possible, 
the executive’s human capital and enhance their social capital network. 
In addition, hypotheses 5a-1 and 5c predicted that an executive retirement would 
influence directorships and that the context of the retirement would be influential. Model 
3 in Table 13 presents evidence for these two complementary hypotheses. Initially I 
tested the main effect of retirement upon joining a board and found a significant but 
negative relationship (odds ratio= .24; p < .001). Those top executives of a firm who 
exited their firm after retirement age significantly reduced the likelihood of joining a 
board subsequent to that event. This suggests that events prior to CEO retirement are 
more influential in gaining board appointments that post-CEO service. 
However, when a retirement is coded as a relay succession (CEO relinquished 
officer status but remained on the board as a director), the likelihood of joining 
subsequent outside boards is significantly increased (odds ratio = 1.65; p < .001). This is 
in keeping with my prediction that those who remain on their home firm boards are more 
desirous of board service than others. Due to the naturally high colinearity between 
retirement and relay succession a mediating effect was not investigated.  
As expected, both firm size and executive age are positively and significantly 
related to the likelihood of joining an outside board and consistent with prior analysis 
(respectively odds ratio= 1.31; p< .001: odds ratio = 1.06; p <. 001). Neither the 
company exiting the sample (odds ratio = .00; n.s.) nor the CEO’s tenure as an officer 
(odds ratio = 1.00; n.s.) was important in obtaining outside board appointments. 
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Cross Sectional Analysis 
I analyze Samples 2 and 4 through establishment of a series of contingency 
tables. A contingency table is a table showing the responses of subjects to one 
categorical variable as a function of another categorical variable. For instance, to 
investigate the types of boards executives in my sample join, I produce a contingency 
table, which utilizes the characteristic of the home firm and those of the outside firm. 
The entries show the number of subjects at each category and examine the relationship 
between subjects' scores on two qualitative or categorical variables.  
If the columns are not contingent on the rows, then the rows and column 
frequencies are independent. The chi square test of independence is used to test the 
relationship between rows and columns for significance. The null hypothesis is that there 
is no relationship between row and column frequencies.  
Sample 2 
This dataset includes one observation per Dun and Bradstreet executive, per 
outside board affiliation.  It is used to test hypotheses about the kinds of boards that 
executives join, and does not model likelihood functions of any kind.  Conceptually, it is 
a cross-sectional dataset, covering the entire 10-year window of the dataset and consists 
of 6,858 observations. Each of these observations represents a unique executive / outside 
board pairing.  
Hypothesis 2 predicted that due to the unique characteristics that women 
executives bring to directorship service, they would tend to join outside boards of firms 
that place additional value not only on their ability to bring legitimacy to the board but 
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also to serve the interests of their firm’s influential stakeholders. I argued that women 
executives, when serving in outside directorship positions, would likely be aligned with 
service oriented firms rather than manufacturing oriented firms. To test this, I identified 
each executive’s home firm affiliation through a one digit SIC code (reference Appendix 
D). Alternative tests were conducted at a two-digit level with substantially the same 
results. 
Table 14, found in Appendix E, presents the contingency table and Chi-Square 
results investigating if those executives coded as female tend to join as outside directors 
the boards of firms who are more likely to have women as important stakeholders. 
Accordingly, Hypothesis 2 predicted a positive relationship. No support was found for 
this prediction (χ2= 3.82; n.s.). Women executives appear randomly dispersed between 
firms that list their primary industrial classification as manufacturing and those 
characterized as service.  In addition, those who did join an outside board seemed to 
favor firms whose primary industrial classification is listed as manufacturing. 
Approximately 66% of the total joined the boards of manufacturing firms while the 
remaining 34% joined the boards of service firms, regardless of gender. 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b investigate the types of boards that executives join in 
relation to their home firm. Theory argued that the resources an executive brings to 
board service through their human and social capital would be most valued where their 
expertise would be of greatest benefit to the outside firm. Therefore, Hypothesis 3a 
predicted a positive relationship between those executives who originate from 
manufacturing firms and the likelihood they will accept outside board appointments of 
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other manufacturing firms. Support was found for this prediction (χ2= 111.08; p<. 001) 
as those executives who came from manufacturing firms are more likely to accept 
positions as outside directors on other manufacturing oriented firms.  Approximately 
70% of executives who have manufacturing as their home firm choose to join the boards 
of firms categorized similarly. 
Hypothesis 3b argued likewise for those executives who have service oriented 
home firms. I predicted that the same specific human and social capital important for 
manufacturing oriented firms would be present for service oriented firms. Table 15 in 
Appendix E reports the results on my findings. While significant difference between 
means was observed (χ2= 111.08; p<. 001), the direction was not as anticipated.  Table 
14 suggests that executives who list their home firm as service are more likely to align 
their outside board directorships with manufacturing firms. While the difference is not as 
varied as manufacturing executives, there still is a significant difference. 55% of those 
who have service as a home firm designation choose manufacturing firms for their 
outside directorships while the remaining 45% choose to join other service firms. 
Hypothesis 4b predicted that the prestige of the home firm would shape the type 
of outside board affiliation. In other words, those executives who originate from firms 
that are more prestigious will seek to align themselves with outside boards of equivalent 
status. Table 16 presents evidence of a significant difference between the prestige of the 
home firm and the outside firm. To assess prestige, I used a ranking of the firm sales 
within its industry and then characterized its position relative to that industry. For 
example, if the home firm was first in sales within its primary two digit SIC 
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classification, it was placed into quartile 1. If the firm was last in sales within its industry 
it was placed in quartile 4. This process was duplicated for the outside firm. 
Results from Table 16, found in Appendix E, suggest significant differences 
between the prestige of the home firm and that of the outside firm (χ2= 44.28; p<. 001). 
Examination of Table 16 reveals that there is a tendency for those executives who come 
from prestigious home firms to align themselves with the most prestigious outside firm. 
However, 45% of those executives who come from the most prestigious home firm also 
align themselves with outside firms in quartiles 2, 3, and 4. Of note is quartile 4, the 
lowest category of sales ranking within an industry. For all categories of home firm 
prestige, there was a larger representation of executives who joined boards of outside 
firms in quartile 4 than in quartile 3. Additionally, there appears to be a pattern of 
moving up from lower status to higher status. For executives of home firms in quartile 2, 
3, and 4 there is a tendency to align themselves with higher status firms than that of their 
home firm. 
The last hypothesis tested with Sample 2 is 4d, which predicted that individual 
executive prestige such as having prestigious family connections would influence the 
types of outside board positions a given executive would accept. Following the previous 
hypothesis, I measured outside firm prestige as that firms sales ranking within in 
industry, measure at a two digit SIC classification level. Table 17, located in Appendix 
E, displays two types of executive prestige, previous educational affiliations and family 
connections. Hypothesis 4d concerning family connections is not supported (χ2= 3.34; 
n.s.). Prestigious family connections do not appear influential in deciding which board 
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opportunities to undertake. This implies that those who belong to prestigious families are 
just as likely as those who do not belong to a prestigious family to join an outside firm as 
director.   
To further test prestige alignment, I investigated the impact of whether a given 
executive attended a prestigious university or not. Table 17 also presents the results of 
this analysis. I find a significant difference (χ2= 21.29; p<. 001) between those who did, 
and those who did not, attend a prestigious university and their outside board affiliations.  
Executives with prestigious educational credentials are more likely to align themselves 
with higher status outside firms than those without prestigious educational credentials. 
Sample 4 
This dataset is a subset of Sample 2 and identifies those executives who serve on 
multiple boards. There is one observation per executive per outside board affiliation and 
in the case of multiple years, I keep only the observation during which the executive 
served on largest number of boards. The data set consists of 8,862 observations. While 
the range of boards joined within any given year ranges from 2 to 12, over 95% of the 
executives served on 6 outside boards or less. 
This database investigates those who join multiple boards. Theory presented in 
Chapter III argued that those who served on multiple boards sought to increase, and or 
sustain, prestigious affiliations. Accordingly, I investigated various executive prestige 
measures as to their relationship to those who join multiple boards. Hypothesis 6 
predicted that executive prestige would be positively associated with individuals who 
served on multiple outside boards. 
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Table 18, located in Appendix E, reports Chi-square testing on those executives 
who are observed serving on more than one board in any given year. Theory developed 
in Chapter III argued that those who do so place higher emphasis on prestige and 
advantage gained through increases in ones social capital. I assigned any executive who 
joined less than two boards a zero score to differentiate them from those with multiple 
observations. I tested prestige, consistent with previous tests, in two ways. First, I 
performed Chi-square testing on the number of boards an executive joined vs their 
previous attendance at a prestigious university.  I find significant differences (χ2= 80.69; 
p<. 001) suggesting that attendance at a prestigious university indicates a disposition 
towards serving on outside boards multiple times. Second, I tested prestigious family 
connections and find small significance (χ2= 20.71; p=. 04), however this relationship 
turns insignificant in the likelihood ratio chi-square test (χ2= 18.34, p>.05).  
Summary 
This chapter presents empirical evidence concerning executives and outside 
directorships. A summary of all Hypotheses is presented in Appendix E Table 19. This 
table recaps each prediction with its appropriate finding and direction. The Table 
additionally provides an introduction into the discussion chapter which is organized 
around the three original research questions posed at the beginning of this study: 
likelihood of joining an outside board; patterns of outside directorship affiliations; and 
likelihood of exiting an outside board. 
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 I find consistent and strong support for hypotheses that predict the likelihood of 
joining a corporate board based on human and social capital emanating from the home 
firm. I additionally find consistent and strong support for the contention that prestige in 
certain context matters; those with prestigious home firms tend to align themselves with 
other prestigious firms when accepting outside directorship opportunities. Additionally, 
there is strong and consistent support for the contention that those who value prestigious 
affiliations such as those who have attended a prestigious university also desire 
association as an outside director. However, those with prestigious family connections 
do not join or exit boards with the same regularity discovered with other individuals. 
Because this study explores an important but relatively under researched area, 
antecedents of directorship, the findings are encouraging and informative. In the 
following Chapter, I discuss how my findings contribute to furthering our understanding 
of the corporate upper echelons.
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CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION 
“The study of managerial elites is one of the most important, yet neglected areas 
of social science research” (Pettigrew, 1992 : p.163) 
Following Pettigrews’ call for more in depth investigation into managerial elites, 
this study examines the antecedents to outside board service by focusing on the 
executives themselves in concert with firm characteristics. Accordingly, the findings of 
this study have important implications for research examining boards of directors. The 
following is organized around the three main theoretical questions that this research 
investigated. The first section concerns the likelihood a given executive will join an 
outside board. The second section concerns those executives who choose to join and 
examines their differential patterns of service. Third, I examine those who serve as 
outside directors and investigate the likelihood of exiting outside board positions. 
Likelihood of Joining and Outside Board 
Much of the literature on outside directors has proceeded from the assumption 
that appointments are a means for gaining access to resources critical to firm success 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  In particular, appointing corporate executives could be a 
way for firms to reduce uncertainty in their environment. My empirical results suggest, 
in partial support of this theory, that corporations are staffing their boards with proven 
executives who have business acumen as demonstrated by their ascension to the pinnacle 
of America’s largest corporations. Additionally, I find that those executives who make 
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the requisite investments in their human and social capital will likely reap the rewards of 
those investments. This finding also supports the contention of Brickley and Coles 
(1999) who suggest that performance in the last two years of a CEO’s career is 
influential in their ability to garner outside board appointments. Those with better 
performance at the home firm improved their chance vis-à-vis outside the firm. 
However, there are differences between the upper echelons and timing is of critical 
importance in the decision to join an outside board or not. 
Home Firm Career 
For example, I find that holding the title of CEO or chair is significantly related 
to an executive joining an outside board. Additionally, holding the title of president or 
COO is also significant, however the influence of President or COO is approximately 
half that of the CEO or Chair. In a post hoc analysis, I additionally investigated those 
who hold a title other than CEO, chair, president, or COO and find that there is a 
significant and negative likelihood of becoming a corporate director in an outside firm. 
The ladder of hierarchy that legitimizes executives for board service appears to begin at 
the first or second level in the organization. This finding also brings into question the 
available human and social capital assets stocks of those who have not reached the top 
pinnacles in their organizations. 
My collection of outside directorships covered all publicly held corporations in 
the U.S. for the period of 1990 to 2001, which afforded me the opportunity to identify 
directorships in a wide range of sizes and industries. It is interesting to note that firm size 
is a large positive and significant influence on gaining an outside board position. The 
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odds of executives from larger firms joining a corporate board are approximately 1.5 
times that of other executives. 
Also captured in the analysis were those executives who left their home firm, the 
reason for which was beyond the scope of this study. It is worthy to note though, that the 
odds of these executives gaining outside board positions is 3.31 times greater than 
executives who remain with the home firm. I additionally conducted a post hoc analysis 
on this data utilizing an interaction with firm size and find that those executives who left 
the largest firms and the ones most likely to gain outside directorships. Leaving the 
largest of the Fortune 1000 is an important antecedent to joining another corporate 
board. The true nature of this relationship is weakly understood at present, since where 
and why these executives left their home firm is unknown. What I do know is that 
leaving the largest of the Fortune 1000 firms is a significant predictor of whether or not 
an executive will join another firm as an outside director. 
I expected, consistent with human and social capital theory, a promotion event 
would provide a “bump” to the executive’s prospect of gaining outside directorships. 
While I only examined the first year of promotion, the results seem informative. In the 
first year after being promoted to CEO and or chairman, there is a decreased likelihood 
that the new CEO will join an outside board. What this suggests is that once the CEO 
becomes entrenched in the organization (after the initial year of service), then they are 
more likely to proceed with external ties such as outside board appointments.  This 
supports previous research that has discussed the “going in mandate” of a new CEO 
(Gabarro, 1987) and that until their power is taken for granted, new CEO’s are focused 
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largely on internal tasks. Promotion to President and / or COO provided no discernable 
advantage to gaining outside directorships. While in contrast to that predicted, I suspect 
the result is largely an artifact of the time constraint imposed upon the promotion event 
and the attainment of an outside directorship. In the first year after promotion to heir 
apparent (President / COO) there is a period of assimilation during which the heir 
apparent is either promoted to the top position or exits the firm. While the relay 
succession is the most common in firms, it is not out of the realm of possibility that the 
heir apparent will exit the firm due to issues such as low firm performance or high CEO 
power (Cannella & Shin, 2001). During this time the newly appointed President / COO 
is likely focused on internal tasks and the potential for promotion to the CEO slot. 
An executive’s transferable skills lead to an individual’s relative ease of 
movement in the job market (Becker, 1993). Human capital theory holds that 
transferable skills can lead to an individual’s relative movement within an appropriate 
labor market. I therefore predicted that an executive retirement, specifically a CEO, 
would influence both board exits and entries. Consistent with the prediction, I find that 
retiring CEOs are significantly less likely to join new outside boards post retirement than 
others. While this intuitively requires further analysis, the data supports the contention 
that the retirement event is not influential in joining; rather it dampens the prospects. It 
appears that pre-retirement board appointments are the most influential, in other words, 
the time before retirement is the most crucial to outside directorships post retirement. A 
previous study found that running a tight ship in the years prior to retirement paid off 
handsomely in terms of outside board appointments (Brickley et al., 1999). The authors 
  131   
  
found that rising stock prices and return on assets just prior to a CEO retirement event 
lead to not only the executive improving the likelihood of staying in the firm as a 
director but also brought about a stronger possibility of being appointed to outside 
boards. 
In addition, CEO dismissals were contrary to my hypothesized relationship. I 
expected that the loss of human capital and social capital that accompany an executive 
dismissal would translate into subsequent losses of outside board positions. However, I 
find a significant and positive effect among those CEOs characterized as dismissed. The 
strength of this finding suggests that dismissed CEOs who have not achieved retirement 
age are more likely to affiliate and make new allegiances with outside boards than 
others. It is likely that outside board affiliations might be a ladder of future opportunity 
for those executives who have left their previous firm under cloudy circumstances. Not 
only does the outside board provide access to social networks (Uzzi, 1996) which 
provide the potential for new opportunities (Granovetter, 1995), it also provides some 
foundation for the perceived loss of human capital that came with the departure from the 
previous firm (Becker, 1993). 
Interestingly, as examined above, leaving the firm altogether, either through 
retirement or dismissal, is influential in the likelihood a given executive will join an 
outside board. However, both in different directions than originally hypothesized. On the 
other hand, when the executive remains at the firm as a non-executive (e.g. remains as a 
non-executive director) the direction and magnitude are as expected. There is a 
significantly enhanced likelihood that those executives who leave as CEO but retain a 
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seat on the board will join an outside board. The content of these executives’s human 
and social capital is likely in demand at the home firm by virtue of their remaining as a 
non-executive director, which subsequently translates into opportunities at other firms. 
Prestige 
Equally interesting is the contradictory findings of prestige in predicting the 
likelihood that a corporate executive will join an outside board. Education is a classic 
human and social capital variable that serves as a signal of ability to the job market 
(Spence, 1973) thus enhancing an individual’s actual ease of movement. The evidence 
suggests that previous attendance at a prestigious university significantly improves the 
odds of becoming an outside director. This seems in line with previous empirical work 
(D'Aveni, 1990; D'Aveni & Kesner, 1993; Davern, 1999), which regarded the influence 
of prestige as vital to not only the organization but also to the individual. Prestige is 
critically important to those individuals who have it and their access to improved 
networks and channels of information (Granovetter, 1995). 
 However, possessing prestigious family connections is negatively related to 
joining an outside board. This measurement of prestige must be cautiously interpreted, 
as the number of executives who fit this category is relatively small compared to the 
total. The individuals who reside on the social register are also a distinctly different class 
of executive than others. Inclusion implies that the executive has substantial family 
wealth and therefore may be unmotivated to pursue corporate interests other than that 
afforded by the home firm.  
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The results of prestige were unchanged when an interaction term was undertaken 
with firm size. I suspected that prestigious education credentials or family connections 
would be more pronounced when the executive came from a larger firm. However, both 
interaction terms were non-significant and in the same direction as the main effect. This 
argues that the prestige measure is robust across a wide selection of firms of various 
sizes and is not influenced significantly by the organization. 
Summary 
I find empirical support for the prediction that those at the pinnacle of their own 
organizations are most likely to join outside boards, mixed support for the contention 
that executives with prestigious credentials are sought after for corporate board service 
as outside directors, and support for the contention that the context of a succession event 
is influential in obtaining outside board positions. Additionally, promotion to the highest 
echelons of the firm presents either a negative, or a non-statistically significant result on 
joining a corporate board as an outsider in the year following promotion. 
Patterns of Outside Directorship 
This section investigates differential patterns of service for corporate executives. 
The model of outside director service argues that executives will tend to join the types of 
boards to which they can add the most value and conversely, firms attempt to co-opt 
directors for specific tasks. Much of the prior work in board composition and structure 
has come from the premise that outside directors, in particular, are used as a means to 
co-opt external influences, provide control expertise, and be of service to executive 
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management (Johnson et al., 1996).  Board structure refers to the formal organization of 
the board and board composition refers to the affiliation of each member.  
Rooted in sociological theory, resource dependence arguments (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978) assert that firms attempt to reduce uncertainty in their environments and 
therefore try to acquire critical resources in order to mitigate this uncertainty to the 
degree possible. Over time, there has been relatively strong support for this perspective 
(Boeker & Goodstein, 1991; Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988; Pearce & Zahra, 1992; Pfeffer, 
1972; Stearns & Mizruchi, 1993). Although co-optation strategies are generally 
described as mechanisms to reduce uncertainty for the firm, little work has assumed this 
from the perspective of the individual director. What work has been done generally 
investigates issues such as the effects of interlocks on the home firm (Baysinger & 
Butler, 1985; Zajac & Westphal, 1996) and the effect of outside firm performance 
(Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988; Pearce & Zahra, 1992). However, evidence is often 
contradictory and inconsistent.  
Another common explanation for the way boards are staffed lies in theories of 
social class and managerial elites. According to this work, a homogenous culture 
develops from the interactions among directors (Useem, 1984) and an individual’s 
power and status emanates from inclusion into this “club”. Fama and Jensen (1983b) 
contend that a primary motivation for directors is protection of their reputations. To the 
extent that directors are not successful in this endeavor argues for an ex post “settling 
up” that exacts a price in terms of director reputation and the potential impact upon their 
careers (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). However, prior research appears inconsistent 
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and contradictory (Gilson, 1990; Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1992; Hermalin & Weisbach, 
1988; Walsh & Kosnik, 1993).  
I view the composition of the board, not from the view of the firm, but from the 
perspective of the individual outside director. This change in unit of analysis affords me 
the opportunity to ask similar questions in different ways with the hope in resolving 
some of the open questions from prior research. The model of outside board service 
suggests two main impacts regarding patterns of affiliation: (1) females are more likely 
to be associated with particular types of boards; and (2) there is likely a home firm / 
outside firm matching process in outside director selection and consent to join.  
Gender Effects 
Consistent with the model of outside director service, I predicted that women 
executives would most likely be asked, and subsequently accept, outside board positions 
where their value as women will be most influential. Women executives bring not only 
their expertise gained through a successful executive career but also the capacity to serve 
in a legitimacy-enhancing role. The model of outside director service additionally 
proposes that adding women to the board signals sensitivity in the firm that it is 
responsive to women’s issues (Suchman, 1995). Because directors are overwhelmingly 
chosen from executive ranks (Conger et al., 2001; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989), those few 
women who achieve top executive positions are expected to be in high demand.  
However, I find those female executives in my sample who served as outside 
directors were fairly evenly dispersed industry wise. No statistical significance was 
uncovered at a one-digit or at a two-digit SIC classification. The results suggest that 
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those female executives who choose to serve as outsider directors likely served because 
of reasons other than a classification of firm type. Additional caution must be taken as 
the sample of women executives is very small compared to men. Only 1% of the sample 
of the 1990 Fortune 1000 officers who were also listed in the Dun and Bradstreet 
Reference Book of Corporate Management were female. This small sampling might also 
be an indication of the null results. A post hoc analysis was conducted to assess gender 
likelihood to join boards or exits boards and no statistical significance was found. It 
appears that either gender plays no role in additions to corporate boards or the sample 
under represents the population of female executives who serve as outside directors. It is 
noteworthy that women are likely more highly represented in the corporate upper 
echelons today than they were in 1990.  
The types of boards that executives join looks at two patterns of affiliations: (1) 
firm type as represented by either a manufacturing or service orientation; and (2) 
prestige alignment between the executive, the home firm, and the outside firm. 
Firm Type 
My model of outside director service argued that the value of human and social 
capital is most valuable in the context of the executive’s primary home orientation. A 
test of this assumption utilized the SIC classification at a one digit level to identify both 
the home firm and the outside firm as either a manufacturing or service oriented firm. I 
follow logic consistent with commitment to the status quo (Hambrick, Geletkanycz, & 
Fredrickson, 1993), which argues that top executives become entrenched in the status 
quo as a result of their industry and organizational tenure. They therefore seek ways in 
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which their human and social capital will be most valuable. However, investigating this 
notion in the context of outside firm linkages appears untested. 
I find that organizational tenure is significantly and positively related to the 
likelihood that an executive will join an outside board. While caution must be taken to 
assure this result is not merely an artifact of the executive aging and thereby becoming 
more accessible and amenable to outside board positions, it is intriguing nonetheless. 
Commitment to the status quo in one industry may translate into more predictable 
outside directorships. 
Additional analysis of firm type identified a strong and significant relationship 
between the executives of home firms and outside firms when both are oriented to 
manufacturing. However, executives from service firms were evenly split between the 
two. While the finding for manufacturing oriented executives was expected, the finding 
for service executives was not. SIC classifications of manufacturing orientation were 
overwhelmingly represented in my sample (66% vs. 34%), which may present some 
challenges to the results. Nonetheless, those in service-oriented firms find themselves 
relatively spread out in terms of the outside directorships they accept. This might be an 
indication of indirect or direct linkages in which their directorships become important 
links back to their home firm as potential suppliers or customers.  
Prestige Alignment 
Outside director service has been previously discussed as a potentially 
prestigious undertaking. Those accepting outside directorships do so at some risk to their 
reputations and careers. Fama and Jensen (1983b) argue that directors are motivated to 
  138   
  
uphold shareholder interests because their reputations are important to them. It is logical 
to conclude, and the model of outside director service predicts, that both the firm and the 
executive will be concerned about which associations each chooses.  
Home Firm to Outside Firm Alignment. I find a significant relationship 
between the prestige of the home firm and the outside firm. Executives of more 
prestigious home firms tend to associate with outside firms of at least equal prestige. My 
findings also reflect a tendency for executives to move up in prestige.  Executives of 
firms in the second, third, and fourth quartile of their industry seek outside board 
positions in firms more prestigious than their own. This is likely reflective of the 
difficulty those firms are having in recruiting new directors (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). 
In order to find candidates, firms seeking directors are not able to identify enough 
willing candidates amongst their peers in the corporate world. Therefore, they seek firms 
of lesser status and prestige than themselves in order to get the complement of corporate 
executives they feel they need. 
This is also a way for executives to increase their standing and prestige amongst 
their peers. An executive from a lesser prestigious firm that obtains an outside 
directorship on a more prestigious firm stands to significantly enhance their reputation 
and standing due to this association.  
Executive Prestige and Outside Firm Prestige. An additional way for 
executives to enhance or maintain their prestige, irrespective of their home firm, is 
through their individual characteristics. As Laumann argued (1966), preferred partners 
for interaction are those that will enhance the prestige of the less or equal actor. 
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Individuals therefore, tend to pursue association with individuals of similar, or slightly 
higher socioeconomic status. Prestigious characteristics such as those who attended a 
prestigious university or have family connections in the social register are likely 
candidates for other prestigious affiliations.  
I find educational prestige does predict an executive’s likelihood of outside 
director affiliation. Those who attended a prestigious university are significantly more 
likely to affiliate with outside firms that are the most prestigious in their industry. Also, 
they are more likely to be associated with multiple boards. The prestigious nature of 
their individual characteristic appears to carry over to external prestigious affiliations. 
However, the same does not hold for prestigious family connections. In both the 
prestige of the outside firm and the likelihood of multiple boards, I find null results. 
While family listings in the social register is arguably an extremely prestigious 
affiliation, those included who are also in the corporate elite do not appear to translate 
their family prestige into outside directorships. As might be expected, the magnitude of 
executives who fall into this category is relatively small, representing less than 2% of all 
those who serve as outside directors.  
Summary 
Patterns of service investigated those who serve as outside directors and sought 
to understand some of the differing patterns of association. I find: executives from 
prestigious home firms tend to align themselves with outside firms of equal or higher 
prestige; executives with prestigious educational credentials seek to align themselves 
with the more prestigious outside firms; executives with prestigious educational 
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credentials obtain more outside directorships than others; and inclusion in the social 
register is not influential in either prestige alignment or serving on multiple boards. The 
finding regarding prestigious family connections are similar to that investigated about 
joining a board, i.e., not influential in either case. The findings do identify a significant 
trend of prestige alignment among executives and the firms they tend to join as outside 
directors. This seems consistent with past work on prestige (D'Aveni, 1990). Outside 
directors serve the interests of the firm in enhancing their prestigious standing in the 
community of firms and executives seek to enhance their prestige through affiliation 
with the most prestigious outside firm possible.  
Likelihood of Exiting an Outside Board 
The model of outside director service and the theory developed in Chapter III 
argue that outside directors differ from normal firm employees regarding exit. They have 
options not generally available to the traditional employee and are generally not 
concerned with their next employment opportunities. The following is organized into 
two discussion areas: (1) shifts in prestige that influence exit; and (2) the impact of shifts 
in power at either, or both, the home firm and the outside firm. 
Prestige Shifts 
I investigate prestige shifts in much the same way as discussed in the section on 
patterns of affiliations. In that section, executives were significantly influenced by the 
nature of their prestigious affiliations. However, the impact of prestige upon outside 
directorship exit exhibits a different pattern. 
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In opposition to that expected, a positive shift in prestige increased outside 
director exit when it occurred in the outside firm. Changes at the home firm and changes 
between the home firm and the outside firm respectively appear to have no influence. 
Results suggest that when the outside firm is in significant transition, vis-à-vis its 
prestigious standing, it may be expected to significantly alter the make up of its board. 
This supports the theories of resource dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). When the 
firm changes its profile, the requirement for certain types of directors’ change with it. 
However, this finding seems in contrast to social class theorists (Mizruchi & Stearns, 
1994) who argue that the board is a social network of like-minded individuals who are 
expected to perpetuate the elite status of each other. Support for social class theorists 
predications would argue that board make-up would not alter substantially when prestige 
enhancements occurred. Rather, the expectation would be that the make-up of the board 
would remain relatively constant, as all members would receive a prestige “boost” as an 
artifact of their associations. However, this is not the case. As firms grow and prosper 
their needs for directors change and subsequently the likelihood of director turnover is 
increased. 
Succession Context 
Few events that occur in organizations are as substantively important or as open 
to strife within the organization as chief executive succession (Boeker & Goodstein, 
1993). The replacement of the CEO has the potential to significantly enhance or reduce 
the power of other organizational members and may have important consequences for 
the firm’s future strategy and structure (Pfeffer, 1981). I define power as the capacity of 
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individual actors to exert their will over others, which is consistent with other scholar’s 
views (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; Pfeffer, 1981). Their will in the current context 
deals with outside director turnover. 
Following earlier arguments, I consider it likely that changes in the power 
structure of a firm will affect outside board positions and that such changes would 
disrupt the social structure of the upper echelons. Accordingly, I find that a succession 
event in either the home firm or the outside firm is influential in outside directorship 
exit. In the first case, home firm succession, I find when the incumbent CEO is replaced, 
regardless of how, there is a significantly reduced likelihood that the executives of that 
home firm will exit their outside directorship positions. This suggests that turmoil due to 
change in the CEO at the home firm creates the need for the executives in that firm to 
maintain connections to other firms. Rather that focus internally, executives are expected 
to seek self interested behavior as their future with a new power structure in their home 
firm is in doubt.  
As expected, succession in the outside firm significantly increases the odds that 
outside directors will exit their positions. Significant changes in the power structure 
places demands upon those in power to consolidate their positions in the firm and may 
attempt to do this with director realignment. This finding supports other work in the area 
of increased turnover after a CEO change (Ward et al., 1999). 
Further investigation into CEO succession revealed some interesting findings. 
When the CEO retired (left the firm) or remained on the board as a non-executive 
director, results suggest non-significant impact upon director turnover within three years 
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of that event. However, if the ex-CEO relinquishes the title of CEO but retains the title 
of Chair, the likelihood of outside director is significantly enhanced. In other words, if 
the outgoing CEO remains as an officer and a director of the firm, turnover is greater 
than if he or she leaves altogether or relinquishes the officer position for a director 
position. This supports the power circulation of control model (Shen & Cannella, 2002). 
Results suggest that power contestation between the outgoing CEO and the new 
incumbent CEO is in play at the firm, and the newly elected CEO might be attempting to 
staff the board in different ways than the predecessor.  
CEO dismissal at the home firm and the outside firm was also expected to 
influence board turnover. Prior research (Daily & Dalton, 1994b; Hambrick & D'Aveni, 
1992) found different patterns of turnover in bankruptcy situations when firms are in 
distress. However, the results of this study suggest that CEO dismissal will have little 
influence on outside director turnover. This may indicate that the board has assumed 
power of the firm’s governance situation and consistent with Fama and Jensen’s (1983b) 
arguments will stay with the firm to protect their reputations as experts in decision-
making. As noted earlier, I only measured turnover within three years of the succession 
event when the board and the new CEO are likely reorganizing and reshaping the firm in 
their own ways.  
Summary 
I find that as firms improve in prestige there is a need for different directors. This 
suggests that firms who are growing and improving are sensitive to who is staffing their 
boards and subsequently are expected to exhibit higher levels of turnover than others. 
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Additionally, the context of CEO succession is influential in analyzing outside director 
turnover. If the ex-CEO remains as an executive officer and board chair, turnover is 
more likely. Conversely, if the ex-CEO retires completely from the firm, or dismissed, or 
remains a non-executive officer, results suggest that turnover is not significantly 
influenced.  
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS 
Research on corporate governance in general and boards of directors in particular 
is an important strategic issue for all firms (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). In order for 
firms to better manage their governance practices, it is necessary for them to understand 
more fully the individuals that populate their boards and how their motivations for 
service might eventually influence strategic decision-making. The present study is an 
endeavor in that direction. This concluding chapter summarizes both the theory and 
empirical evidence presented previously, discusses its limitations, and points out its 
implications for further discovery and use.  
Conclusions 
To my knowledge, this study represents the first attempt to systematically 
analyze the antecedents of board service. The literature review in Chapter II concluded 
that both human and social capital assets would be influential in profiling those 
corporate executives who choose to serve as outside directors. However, previous 
research primarily has taken the role of the outside director as defined by the firm, is 
largely influenced by the incumbent CEO, and subsequently investigated its 
consequences for firm performance (Boeker, 1992; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; 
Johnson et al., 1996; Westphal & Milton, 2000; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Consequently, 
research concerning outside directors often dichotomizes them into groups such as 
insiders, affiliated or related parties, and outsiders. The present study seeks to understand 
director service from the perspective of the director, then the firm. 
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Following an individual unit of analysis, a model of outside director service was 
developed in Chapter III which highlights an under researched phenomenon, the 
individual director and their motivations for service. The model proposes that 
individuals face a wide range of information regarding service and if offered a position 
on a board, or boards, must choose between alternatives. Since service is time 
consuming (Korn Ferry, 2000) and corporate executives are the most sought after for 
service (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989), it is likely that potential directors and firms will seek 
an alignment or fit, where the needs and motives of both are considered. 
Empirical evidence provides both support for the current outside director service 
model and new insights into improving it. Strong support was found regarding the 
existence of an executive’s home firm career as influential in obtaining outside board 
seats. As predicted, those at the uppermost echelons are the most likely to join. 
Additionally, holding a directorship in the home firm is a more likely route to outside 
service. However, promotion had either no effect, or a negative effect, during the first 
year in a new position, suggesting that outside service requires some demonstrated 
accomplishment rather that just mere title.  The evidence presented suggests that 
executives in early career face diminished prospects of joining outside boards. 
Strong support was also found for those executives from the largest firms. They 
are more likely than others to accept outside board seats. This is somewhat surprising 
given the fact that outside board seats were searched for all U.S. public corporations, so 
a wide range of outside firm sizes was investigated. Nonetheless, those in the largest 
home firms certainly command the most attention.  
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Ending service at the home firm as an officer yielded some very interesting 
results. Retirements do not significantly affect an executives either joining, or exiting, 
outside boards. This seems to suggest that executive’s outside board appointments 
during their full time career are the ones they most likely retain post full time executive 
careers. However, remaining on the board opens the model of service up to question. If 
the executive remains as a director in the home firm they are more likely to accept new 
outside director positions. On the contrary, if the CEO relinquished his or her title for 
board chair under a succession, turnover on the board increases. More insight into this 
phenomenon might yield some clearer results but there are likely issues of power and 
control currently not identified.  
Additionally, CEO dismissal resulted in findings in opposition to the model and 
theory hypothesized. Utilizing past research on CEO succession (Cannella & Lubatkin, 
1993; Cannella & Shen, 2001; Shen & Cannella, 2002) theory suggested that the loss of 
human capital associated with an executive dismissal would translate into fewer 
opportunities as well as lost opportunities in the external labor market. However, I find 
that dismissal increased the odds of joining an outside board. Also, dismissal of the 
outside firm’s CEO suggested a negative but insignificant relationship to board exit. The 
data suggests that executives dismissed from their firm will seek new opportunities for 
rebuilding their human and social capital and that outside board service is a way in 
which this might be accomplished. 
The model of outside director service also predicted a strong association between 
prestige, the executive, their home firm, and their outside firm. For the most part, strong 
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support was found for this premise. Those executives who attended a prestigious 
university were found to join more boards and be more likely to serve on multiple 
boards. In addition, coming from a prestigious home firm is a significant predictor of 
joining the board of a prestigious outside firm. There is also a tendency for less 
prestigious executives to attempt to improve their standing through association with 
those of equal or higher status (Laumann, 1966). I find no support for a connection 
between those executives who come from prestigious families and outside board service. 
There was either a negative relation or none at all. I suggest this might be attributable to 
the small sample size of this group or possibly the nature of this prestige is more 
complicated than the model depicts. It is possible that for this group of individuals, 
outside boards service is not really seen as a prestigious endeavor. 
Limitations 
Importantly, this paper is concerned in part with the likelihood that a corporate 
executive will join, serve, and exit an outside board. As such I investigated  the previous 
number of boards that an executive sits upon. This control was significant and positive 
during many of the statistical runs denoting the potential that the likelihood of joining is 
conditioned upon the premise that the executive is already serving on an outside board. 
The previous number of board appointments was also highly correlated with many of the 
independent variables. This leaves open the question as to the attainment of the first 
board position. How is the first position attained and is there a progression ladder from 
small to large directorships depending upon an individual’s affiliations and 
accomplishments?  
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While the theoretical foundations developed herein would support this 
contention, future empirical work is needed to better understand this issue. In addition, 
for an executive to accept outside directorships, his or her organization must become an 
enabler to such duty.  Recent anecdotal evidence suggests that board service is becoming 
less valued by corporations as executives are increasingly required to focus their energy 
on the home firm. For example, General Electric has gone so far as to not permit any of 
their senior executives to serve on outside boards. Other companies such as Johnson & 
Johnson have set policies, which limit service to only one board seat in addition to their 
own. Due to the size of my sample, I was unable to ascertain each and every firm’s 
policy on outside board service.  
Additionally, nearly 60% of CEO’s responding to a recent Korn Ferry survey 
said that they had turned down a board invitation within the last twelve months (Lear, 
2000). The top reasons given for rejecting offers to serve were time demands, conflicts 
in meeting dates, and perceived business conflicts with their home organization. While 
these restrictions may be important for a small number of firms as suggested earlier, my 
evidence suggests that a preponderance of firms allow their executives to acquire and 
retain outside board seats. Corporations seem to be very forgiving in allowing their 
executives to participate in joining outside boards. It is conceivable that not only is 
outside board service part of a perk to allow executives to gain status and visibility, it 
might also represent a portion of a training program for high potential executives who 
are being groomed for the uppermost executive suite. 
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Finally, this study argues that certain individuals are more likely to join, serve in 
different patterns and exit other firms as outside directors than others, and implies that if 
asked to join, the individual will do so. In reality, however, becoming an outside director 
is a voluntary exercise. Not all offers are likely to be accepted. Unfortunately, due to the 
difficulty of observing both a request to join and a subsequent refusal, identifying the 
reason for refusal is beyond the scope of this research. I am only able to separate those 
who join from those who do not, and leave the reasons for not joining to future research.  
Implications 
I believe that the effects of prestige are most likely the result of a relationship 
that is more complex than tested in the model. For example, future research might 
examine board prestige in total as a potential moderator of my hypotheses. More 
specifically, it may be that boards with low levels of prestige (e.g., few board members 
with prestigious families or educational backgrounds) are not very concerned with 
obtaining prestigious directors. Alternatively, boards with higher levels of prestige may 
be more interested in perpetuating the economic elite and, as such, may be more 
interested in obtaining the services of executives with prestigious backgrounds. 
In addition, future research might also examine the influence of CEO prestige as 
a moderator of our proposed relationships. CEOs with lower levels of prestige may be 
reluctant to fill their boards with prestigious directors as this prestige may provide the 
board with more power. Alternatively, CEOs with prestigious backgrounds may highly 
value the connections provided by prestigious directors and may feel less threatened by 
these credentials. 
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Additionally, future research in this area should more closely examine the role of 
performance (e.g., accounting and market) in the executives’ home firms as independent 
variables. It may be that executives serving as the heads of high-performing companies 
may represent more attractive candidates to boards of directors attempting to fill vacant 
board seats. In addition, firm performance may interact with my hypothesized variables 
and future research would benefit from examining these relationships. 
Additional research could also investigate what I might call serial directors. I 
identified in this study that certain individuals are sitting on multiple boards and joining 
several at once. The antecedents of this phenomenon are intriguing and worthy of future 
consideration. 
Implications for Theory Development 
By examining the antecedents of outside director service from an individual level 
of analysis, the present study provides some new insights to our understanding of board 
service. It is several implications for both academic research and managerial practice.  
As far as I know, a theoretically full model of outside director service has not 
been undertaken. Given the importance of outside directors to the overall governance 
process it appears critical for research to grasp this important topic. One of the most 
important contributions of this work is to identify who is populating America’s corporate 
boards and some of their motivations for doing so. This has significant implications for 
research on corporate governance, top management teams, board dynamics, strategic 
decision-making, and CEO succession. 
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First, the present study suggests a re-conceptualization of research in corporate 
governance. Extent research as been heavily influenced by agency theory in that boards 
are seen as a way for the most powerful influences in the firm to achieve self interested 
ends (Berle & Means, 1932; Fama & Jensen, 1983b; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). The 
present study challenges this notion by arguing for a perspective of service from the 
viewpoint of the individual member. Motives for service on outside boards have wide 
ranging implications for both the home firm and the outside firm. 
Second, the present study has both theoretical and methodological implications 
for CEO succession research. Theoretically, it challenges the basic notion of identifying 
successors based on a dichotomy of insider or outsider. Instead of treating succession as 
merely an extension of who is the predecessor and follower, I identify forces that follow 
the decision of the predecessor to remain on the board as chair, director, or retire 
altogether. Alternatively, more clarification on post-executive service, especially for 
those dismissed from a firm is needed. How executives attempt to regain their damaged 
human and social capital through outside affiliations might inform future work in this 
area.  
Methodologically, and also theoretically, the present study highlights the 
importance of taking a longitudinal approach to the study of executive movements 
among firms. Most previous work has taken a static, cross-sectional approach. I 
demonstrate that analyzing an executive’s career over a window of time is an influential 
element in the decisions to join, serve in different ways, and exit outside boards. 
Indicative of this is the evolutionary nature of service. Those in lower organizational 
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levels must pay their “dues” in terms of improving human and social capital before they 
are afforded the opportunity to advance their status through outside board appointments. 
Therefore, it is important for governance researchers to incorporate dynamic elements 
into their models and testing. 
Implications for Managerial Practice 
The present study has important implications for managerial practice. First, it 
suggests that executives who serve differ importantly from those who do not. When 
choosing an outside board to join, a given executive appears aware of the prestigious 
nature of the affiliation. This maybe especially true given the turmoil in the governance 
ranks of late. Picking the right directors, retaining those who perform, and shedding 
those who do not, is of critical importance to the firm. Alternatively, choosing the right 
firm from the director’s standpoint is also critically important. Since prestige may be 
gained or lost through affiliation, executives must take care to choose wisely among 
given alternatives.  
Second, firms undergoing a CEO succession must take heed concerning the 
impact upon their board. I demonstrated that depending upon the context of the 
succession, the effect upon board members occurred in different patterns. A high 
performing board going through a succession event needs to evaluate its membership 
differently from that of a low performing board facing the same situation. However, my 
initial findings question this as performance influences appear inconsequential to board 
exit. Both low performing and high performing boards seem to have similar turnover 
rates. This might be informative in and of itself. 
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Third, service limitations by companies might be influential in the board / 
performance relationship. If the governance practices of a particular firm limits its 
executive’s service regarding outside boards, then an assessment of this policy seems 
warranted. Service accrues to the executive and their firm certain advantages, not the 
least of which is influential network contacts and opportunities that come from meeting 
other executives facing different business challenges.  On the other hand, outside board 
service takes time and attention away from the home firm. It is important that prudent 
judgment for executive service be initiated, particularly regarding those executives found 
serving on many boards during their executive careers. Given the prestigious nature of 
board service, it would be desirable for firms to balance the demands at home and away, 
use controls where necessary, and incentives as appropriate.  
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APPENDIX A 
CNUM PERMNO COMPANY NAME CNUM PERMNO COMPANY NAME 
817826 77015 7 ELEVEN INC 026375 13056 AMERICAN GREETINGS CORP 
831865 19852 A O SMITH CORP 026609 15667 AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS CO 
808194 69199 A SCHULMAN INC 030954 65859 AMERICAN INFORMATION TECH 
002824 20482 ABBOTT LABORATORIES 026874 66800 AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GR 
217016 59248 ADOLPH COORS CO 027429 46754 AMERICAN MEDICAL INTERNAT 
007903 61241 ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES IN 31734L 29049 AMERICAN PETROFINA INC 
007869 18147 AEROQUIP VICKERS INC 00202M 65111 AMERICAN PRESIDENT COMPAN 
008117 46850 AETNA INC 029404 85447 AMERICAN SAVINGS BANK FSB 
008262 57349 AFFILIATED PUBLICATIONS I 029717 10372 AMERICAN STANDARD COS INC 
001054 68806 AFG INDUSTRIES INC 030096 17558 AMERICAN STORES CO 
001055 57904 AFLAC INC 001957 10401 AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELE 
009158 28222 AIR PRODUCTS & CHEMICALS  030700 10797 AMERIFIRST BANK A FEDERAL 
009269 51721 AIRBORNE FREIGHT CORP 030900 13980 AMERITRUST CORP 
011659 28804 ALASKA AIR GROUP INC 030789 44548 AMES DEPARTMENT STORES IN 
013068 42083 ALBERTO CULVER CO 031105 10460 AMETEK INC 
013104 50032 ALBERTSON S INC 031905 19553 AMOCO CORP 
013750 85244 ALCO HEALTH SERVICES CORP 031825 14091 AMOSKEAG CO 
451713 48514 ALCO STANDARD CORP 031897 27051 AMP INC 
013817 24643 ALCOA INC 001765 21020 AMR CORP 
014476 63845 ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER SER 032165 62770 AMSOUTH BANCORPORATION 
014482 11691 ALEXANDER & BALDWIN INC 032172 10479 AMSTAR CORP 
017175 71271 ALLEGHANY CORP 032177 10487 AMSTED INDUSTRIES INC 
016900 75002 ALLEGHENY LUDLUM CORP 032375 64151 ANACOMP INC 
017361 10137 ALLEGHENY POWER SYSTEM IN 032837 11241 ANCHOR BANCORP INC 
019411 26331 ALLIED PRODUCTS CORP 033038 75031 ANCHOR GLASS CONTAINER CO 
438516 10145 ALLIED SIGNAL INC 035229 59184 ANHEUSER BUSCH COS INC 
01975T 40935 ALLMERICA PROPERTY & CASU 035290 46077 ANIXTER INTERNATIONAL INC 
020011 75795 ALLSTATE FINANCIAL CORP 037389 61735 AON CORP 
026351 48397 AM GENERAL CORP 037829 85551 APPLE BANCORP INC 
001723 18980 AM INTERNATIONAL INC 037833 14593 APPLE COMPUTER INC 
023127 10161 AMAX INC 039483 10516 ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND CO 
023164 67969 AMBASE CORP 040157 10843 ARGONAUT GROUP INC 
023905 60046 AMDAHL CORP 040422 70359 ARISTECH CHEMICAL CORP 
023551 28484 AMERADA HESS CORP 040790 77595 ARKANSAS BEST CORP 
023608 24985 AMEREN SERVICES CO 042170 17566 ARMCO INC 
023657 80778 AMERICA WEST AIRLINES INC 042384 19692 ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIE 
349631 10225 AMERICAN BRANDS INC 043339 21143 ARVIN INDUSTRIES INC 
024898 54332 AMERICAN CAPITAL CORP 043413 10364 ASARCO INC 
025321 23341 AMERICAN CYANAMID CO 044204 24272 ASHLAND INC 
025537 24109 AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER C 048535 15625 ATLANTIC FINANCIAL FEDERA 
025816 59176 AMERICAN EXPRESS CO 048825 10604 ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO 
025932 60687 AMERICAN FINANCIAL GROUP  053015 44644 AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING 
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CNUM PERMNO COMPANY NAME CNUM PERMNO COMPANY NAME 
053807 27684 AVNET INC 095177 55108 BLOUNT INC 
054303 40416 AVON PRODUCTS INC 096650 18551 BOATMEN S BANCSHARES INC 
054350 10360 AVONDALE INDUSTRIES INC 097023 19561 BOEING CO 
382388 12140 B F GOODRICH CO 097383 42024 BOISE CASCADE CORP 
057224 75034 BAKER HUGHES INC 099599 16571 BORDEN INC 
058459 33347 BALFOUR MACLAINE CORP 099724 17590 BORG WARNER CORP 
058498 57568 BALL CORP 102183 66130 BOWATER INC 
05873C 58480 BALLY ENTERTAINMENT CORP 105423 19095 BRANIFF INC 
210371 24221 BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC  109043 17961 BRIGGS & STRATTON CORP 
06423A 65138 BANC ONE CORP 110122 19393 BRISTOL MYERS CO 
694058 16548 BANCORP HAWAII INC 146227 40352 BROADWAY STORES INC 
059790 35781 BANCWEST CORP NEW 115637 29938 BROWN FORMAN CORP 
060505 59408 BANK OF AMERICA CORP 115885 53786 BROWNING FERRIS INDUSTRIE 
06605R 51772 BANK OF BOSTON CORP 116881 19589 BRUNO S INC 
063840 16695 BANK OF NEW ENGLAND CORP 117043 10874 BRUNSWICK CORP 
064057 49656 BANK OF NEW YORK CO INC 12189T 50227 BURLINGTON NORTHERN INC 
065068 16716 BANK SOUTH CORP 122014 75333 BURLINGTON RESOURCES INC 
066050 58827 BANKAMERICA CORP 123655 19992 BUTLER MANUFACTURING CO 
066365 48354 BANKERS TRUST CORP 067383 46877 C R BARD INC 
303698 29532 BANNER INDUSTRIES INC 127055 46690 CABOT CORP 
066821 16890 BANTA CORP 128026 66456 CALFED INC 
068055 61284 BARNETT BANKS INC 129894 59432 CALIBER SYSTEM INC 
071707 26518 BAUSCH & LOMB INC 131271 51414 CALMAT CO 
071813 27887 BAXTER INTERNATIONAL INC 133429 61954 CAMERON IRON WORKS INC 
072723 17196 BAYBANKS INC 134429 25320 CAMPBELL SOUP CO 
05527L 19052 BB&T FINANCIAL CORP 139859 30330 CAPITAL CITIES ABC INC 
073902 68304 BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES IN 744061 53081 CAPITAL HOLDING CORP 
074077 17953 BEATRICE CO 142339 27334 CARLISLE COMPANIES INC 
075887 39642 BECTON DICKINSON & CO 98155F 53524 CAROLINA FREIGHT CORP 
077852 22323 BELL & HOWELL CO 743263 23114 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO 
92343V 65875 BELL ATLANTIC CORP 144285 20618 CARPENTER TECHNOLOGY CORP 
079860 65883 BELLSOUTH CORP 256605 40707 CASTLE & COOKE INC 
081437 43772 BEMIS CO INC 149123 18542 CATERPILLAR INC 
081721 19377 BENEFICIAL CORP 124800 59686 CBI INDUSTRIES INC 
082072 10958 BENJ FRANKLIN FEDERAL SAV 12490K 15368 CBS CORP 
083739 42438 BERGEN BRUNSWIG CORP 124845 20730 CBS INC 
084670 17778 BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC 124883 25137 CCH INC 
086551 58018 BEST PRODUCTS CO INC 151883 69243 CENTERIOR ENERGY CORP 
08658U 10989 BESTFOODS 152312 53831 CENTEX CORP 
087509 10786 BETHLEHEM CORP 152357 23851 CENTRAL & SOUTH WEST CORP 
087851 47992 BEVERLY ENTERPRISES 153469 22075 CENTRAL FIDELITY BANKS IN 
089671 44409 BIG THREE INDUSTRIES INC 155177 27158 CENTRAL SOYA CO INC 
090324 17962 BINDLEY WESTERN INDUSTRIE 15640L 75043 CENTRUST SAVINGS BANK 
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CNUM PERMNO COMPANY NAME CNUM PERMNO COMPANY NAME 
156879 11105 CERTAINTEED CORP 204912 25778 COMPUTER ASSOCIATES INTER 
158525 21397 CHAMPION INTERNATIONAL CO 205363 40125 COMPUTER SCIENCES CORP 
808513 75186 CHARLES SCHWAB CORP 205887 56274 CONAGRA FOODS INC 
161241 52652 CHARTER MEDICAL CORP 206813 24707 CONE MILLS CORP 
161610 41718 CHASE MANHATTAN CORP 208108 10967 CONNER PERIPHERALS INC 
16161A 47896 CHASE MANHATTAN CORP NEW 208368 71765 CONRAIL INC 
163596 64194 CHEMED CORP 209115 11404 CONSOLIDATED EDISON CO OF 
165159 21960 CHESAPEAKE CORP 209615 21821 CONSOLIDATED NATURAL GAS  
166751 14541 CHEVRON CORP 209759 26586 CONSOLIDATED PAPERS INC 
167155 77476 CHICAGO & NORTH WESTERN H 210902 39335 CONTEL CORP 
170032 14955 CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATI 211113 57250 CONTINENTAL BANK CORP 
171196 11260 CHRYSLER CORP 211327 46658 CONTINENTAL CORP 
171232 59192 CHUBB CORP 216669 21979 COOPER INDUSTRIES INC 
125509 64186 CIGNA CORP 216831 27430 COOPER TIRE & RUBBER CO 
172062 23473 CINCINNATI FINANCIAL CORP 218412 21290 CORDANT TECHNOLOGIES INC 
598709 22680 CINCINNATI MILACRON INC 218695 27263 CORESTATES FINANCIAL CORP 
172576 48047 CIRCLE K CORP 219350 22293 CORNING GLASS WORKS 
172862 65525 CITADEL HOLDING CORP 22160K 64064 COSTCO COS INC 
173034 47079 CITICORP 224399 20204 CRANE CO 
172967 70519 CITIGROUP INC 225224 62164 CRAY RESEARCH INC 
173124 23705 CITIZENS & SOUTHERN CORP  226091 79354 CRESTAR FINANCIAL CORP 
126335 23836 CITIZENS SAVINGS FINANCIA 227901 87090 CROSSLAND SAVINGS FSB 
181396 18446 CLARK EQUIPMENT CO 228219 31042 CROWN CENTRAL PETROLEUM C 
189054 46578 CLOROX CO 228255 17726 CROWN CORK & SEAL CO INC 
125896 23229 CMS ENERGY CORP 229070 68363 CRYSTAL BRANDS INC 
12612W 41929 CNF TRANSPORTATION INC 126408 62148 CSX CORP 
19039M 86714 COAST SAVINGS & LOAN ASSO 231021 41080 CUMMINS ENGINE CO INC 
190441 38893 COASTAL CORP 126650 17005 CVS CORP 
191216 11308 COCA COLA CO 232528 75051 CYCLOPS INDUSTRIES INC 
191219 70500 COCA COLA ENTERPRISES INC 232809 87127 CYPRUS AMAX MINERALS CO 
194162 18729 COLGATE PALMOLIVE CO 235811 11607 DANA CORP 
196864 11332 COLT INDUSTRIES INC 235851 49680 DANAHER CORP 
197648 11340 COLUMBIA ENERGY GROUP 237688 57592 DATA GENERAL CORP 
404119 76171 COLUMBIA HCA HEALTHCARE C 87612E 49154 DAYTON HUDSON CORP 
198274 92567 COLUMBIA PICTURES ENTERTA 254653 28186 DCNY CORP 
198415 68339 COLUMBIA SAVINGS & LOAN A 242361 63554 DEAN FOODS CO 
200273 18999 COMBUSTION ENGINEERING IN 244199 19350 DEERE & CO 
200336 61524 COMDISCO INC 247361 26112 DELTA AIR LINES INC 
200340 25081 COMERICA INC 247904 11062 DELTA WOODSIDE INDUSTRIES 
200525 25129 COMMERCE BANCSHARES INC 248019 61743 DELUXE CHECK PRINTERS INC 
201647 86861 COMMERCIAL FEDERAL CORP 248631 31181 DENNISON MANUFACTURING CO 
201723 30680 COMMERCIAL METALS CO 233331 11674 DETROIT EDISON CO 
904911 20853 COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO 252165 45874 DEXTER CORP 
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CNUM PERMNO COMPANY NAME CNUM PERMNO COMPANY NAME 
252747 75053 DIAMOND SHAMROCK INC 922944 15456 F W WOOLWORTH CO 
254394 29867 DIBRELL BROTHERS INC 307351 40811 FAR WEST FINANCIAL CORP 
253849 43916 DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORP 31428X 60628 FDX CORP 
254067 49429 DILLARD DEPARTMENT STORES 313549 21338 FEDERAL MOGUL CORP 
25429Q 10594 DIME BANCORP INC 313693 25371 FEDERAL PAPER BOARD CO IN 
255519 10886 DIXIE GROUP INC 314099 18550 FEDERATED DEPARTMENT STOR 
257183 30430 DOMINION BANKSHARES CORP 315405 21135 FERRO CORP 
25746U 64936 DOMINION RESOURCES INC VA 316773 34746 FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 
344822 41515 DOSKOCIL COMPANIES INC 810022 10016 FIGGIE INTERNATIONAL INC 
260003 25953 DOVER CORP 317441 46084 FINANCIAL CORP OF SANTA B 
260543 20626 DOW CHEMICAL CO 317916 75291 FINEVEST FOODS INC 
260561 58990 DOW JONES & CO INC G9618E 68419 FIREMAN S FUND CORP 
261018 54279 DOWNEY FINANCIAL CORP 758940 35044 FIRST ALABAMA BANCSHARES  
261597 19254 DRESSER INDUSTRIES INC 318900 35175 FIRST AMERICAN CORP TENN 
264399 27959 DUKE ENERGY CORP 902973 66157 FIRST BANK SYSTEM INC 
615369 48506 DUN & BRADSTREET CORP 319356 75880 FIRST BRANDS CORP 
26633L 76635 DURACELL INTERNATIONAL IN 898402 35263 FIRST CAPITAL CORP 
895927 19828 DWG CORP 319455 53858 FIRST CHICAGO CORP 
263534 11703 E I DU PONT DE NEMOURS &  31945A 56450 FIRST CHICAGO NBD CORP 
269157 43342 E SYSTEMS INC 319591 75344 FIRST CITY BANCORPORATION 
811039 11936 E W SCRIPPS CO 55261F 35554 FIRST EMPIRE STATE CORP 
269803 21872 EAGLE PICHER INDUSTRIES I 320195 52505 FIRST FIDELITY BANCORP IN 
277461 11754 EASTMAN KODAK CO 320264 35722 FIRST FLORIDA BANKS INC 
278058 11762 EATON CORP 320548 26550 FIRST INTERSTATE BANCORP 
278749 31536 ECHLIN INC 320806 35888 FIRST MARYLAND BANCORP 
278865 70578 ECOLAB INC 318906 35204 FIRST OF AMERICA BANK COR 
281020 15720 EDISON INTERNATIONAL 336072 53903 FIRST PENNSYLVANIA CORP 
714046 42200 EG&G INC 336294 36274 FIRST SECURITY CORP 
285661 83596 ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS C 337162 36397 FIRST TENN NATIONAL CORP 
532457 50876 ELI LILLY & CO 337358 36469 FIRST UNION CORP 
291011 22103 EMERSON ELECTRIC CO 337477 52265 FIRST VIRGINIA BANKS INC 
292004 70586 EMPIRE OF AMERICA FEDERAL 929771 68443 FIRST WACHOVIA CORP 
29266M 24096 ENERGY EAST CORP 33761C 53209 FIRST WISCONSIN CORP 
292973 71124 ENESCO GROUP INC 33761R 35474 FIRSTFED MICHIGAN CORP 
292845 62834 ENGELHARD CORP 339030 47159 FLEET BOSTON CORP 
293561 23317 ENRON CORP 339099 46295 FLEETWOOD ENTERPRISES INC 
293567 25056 ENSERCH CORP 339130 47271 FLEMING COS INC 
29358L 47750 ENSTAR GROUP INC 34065c 36944 FLORIDA FEDERAL SAVINGS & 
29364G 24010 ENTERGY CORP 341018 37007 FLORIDA NATIONAL BANKS OF 
294441 33305 EQUITABLE BANCORPORATION 302571 24205 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO 
296683 66544 ESSELTE BUSINESS SYSTEMS  341109 22496 FLORIDA PROGRESS CORP 
297659 42550 ETHYL CORP 343496 49031 FLOWERS INDUSTRIES INC 
302051 79780 EXIDE CORP 576206 26382 FLUOR CORP 
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344775 37189 FOOD LION INC 92552R 19721 GREYHOUND CORP 
345370 25785 FORD MOTOR CO 398048 77142 GREYHOUND LINES INC 
347460 54754 FORT HOWARD CORP 400181 21274 GRUMMAN CORP 
347471 61583 FORT JAMES CORP 362320 21004 GTE CORP 
350244 18112 FOSTER WHEELER CORP 401321 75256 GUARDIAN BANCORP 
351604 27860 FOXBORO CO 401794 54770 GUILFORD MILLS INC 
354623 10037 FRANKLIN SAVINGS ASSOCIAT 402550 23405 GULF STATES UTILITIES CO 
592907 76563 FRED MEYER INC 359694 37875 H B FULLER CO 
356714 62877 FREEPORT MCMORAN INC 008677 56266 H F AHMANSON & CO 
G3682L 71984 FRUIT OF THE LOOM INC 423074 23077 H J HEINZ CO 
591695 25961 FUQUA INDUSTRIES INC 404073 57832 HAL INC 
458506 18278 FURNITURE BRANDS INTERNAT 406216 23819 HALLIBURTON CO 
361428 41953 GAF CORP 410306 44468 HANDY & HARMAN 
364730 47941 GANNETT CO INC 411631 27924 HARCOURT BRACE JOVANOVICH 
368145 75295 GAYLORD CONTAINER CORP 412822 70033 HARLEY DAVIDSON INC 
361582 62236 GEICO CORP 413345 32563 HARNISCHFEGER INDUSTRIES  
368682 20765 GENCORP INC 413875 25582 HARRIS BANKCORP INC 
369550 12052 GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP 415864 25304 HARSCO CORP 
369604 12060 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO 417119 22250 HARTMARX CORP 
370118 23253 GENERAL INSTRUMENT CORP 417434 38770 HARVARD INDUSTRIES INC 
370334 17144 GENERAL MILLS INC 418056 52978 HASBRO INC 
370442 12079 GENERAL MOTORS CORP 423236 27879 HELENE CURTIS INDUSTRIES  
36225X 22541 GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES  962901 10278 HENLEY GROUP INC 
370563 62252 GENERAL RE CORP 427056 18016 HERCULES INC 
370838 12095 GENERAL SIGNAL CORP 600544 54114 HERMAN MILLER INC 
372460 46674 GENUINE PARTS CO 427866 16600 HERSHEY FOODS CORP 
440452 32870 GEO A HORMEL & CO 428040 84663 HERTZ CORP 
373200 75222 GEORGIA GULF CORP 428236 27828 HEWLETT PACKARD CO 
373298 23915 GEORGIA PACIFIC CORP 428656 41807 HIBERNIA CORP 
373712 25910 GERBER PRODUCTS CO 431573 52716 HILLENBRAND INDUSTRIES IN 
374478 32205 GIANT FOOD INC 432848 23309 HILTON HOTELS CORP 
375766 16424 GILLETTE CO 432899 72055 HIMONT INC 
376365 75397 GITANO GROUP INC 434390 85335 HOECHST CELANESE CORP 
381197 67563 GLENFED INC 435071 39669 HOLIDAY CORP 
380804 10178 GOLDEN BOOKS FAMILY ENTER 435767 50729 HOLLY FARMS CORP 
381317 53479 GOLDEN WEST FINANCIAL COR 437076 66181 HOME DEPOT INC 
382550 16432 GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO 43739D 66202 HOME FEDERAL SAVINGS & LO 
389908 66579 GREAT AMERICAN BANK A FED 437292 42359 HOME OWNERS FEDERAL SAVIN 
389893 54340 GREAT AMERICAN MANAGEMENT 438092 42439 HON INDUSTRIES INC 
390064 26657 GREAT ATLANTIC & PACIFIC  438506 18374 HONEYWELL INC 
39054L 39889 GREAT LAKES BANCORP A FED 44107P 46703 HOST MARRIOTT CORP 
390568 32379 GREAT LAKES CHEMICAL CORP 441815 20124 HOUSEHOLD INTERNATIONAL I 
391090 25160 GREAT NORTHERN NEKOOSA CO 75952J 21792 HOUSTON INDUSTRIES INC 
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443782 68945 HUDSON FOODS INC 487836 26825 KELLOGG CO 
444859 48653 HUMANA INC 488044 57437 KELLWOOD CO 
446150 42906 HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES INC 488152 47379 KELLY SERVICES INC 
96647R 38973 IC INDUSTRIES INC 488396 47395 KEMPER CORP 
451841 76263 ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD 492386 25769 KERR MCGEE CORP 
26816Q 23720 ILLINOIS POWER CO 493267 64995 KEYCORP 
452308 56573 ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS INC 494274 47715 KIMBALL INTERNATIONAL INC 
449669 75259 IMC FERTILIZER GROUP INC 494368 17750 KIMBERLY CLARK CORP 
452540 72100 IMO DELAVAL INC 499040 48960 KNIGHT RIDDER INC 
452722 27000 IMPERIAL CORP OF AMERICA 501044 16678 KROGER CO 
453096 11874 IMPERIAL HOLLY CORP 505336 48347 LA Z BOY CHAIR CO 
44977F 43976 INB FINANCIAL CORP 505862 65656 LAFARGE CORP 
456866 12431 INGERSOLL RAND CO 515062 33646 LANDMARK LAND CO INC 
78375P 12458 INLAND STEEL INDUSTRIES I 521894 26489 LEAR SEATING CORP 
457659 16053 INSILCO CORP 524660 60943 LEGGETT & PLATT INC 
880915 65293 INSPIRATION RESOURCES COR 527288 20415 LEUCADIA NATIONAL CORP 
458104 61990 INTEGRA FINANCIAL CORP 527364 52564 LEVI STRAUSS ASSOCIATES I 
458140 59328 INTEL CORP 532716 64282 LIMITED INC 
458665 44768 INTERFACE INC 533900 81678 LINCOLN ELECTRIC CO 
458683 44792 INTERGRAPH CORP 534187 49015 LINCOLN NATIONAL CORP 
458702 15747 INTERLAKE CORP 538021 26294 LITTON INDUSTRIES INC 
459200 12490 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MA 539320 49905 LIZ CLAIBORNE INC 
459362 46199 INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS CO 539830 21178 LOCKHEED CORP 
459506 40272 INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS & F 540424 26710 LOEW S CORP 
561232 12511 INTERNATIONAL MINERALS &  541535 54551 LOMAS & NETTLETON FINANCI 
460043 53129 INTERNATIONAL MULTIFOODS  542312 89675 LONE STAR TECHNOLOGIES IN 
460146 21573 INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO 49337W 24360 LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO 
460321 45437 INTERNATIONAL SHIPHOLDING 543162 53612 LONGS DRUG STORES CORP 
460690 53065 INTERPUBLIC GROUP OF COS  543213 50092 LONGVIEW FIBRE CO 
450911 12570 ITT CORP 543859 33785 LORAL CORP 
445658 42877 J B HUNT TRANSPORT SERVIC 546268 33814 LOUISIANA LAND & EXPLORAT 
708160 18403 J C PENNEY CO INC 546347 56223 LOUISIANA PACIFIC CORP 
616880 48071 J P MORGAN & CO INC 548661 61399 LOWE S COS INC 
475086 46448 JEFFERSON SMURFIT CORP 502129 75231 LPL INVESTMENT GROUP INC 
478129 16707 JOHNS MANVILLE CORP DE 502161 48267 LSI LOGIC CORP 
478160 22111 JOHNSON & JOHNSON 502210 25507 LTV CORP 
478366 42534 JOHNSON CONTROLS INC 549271 43721 LUBRIZOL CORP 
481088 42104 JOSTENS INC 549866 22373 LUKENS INC 
46624E 85735 JPS INDUSTRIES INC 552078 75444 LYONDELL CHEMICAL CO 
466265 46288 JWP INC 410522 43238 M A HANNA CO 
482584 12749 K MART CORP 554511 50703 MACK TRUCKS INC 
483548 47002 KAMAN CORP 559177 11184 MAGMA COPPER CO 
485170 12650 KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN INDU 559424 75596 MAGNETEK INC 
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565004 51351 MANUFACTURERS NATIONAL CO 608554 54827 MOLEX INC 
565097 43668 MAPCO INC 71713U 18382 MONSANTO CO 
568287 19043 MARINE MIDLAND BANKS INC 617446 69032 MORGAN STANLEY DEAN WITTE 
569790 47837 MARION LABORATORIES INC 618447 55079 MORRISON KNUDSEN CORP 
570387 67328 MARK IV INDUSTRIES INC 620076 22779 MOTOROLA INC 
571154 44169 MARLEY CO 626717 28345 MURPHY OIL CORP 
571748 45751 MARSH & MCLENNAN COMPANIE 62952P 76597 NABISCO GROUP HOLDINGS CO 
571834 51706 MARSHALL & ILSLEY CORP 629579 28118 NACCO INDUSTRIES INC 
572900 20562 MARTIN MARIETTA CORP 629853 41179 NALCO CHEMICAL CO 
574599 34032 MASCO CORP 631158 56040 NASH FINCH CO 
574670 51800 MASCO INDUSTRIES INC 635405 56232 NATIONAL CITY CORP 
577081 39538 MATTEL INC 636316 20570 NATIONAL GYPSUM CO 
577730 24715 MAXUS ENERGY CORP 05349F 19019 NATIONAL INTERGROUP INC 
577913 34067 MAXXAM INC 88033G 52337 NATIONAL MEDICAL ENTERPRI 
577778 13100 MAY DEPARTMENT STORES CO 637640 51377 NATIONAL SEMICONDUCTOR CO 
578349 63669 MAYFLOWER GROUP INC 637657 22066 NATIONAL SERVICE INDUSTRI 
578592 13119 MAYTAG CORP 638539 70885 NATIONAL WESTMINSTER BANC 
552653 27086 MCA INC 638612 84644 NATIONWIDE LIFE INSURANCE 
579780 52090 MCCORMICK & CO INC 63934E 12503 NAVISTAR INTERNATIONAL CO 
580037 64629 MCDERMOTT INC 628850 47773 NCH CORP 
580135 43449 MCDONALD S CORP 628862 19537 NCR CORP 
580169 26729 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS CORP 640808 66659 NERCO INC 
580645 17478 MCGRAW HILL COS INC 650111 47466 NEW YORK TIMES CO 
552673 50404 MCI COMMUNICATIONS CORP 651229 60986 NEWELL CO 
581556 25646 MCKESSON CORP 651639 21207 NEWMONT MINING CORP 
582834 19895 MEAD CORP 653520 24184 NIAGARA MOHAWK HOLDINGS I 
584404 50972 MEDIA GENERAL INC 654106 57665 NIKE INC 
585055 60097 MEDTRONIC INC 655664 57817 NORDSTROM INC 
58551A 59379 MELLON BANK CORP 655844 64311 NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORP 
587342 52821 MERCANTILE BANCORPORATION 656559 49752 NORTEK INC 
587533 22891 MERCANTILE STORES CO INC 664161 58166 NORTHEAST SAVINGS F A 
589152 52920 MERCHANTS NATIONAL CORP 664397 44206 NORTHEAST UTILITIES 
589331 22752 MERCK & CO INC 98389B 23931 NORTHERN STATES POWER CO  
589433 42796 MEREDITH CORP 665859 58246 NORTHERN TRUST CORP 
589580 52944 MERIDIAN BANCORP INC 666807 24766 NORTHROP CORP 
590188 52919 MERRILL LYNCH & CO INC 62945J 21485 NORTHWEST AIRLINES CORP 
591908 68574 METROPOLITAN FINANCIAL CO 75952U 58393 NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL LIF 
594563 53402 MICHIGAN NATIONAL CORP 668605 39300 NORTON CO 
59780E 53891 MIDLANTIC CORP 949746 38703 NORWEST CORP 
598130 53939 MIDWAY AIRLINES CORP 670346 34817 NUCOR CORP 
601073 54181 MILLIPORE CORP 670768 66018 NYNEX CORP 
604059 22592 MINNESOTA MINING & MANUFA 674599 34833 OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORP 
553107 51781 MNC FINANCIAL INC 676346 34841 OGDEN CORP 
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337932 23026 OHIO EDISON CO 693475 60442 PNC BANK CORP 
677401 55642 OHIO MATTRESS CO 731095 26438 POLAROID CORP 
679833 59345 OLD KENT FINANCIAL CORP 732827 56143 POPE & TALBOT INC 
680223 59396 OLD REPUBLIC INTERNATIONA 737628 49744 POTLATCH CORP 
680293 59409 OLD STONE CORP 737679 23501 POTOMAC ELECTRIC POWER CO 
680665 13610 OLIN CORP 693506 22509 PPG INDUSTRIES INC 
681919 30681 OMNICOM GROUP INC 740459 71001 PREMARK INTERNATIONAL INC 
68763F 75423 ORYX ENERGY CO 741130 64013 PRESTON CORP 
690020 20394 OUTBOARD MARINE CORP 741555 60337 PRIME COMPUTER INC 
690368 51457 OVERSEAS SHIPHOLDING GROU 742718 18163 PROCTER & GAMBLE CO 
69073F 24811 OWENS CORNING 743315 64390 PROGRESSIVE CORP 
690768 13661 OWENS ILLINOIS INC 744573 23712 PUBLIC SERVICE ENTERPRISE 
691497 34948 OXFORD INDUSTRIES INC 747402 24539 QUAKER OATS CO 
377316 57154 P H GLATFELTER CO 747410 20183 QUAKER STATE CORP 
693718 60506 PACCAR INC 747633 13354 QUANTUM CHEMICAL CORP 
694232 16870 PACIFIC ENTERPRISES 556139 12976 R H MACY & CO INC 
69331C 13688 PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO 257867 38682 R R DONNELLEY & SONS CO 
694890 66026 PACIFIC TELESIS GROUP 750438 15560 RADIOSHACK CORP 
695114 42833 PACIFICORP 751277 28353 RALSTON PURINA CO 
695629 54463 PAINE WEBBER GROUP INC 754603 64346 RAYCHEM CORP 
697757 20984 PAN AM CORP 755111 24942 RAYTHEON CO 
697926 22082 PANENERGY CORP 758110 91380 REEBOK INTERNATIONAL LTD 
699216 32475 PARAMOUNT COMMUNICATIONS  759458 77635 RELIANCE ELECTRIC CO 
701094 41355 PARKER HANNIFIN CORP 759464 70172 RELIANCE GROUP HOLDINGS I 
69351T 22517 PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGH 760719 53938 REPUBLIC NEW YORK CORP 
70931Q 35211 PENNZENERGY CO 761339 77641 REVCO D S INC 
709631 62034 PENTAIR INC 761525 25988 REVLON INC 
709789 78903 PEOPLES BANCORP INC 761682 75358 REXENE CORP 
713448 13856 PEPSICO INC 761695 66799 REYNOLDS & REYNOLDS CO 
038020 27713 PERKIN ELMER CORP 761763 18921 REYNOLDS METALS CO 
714275 62245 PERPETUAL FINANCIAL CORP 76242T 39570 RHONE POULENC RORER INC 
717081 21936 PFIZER INC 763408 11928 RICHFOOD HOLDINGS INC 
717265 17806 PHELPS DODGE CORP 766570 66967 RIGGS NATIONAL CORP 
693320 60679 PHH CORP 767754 46922 RITE AID CORP 
30161N 21776 PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC CO 774347 18948 ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CO 
718154 13901 PHILIP MORRIS COS INC 775371 23990 ROHM & HAAS CO 
718320 42753 PHILIPS INDUSTRIES 775422 25312 ROHR INC 
718507 13928 PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO 781088 26884 RUBBERMAID INC 
718592 13936 PHILLIPS VAN HEUSEN CORP 782352 47490 RUSSELL CORP 
745867 54148 PHM CORP 783549 27633 RYDER SYSTEM INC 
723484 27991 PINNACLE WEST CAPITAL COR 783759 62682 RYKOFF SEXTON INC 
724479 24459 PITNEY BOWES INC 783764 62383 RYLAND GROUP INC 
725701 18649 PITTSTON CO 786429 59440 SAFECO CORP 
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79549B 27596 SALOMON INC 853836 36775 STANDARD PRODUCTS CO 
802183 66069 SANTA FE PACIFIC CORP 853887 72494 STANDARD REGISTER CO 
803111 22840 SARA LEE CORP 854616 43350 STANLEY WORKS 
804795 68938 SAVANNAH FOODS & INDUSTRI 33763V 36127 STAR BANC CORP 
78387G 66093 SBC COMMUNICATIONS INC 857477 72726 STATE STREET BOSTON CORP 
806605 25013 SCHERING PLOUGH CORP 857645 72769 STATESMAN GROUP INC 
783890 68161 SCI SYSTEMS INC 858903 75422 STERLING CHEMICALS INC 
808655 45671 SCIENTIFIC ATLANTA INC 861589 36978 STONE CONTAINER CORP 
809877 18032 SCOTT PAPER CO 862099 77123 STOP & SHOP COS INC 
811804 69607 SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY INC 862111 58464 STORAGE TECHNOLOGY CORP 
784635 55212 SEALED POWER CORP 864278 73235 SUBARU OF AMERICA INC 
812190 70180 SEAMEN S CORP 864635 79673 SUDBURY INC 
812387 14322 SEARS ROEBUCK & CO 866005 51588 SUMMIT BANCORP 
814823 60839 SECURITY PACIFIC CORP 86764P 14656 SUN CO INC 
817320 72733 SEQUA CORP 866810 10078 SUN MICROSYSTEMS INC 
817587 70077 SERVICE MERCHANDISE CO IN 867323 26454 SUNDSTRAND CORP 
81760N 71116 SERVICEMASTER CO 867914 68144 SUNTRUST BANKS INC 
784132 10683 SFFED CORP 867884 54471 SUPER FOOD SERVICES INC 
820286 54412 SHAW INDUSTRIES INC 868536 44951 SUPER VALU STORES INC 
820484 41081 SHAWMUT CORP 868443 37065 SUPERMARKETS GENERAL CORP 
822703 26083 SHELL OIL CO 871829 52038 SYSCO CORP 
824348 36468 SHERWIN WILLIAMS CO 874829 10944 TALMAN HOME FED SAV & LOA 
826681 51764 SIGNET BANKING CORP 875080 66333 TAMBRANDS INC 
832248 70923 SMITHFIELD FOODS INC 875370 74617 TANDEM COMPUTERS INC 
833034 60206 SNAP ON INC 872275 10375 TCF FINANCIAL CORP 
833663 70958 SOCIETY CORP 878895 74932 TECUMSEH PRODUCTS CO 
833665 70966 SOCIETY FOR SAVINGS BANCO 879131 40061 TEKTRONIX INC 
835495 71176 SONOCO PRODUCTS CO 87924V 75030 TELE COMMUNICATIONS INC 
835714 22138 SOO LINE CORP 01741R 43123 TELEDYNE INC 
841297 49437 SOUTHDOWN INC 879868 66114 TEMPLE INLAND INC 
841338 55247 SOUTHEAST BANKING CORP 880370 26542 TENNECO INC 
842587 18411 SOUTHERN CO 881609 37284 TESORO PETROLEUM CORP 
843584 79550 SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPOR 881694 14736 TEXACO INC 
844730 71686 SOUTHTRUST CORP 210802 60388 TEXAS AIR CORP 
844741 58683 SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO 882491 40694 TEXAS INDUSTRIES INC 
846104 71889 SOVRAN FINANCIAL CORP 882508 15579 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INC 
851783 44062 SPRINGS INDUSTRIES INC 873168 24563 TEXAS UTILITIES CO 
852061 39087 SPRINT CORP 883203 23579 TEXTRON INC 
852206 20079 SQUARE D CO 883556 62092 THERMO ELECTRON CORP 
784687 71087 SSMC INC 884315 38578 THOMAS & BETTS CORP 
790148 76123 ST JOE CO 885184 37640 THORN APPLE VALLEY INC 
792860 59459 ST PAUL COS INC 887315 40483 TIME INC 
853258 16715 STANDARD COMMERCIAL CORP 887360 40635 TIMES MIRROR CO 
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872540 40539 TJX COMPANIES INC 918905 45225 VALHI INC 
891092 60580 TORO CO 920003 80099 VALLEY NATIONAL CORP 
891490 61663 TOSCO CORP 920253 80128 VALMONT INDUSTRIES INC 
892335 61065 TOYS R US INC 92220P 27043 VARIAN ASSOCIATES INC 
893349 19617 TRANS WORLD AIRLINES INC 925524 75104 VIACOM INC 
893485 19051 TRANSAMERICA CORP 928347 71204 VISTA CHEMICAL CO 
903369 46324 TRANSCON INC 928869 22074 VONS COMPANIES INC 
894180 47300 TRAVELERS CORP 929160 15202 VULCAN MATERIALS CO 
894650 75649 TREDEGAR CORP 383883 25005 W R GRACE & CO 
896047 65787 TRIBUNE CO 384802 52695 W W GRAINGER INC 
896522 55001 TRINITY INDUSTRIES INC 931142 55976 WAL MART STORES INC 
89835J 76479 TRUSTCORP INC 931422 19502 WALGREEN CO 
872649 18681 TRW INC 254687 26403 WALT DISNEY CO 
900273 54287 TURNER CORP 933696 46770 WANG LABORATORIES INC 
338471 72792 TW SERVICES INC 934390 77080 WARNACO GROUP INC 
902124 45356 TYCO INTERNATIONAL LTD 934488 24678 WARNER LAMBERT CO 
902252 76185 TYLER CORP 939322 81593 WASHINGTON MUTUAL INC 
902494 77730 TYSON FOODS INC 939640 53225 WASHINGTON POST CO 
91273H 66122 U S WEST INC 94106K 57381 WASTE MANAGEMENT INC 
902549 19596 UAL CORP 948774 75597 WEIRTON STEEL CORP 
904784 28310 UNILEVER N V 955465 41427 WEST POINT PEPPERELL INC 
905530 14883 UNION CAMP CORP 958102 66384 WESTERN DIGITAL CORP 
905581 15659 UNION CARBIDE CORP 960878 59467 WESTMORELAND COAL CO 
907818 48725 UNION PACIFIC CORP 961548 21186 WESTVACO CORP 
908640 75193 UNION TEXAS PETROLEUM HOL 961896 82705 WETTERAU INC 
909214 10890 UNISYS CORP 962166 39917 WEYERHAEUSER CO 
909572 78466 UNITED BANKS OF COLORADO  929248 19238 WHEELING PITTSBURGH CORP 
911312 87447 UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC 963320 25419 WHIRLPOOL CORP 
912605 25937 UNITED STATES SHOE CORP 967446 79745 WICKES COS INC 
913004 79303 UNITED STATIONERS INC 969133 82959 WILLAMETTE INDUSTRIES INC 
913017 17830 UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP 974280 24803 WINN DIXIE STORES INC 
913353 47917 UNIVAR CORP 977385 38375 WITCO CORP 
913456 16555 UNIVERSAL CORP 982526 15472 WM WRIGLEY JR CO 
81725T 59619 UNIVERSAL FOODS CORP 981811 83601 WORTHINGTON INDUSTRIES IN 
915289 14891 UNOCAL CORP 984121 27983 XEROX CORP 
91529Y 71175 UNUM CORP 985509 59483 YELLOW CORP 
915302 26681 UPJOHN CO 989349 18067 ZENITH ELECTRONICS CORP 
911905 28847 US AIRWAYS INC    
903290 50956 USF&G CORP    
903293 19131 USG CORP    
902900 77789 UST CORP    
902905 15069 USX CORP    
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APPENDIX B 
SUMMARY LIST OF HYPOTHESIS AND CORRESPONDING DATA SETS 
APPENDIX B 
Hypothesis Prediction DV UOA Sample 
1a 
Holding the titles of 
Chairman of the 
Board, Chief 
Executive Officer, 
President, or Chief 
Operating Officer 
will increase the 
likelihood of joining 
an outside board. 
1/0: Joined vs. 
did not join an 
outside board in 
the following 
year.   
One 
observation per 
D&B 
executive per 
year, 1990-
2001. 
Sample 1 
1b 
Serving as an inside 
director on the home 
firm’s board will 
increase the 
likelihood of joining 
an outside board. 
1/0: Joined vs. 
did not join an 
outside board in 
the following 
year.   
One 
observation per 
D&B 
executive per 
year, 1990-
2001. 
Sample 1 
1c 
Promotion to Inside 
Director, Chairman, 
Chief Executive 
Officer, or President 
/ Chief Operating 
Officer will increase 
the likelihood of 
joining an outside 
board.  
1/0: Joined vs. 
did not join an 
outside board in 
the following 
year.   
One 
observation per 
D&B 
executive per 
year, or per 
CEO per year, 
1990-2001. 
Sample 1 
1d 
CEO dismissal 
decreases the 
likelihood of joining 
an outside board. 
 1/0: Joined vs. 
did not join an 
outside board in 
the following 
year.   
One 
observation per 
D&B CEO per 
year per 
outside board 
match 
Sample 6 
2 
Women executives 
are more likely to 
serve on the boards 
of firms that have 
women as important 
stakeholders. 
Board type 
(independent 
classification) 
One 
observation per 
D&B 
executive per 
outside board 
Sample 2 
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Hypothesis Prediction DV UOA Sample 
3a 
Executives of 
manufacturing firms 
who join outside 
boards are more 
likely to accept 
directorships on 
manufacturing firms. 
Board type 
(manufacturing 
vs. service) 
One 
observation per 
D&B 
executive per 
outside board 
Sample 2 
3b 
Executives of service 
firms who join 
outside boards are 
more likely to accept 
directorships on 
service firms 
Board type 
(manufacturing 
vs. service) 
One 
observation per 
D&B 
executive per 
outside board 
Sample 2 
4a 
Executives with 
prestigious 
educational 
credentials are more 
likely to join an 
outside board. 
1/0: Joined vs. 
did not join an 
outside board in 
the following 
year.   
One 
observation per 
D&B 
executive per 
year, 1990-
2001. 
Sample 1 
4b 
Among executives 
who join outside 
boards, home firm 
prestige is positively 
associated with 
outside firm prestige. 
Outside board 
prestige 
One 
observation per 
D&B 
executive per 
outside board 
Sample 2 
4c 
Executives with elite 
family prestige are 
more likely to join an 
outside board. 
1/0: Joined vs. 
did not join an 
outside board in 
the following 
year.   
One 
observation per 
D&B 
executive per 
year, 1990-
2001. 
Sample 1 
4d 
Among executives 
who join outside 
boards, elite family 
prestige is positively 
associated with 
outside firm prestige. 
Outside board 
prestige 
One 
observation per 
D&B 
executive per 
outside board 
Sample 2 
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Hypothesis Prediction DV UOA Sample 
5a-1 
A CEO retirement 
from the home firm 
increases the 
likelihood of outside 
board entry. 
1/0: Joined vs. 
did not join an 
outside board in 
the following 
year.   
One 
observation per 
D&B CEO per 
year per 
outside board 
match 
Sample 6 
5a-2 
A CEO retirement 
from the home firm 
increases the 
likelihood of outside 
board exit. 
1/0: Exited vs. 
did not exit an 
outside board in 
the following 
year.   
One 
observation per 
D&B 
executive per 
outside board 
affiliation per 
year, 1990-
2001. 
Sample 3 
5b 
A CEO retirement 
from the home firm 
when coupled with a 
relay succession 
increases the 
likelihood of joining 
an outside board. 
1/0: Joined vs. 
did not join an 
outside board in 
the following 
year.   
One 
observation per 
D&B CEO per 
year per 
outside board 
match 
Sample 6 
5c 
Among CEOs who 
retire from their 
home firm, staying 
on as a director in 
the home firm 
increases the 
likelihood of joining 
an outside board. 
1/0: Joined vs. 
did not join an 
outside board in 
the following 
year.   
One 
observation per 
D&B 
executive per 
year, 1990-
2001. 
Sample 1 
6 
Among executives 
who join outside 
boards, executive 
prestige is positively 
associated with the 
likelihood of 
multiple 
directorships. 
Number of 
outside board 
affiliations 
One 
observation per 
D&B 
executive 
serving at any 
time on at least 
1 outside 
board. 
Sample 4 
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APPENDIX B 
Hypothesis Prediction DV UOA Sample 
7 
Significant declines 
in prestige, either on 
the firm’s side or the 
director’s side, 
increases the 
likelihood of outside 
director exit 
1/0: Exited vs. 
did not exit an 
outside board in 
the following 
year.   
One 
observation per 
D&B 
executive per 
Fortune 1000 
outside board 
affiliation per 
year, 1990-
2001. 
Sample 5 
8a 
Changes in the 
internal power 
structure of the firm 
increases the 
likelihood of outside 
director exit. 
1/0: Exited vs. 
did not exit an 
outside board in 
the following 
year.   
One 
observation per 
D&B 
executive per 
Fortune 1000 
outside board 
affiliation per 
year, 1990-
2001. 
Sample 5 
8b 
CEO succession in 
the firm increases the 
likelihood of outside 
director exit. 
1/0: Exited vs. 
did not exit an 
outside board in 
the following 
year.   
One 
observation per 
D&B 
executive per 
Fortune 1000 
outside board 
affiliation per 
year, 1990-
2001. 
Sample 5 
8c 
Disruptive CEO 
succession in the 
firm (dismissal, 
forced retirement) 
increases the 
likelihood of outside 
director exit more 
than non-disruptive 
successions 
1/0: Exited vs. 
did not exit an 
outside board in 
the following 
year.   
One 
observation per 
D&B 
executive per 
Fortune 1000 
outside board 
affiliation per 
year, 1990-
2001. 
Sample 5 
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APPENDIX B 
Sample Description Variables  
1 
EVENT HISTORY DATASET 
This is the main hazard function 
dataset.  It will be a discrete-time 
event-history dataset.  Each D&B 
executive will be included in the 
dataset each year between 1990 and 
2001, unless we know of the death of 
the executive.  All independent 
variables will be updated each year, 
except those that are time-invariant 
like educational prestige or family 
prestige.  The key dependent variable 
is coded 1/0, and indicates whether 
the executive joined one (or more) 
outside boards in the following year.  
This will establish temporal 
precedence.  For example, all 
independent variables for 1990 will be 
coded as of fiscal year end 1990, but 
will predict whether the executive 
joined at least one outside board in 
1991.  Those who did not join an 
outside board during 1991 will be 
coded as censored.   
 
Note: Sample 1 tests hypothesis 
1a; 1b; 1c; 4a; 4c;  
n= 57,776 observations 
 
DV 
0/1 – joined at least one outside 
board, versus did not join an outside 
board during the next year 
 
Key IVs 
H1a: Holding the title of the 
uppermost echelon in the 
organization. 
H1b: Promotion to the firm’s board 
during the year  
H1c: Promotion during the year:  we 
separately code promotion to 
President/COO, CH/CEO, and CEO 
to Chair 
H4a: Educational prestige 
H4c: Family prestige  
 
Control Variables 
Firm size 
Executive age 
Year of the observation 
Executive tenure as an officer 
Whether the executive is employed       
by his or her original home firm. 
Whether the home firm exists in the     
year of the observation. 
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APPENDIX B 
Sample Description Variables  
2 
CROSS SECTIONAL DATASET 
 
This dataset includes one observation 
per D&B executive, per outside board 
affiliation.  It is used to test hypotheses 
about the kinds of boards that 
executives join, and does not model 
likelihood functions of any kind.  
Conceptually, it is a cross-sectional 
dataset, covering the entire 10-year 
window of the dataset.   
 
Note: Test hypothesis 
         2; 3a; 3b; 4b; 4d 
n= 6,858 
DV 
Type of outside board 
Key IVs 
H2 Types of board’s women 
executives join.  
H3a;3b Types of boards executives 
join is dependent upon type of home 
firm.  
H4b Type of boards executives join 
is associated with prestige of the 
home firm  
H4d Type of boards executives join 
is dependent upon prestige of the 
executive  
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APPENDIX B 
Sample Description Variables  
3 
EVENT HISTORY DATASET 
 
This dataset is a subset of sample 1 
and consists of only the firms top 
officer (CEO) who have served, or are 
serving, as an outside director. The 
dependent variable of interest is 
whether a given officer exits from his 
or her outside board position 
 
Note: Test Hypothesis 5a-2 
n= 12,737 
DV 
Exit or not an outside board seat- 
dichotomous 
IV 
CEO Retirement 
CEO Relay Succession 
CEO Retirement *Relay Succession 
 
Controls 
Exec age                                                
Home Firm Exec Tenure 
Firm Size 
Year of the observation 
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APPENDIX B 
Sample Description Variables  
4 
CROSS SECTIONAL DATASET 
 
This dataset is a subset of sample 2 
and identifies only those executives 
who serve on multiple boards. There 
is only one observation per executive 
per year and identifies the year in 
which the executive joined more than 
one board. In case of multiple years, I 
keep only the year in which the 
executive served on the largest 
number of boards. 
 
n= 5,131 
 
DV 
Multiple board- Yes =1 / No = 0 
 
H6: Executives who join multiple 
boards are more prestigious than those 
who do not. 
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APPENDIX B 
Sample Description Variables  
5 
EVENT HISTORY DATASET 
Sample 5 consists of only those 
officers who joined and exited the 
boards of firms included in the 
original Fortune 1000 sample. The 
original Fortune 1000 sample 
consisted of those firms on the list in 
1990. Each firm is tracked for the 
next 12 years collecting all officer 
and director data. This models board 
exits in the context of changes that 
occurred to both the home firm and 
the outside firm. Executives may be 
listed more than once in this sample if 
they hold more than one outside 
board position on another Fortune 
1000 company. 
n= 8,042 
DV 
0/1 –exited at least one outside board 
during the observation period 
 
Key IVs 
H7: Firm prestige shifts 
H8a: Firm CEO retirement 
H8b: Firm CEO succession context 
H8c: Disruptive Firm CEO succession 
 
Controls 
Outside Firm Size 
Home Firm Size 
Executive age 
Home Firm Performance 
Outside Firm Performance 
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APPENDIX B 
Sample Description Variables  
6 
EVENT HISTORY DATASET 
 
This dataset is designed to model 
CEO succession in the executives 
home firm. It contains one 
observation per CEO per year. When 
a succession occurs the departing 
executive is tracked to the end of the 
sample window noting his or her age 
at exit. Additionally, the new CEO is 
monitored until another succession 
event occurs or the observation is 
censored at 2001.  
 
n= 9,734 
Test hypothesis: 1d; 5a-1; 5b; 5c;  
 
DV 
0/1 – joined at least one outside 
board, versus did not join an outside 
board during the following year 
 
Key IVs 
H1d: Executive dismissal affects 
joining 
H5a-1: Executive retirement 
influences joining 
H5b: Relay succession influences 
joining 
H5c: Relay succession and staying on 
as director influences joining 
 
Controls 
Firm Size 
Executive age 
Executive exit from home firm 
Home firm exit during sample 
window 
Executive officer tenure at home firm 
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APPENDIX C 
 
LIST OF UNIVERSITIES DESIGNATED AS PRESTIGIOUS 
Utilized: Finkelstein, S. 1992. Power in Top Management Teams: Dimensions, 
Measurement, and Validation. Academy of Management Journal 35: 503-538. 
 
 
 
Amherst College 
Brown University 
Carleton University 
Cornell University 
Dartmouth College 
Grinnell College 
Harvard University 
Johns Hopkins University 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
New York University 
Oberlin College 
Pomona College 
Princeton University 
Stanford University 
Swarthmore College 
United States Military Academy 
United States Naval Academy 
University of California, Berkeley 
University of California, Los Angeles 
University of Chicago 
University of Michigan 
University of Pennsylvania 
Wellesley University 
Williams College 
Yale University 
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APPENDIX D 
 
LISTING OF SIC CODES BY TWO DIGIT CLASSIFICATION 
Source (http://www.osha.gov/cgi-bin/sic/sicser5) 
Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing  
Major Group 01: Agricultural Production Crops  
Major Group 02: Agricultural Production Livestock And Animal Specialties  
Major Group 07: Agricultural Services  
Major Group 08: Forestry  
Major Group 09: Fishing, Hunting, And Trapping  
Mining  
Major Group 10: Metal Mining  
Major Group 12: Coal Mining  
Major Group 13: Oil And Gas Extraction  
Major Group 14: Mining And Quarrying Of Nonmetallic Minerals, Except Fuels  
Construction  
Major Group 15: Building Construction General Contractors And Operative Builders  
Major Group 16: Heavy Construction Other Than Building Construction Contractors  
Major Group 17: Construction Special Trade Contractors  
Manufacturing  
Major Group 20: - Food And Kindred Products  
Major Group 21: Tobacco Products  
Major Group 22: Textile Mill Products  
Major Group 23: Apparel And Other Finished Products Made From Fabrics  
Major Group 24: Lumber And Wood Products, Except Furniture  
Major Group 25: Furniture And Fixtures  
Major Group 26: Paper And Allied Products  
Major Group 27: Printing, Publishing, And Allied Industries  
Major Group 28: Chemicals And Allied Products  
Major Group 29: Petroleum Refining And Related Industries  
Major Group 30: Rubber And Miscellaneous Plastics Products  
Major Group 31: Leather And Leather Products  
Major Group 32: Stone, Clay, Glass, And Concrete Products  
Major Group 33: Primary Metal Industries  
Major Group 34: Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery And Trans. Equipment  
Major Group 35: Industrial And Commercial Machinery And Computer Equipment  
Major Group 36: Electronic And Other Electrical Equipment And Components, Except 
Computer Equip  
Major Group 37: Transportation Equipment  
Major Group 38: Measuring, Analyzing, And Controlling Instruments; Photographic,  
Major Group 39: Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries  
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services  
Major Group 40: Railroad Transportation  
Major Group 41: Local And Suburban Transit And Interurban Highway Passenger  
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Major Group 42: Motor Freight Transportation And Warehousing  
Major Group 43: United States Postal Service  
Major Group 44: Water Transportation  
Major Group 45: Transportation By Air  
Major Group 46: Pipelines, Except Natural Gas  
Major Group 47: Transportation Services  
Major Group 48: Communications  
Major Group 49: Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services  
Wholesale Trade  
Major Group 50: Wholesale Trade-durable Goods  
Major Group 51: Wholesale Trade-non-durable Goods  
Retail Trade  
Major Group 52: Building Materials, Hardware, Garden Supply, And Mobile Home  
Major Group 53: General Merchandise Stores  
Major Group 54: Food Stores  
Major Group 55: Automotive Dealers And Gasoline Service Stations  
Major Group 56: Apparel And Accessory Stores  
Major Group 57: Home Furniture, Furnishings, And Equipment Stores  
Major Group 58: Eating And Drinking Places  
Major Group 59: Miscellaneous Retail  
Finance, Insurance, And Real Estate  
Major Group 60: Depository Institutions  
Major Group 61: Non-depository Credit Institutions  
Major Group 62: Security And Commodity Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges, And Services  
Major Group 63: Insurance Carriers  
Major Group 64: Insurance Agents, Brokers, And Service  
Major Group 65: Real Estate  
Major Group 67: Holding And Other Investment Offices  
Services  
Major Group 70: Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps, And Other Lodging Places  
Major Group 72: Personal Services  
Major Group 73: Business Services  
Major Group 75: Automotive Repair, Services, And Parking  
Major Group 76: Miscellaneous Repair Services  
Major Group 78: Motion Pictures  
Major Group 79: Amusement And Recreation Services  
Major Group 80: Health Services  
Major Group 81: Legal Services  
Major Group 82: Educational Services  
Major Group 83: Social Services  
Major Group 84: Museums, Art Galleries, And Botanical And Zoological Gardens  
Major Group 86: Membership Organizations  
Major Group 88: Private Households  
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Public Administration  
Major Group 91: Executive, Legislative, And General Government, Except Finance  
Major Group 92: Justice, Public Order, And Safety  
Major Group 93: Public Finance, Taxation, And Monetary Policy  
Major Group 94: Administration Of Human Resource Programs  
Major Group 95: Administration Of Environmental Quality And Housing Programs  
Major Group 96: Administration Of Economic Programs  
Major Group 97: National Security And International Affairs  
Major Group 99: Non-classified 
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APPENDIX E 
 
Issue Contention Problem 
Collective or Individual 
Asset (Coleman, Putnam) 
Social capital as a collective 
asset 
Confounding with norms 
and trust 
Closed or open networks 
(Bourdieu, Coleman, 
Putnam, Burt) 
Group should be closed or 
dense 
Vision of class society 
and abscense of mobility 
Functional (Coleman) 
Social capital is indicated by 
its effect on particular 
actions 
Tautology (cause is 
determined by effect) 
Measurement (Coleman) Not quantifiable Heuristic, not falsifiable 
 
Table 1 
 
Controversies in Social Capital 
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Table 2 
 Summary Event History Variables 
 SAMPLE 1 SAMPLE 3 SAMPLE 5 SAMPLE 6 
DV Join a Board Exit a Board Exit a Board Join a Board 
IV 
Social Register 
Edu Prestige 
Home Firm Dir 
CEO/Chair 
Pres / COO 
PromoteCeoCh 
PromotePrCoo 
Promote Dir 
Retired 
Dismiss 
Relay 
 
Firm Prestige Change 
Relative prestige   
Succession last 3 years 
X-CEO stay as Chair 
X-CEO stay as Director 
X-CEO Retire from firm 
X-CEO Dismissed 
 
Dismiss 
Stay as Chair 
Stay as Dir 
Relay 
CONTROLS 
Firm Size 
Executive Age 
Company exit 
Officer Tenure 
Executive Exit 
Firm Size 
Executive Age 
Company exit 
Officer Tenure
Firm Size 
Executive Age 
Firm ROA 
Firm Size 
Executive Age 
Company exit 
Officer Tenure 
Executive Exit 
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Table 3 
Summary Cross Sectional Variables 
 SAMPLE 2 SAMPLE 4 
DV 
Female 
Mfg SIC 
Service SIC 
Education Prestige 
Home Firm Prestige 
Social Register 
Number of Boards 
IV 
Mfg SIC 
Service SIC 
Outside Firm Prestige 
Education Prestige 
Social Register 
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Table 5 
 
Sample 3 - Variable Means, Standard Deviations, Ranges, and Correlation Coefficients 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1  Exit a Board .17 .37 0 1       
2  Executive Age 61.00 6.12 39 85 .094      
3  Home Firm Size 8.42 1.13 1.44 12.07 .017 .082     
4  Officer Tenure 17.75 8.49 1 61 .032 .349 .010    
5  Relay .26 .44 0 1 .085 .387 .037 .143   
6  Retired .74 .44 0 1 -.056 .029 -.053 .145 -.261  
7  Retired * Relay .14 .35 0 1 .065 .458 .056 .157 .686 .244 
 n = 12,737    Correlation coefficients greater than .020 or less than -.020 are significant at p < .05.  
 
 
Note: This sample data set consists of those executives who are listed as the top officer 
at their firm and who during the sample window served on at least 1 outside board. The 
unit of analysis is the executive outside board year. The data set is limited to top officers 
to model retirements and investigates those who leave outside directorship positions. 
Executives are often listed more than once.
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Table 7 
 
Sample 6 - Variable Means, Standard Deviations, Ranges, and Correlation Coefficients 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1  Join a Board .60 1.08 0 1        
2  Retired .74 .44 0 1 .047       
3  Dismissed .16 .36 0 1 -.065 -.698      
4  Relay .26 .44 0 1 -.083 -.184 -.254     
5  Home Firm Size 8.20 1.21 -2.63 12.24 .085 -.024 .035 .036    
7  Executive Age 61.52 7.37 35 102 -.149 .044 -.060 .409 .063   
8  Home Company Exit .17 .38 0 1 -.067 -.340 .404 -.029 -.153 .076  
9  Officer Tenure 18.3 9.16 0 1 -.092 .170 -.202 .172 .002 .402 -.124
          n = 9,734    Correlation coefficients greater than .020 or less than -.020 are significant at p < .05.  
 
 
Note:  This data set consists of the top officer for each Fortune 1000 firm and investigates 
CEOs who join a board.  The top officer (CEO) was selected to provide consistency with 
prior executive succession research. The unit of analysis is the CEO year.  
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Table 8 
 
Sample 2 - Variable Means, Standard Deviations, Ranges, and Correlation Coefficients 
 
 Mean s.d. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1  Female .01 .10 0 1       
2  Outside Firm Type .66 .47 0 1 -.024      
3  Home Firm Type .77 .42 0 1 .014 .127     
4  Home Firm Prestige 1.10 .35 1 4 -.023 -.013 .015    
5  Outside Firm Prestige 1.82 1.07 1 4 -.008 .144 -.027 .065   
6  Edu Prestige .44 .50 0 1 -.039 -.011 .022 -.010 -.044  
7  Social Register .03 .17 0 1 -.018 .014 .030 .031 -.022 .085 
          n = 6,858    Correlation coefficients greater than .025 or less than -.025 are significant at p < .05. 
 
 
 
Note:  This dataset includes one observation per D&B executive, per outside board 
affiliation.  It is used to test hypotheses about the kinds of boards that executives join, 
and does not model likelihood functions of any kind.  Conceptually, it is a cross-
sectional dataset.   
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Table 9 
 
Sample 4 - Means, Std.Dev., Ranges, and Correlation Coefficients 
 
 Mean s.d. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 
1  Number of Boards .24 .43 0 1      
2  Female .02 .15 0 1 -.043     
3  Edu Prestige .34 .48 0 1 .107 -.011    
4  Social Register .02 .13 0 1 .058 -.021 .102   
5  Exec Age>62 .20 .40 0 1 .199 -.038 .059 .037  
6  Firm Size 8.11 1.17 4.23 12.16 .228 -.005 .114 -.037 .112 
 n = 5,131    Correlation coefficients greater than .030 or less than -.030 are significant at p < .05. 
 
 
 
Note:  This dataset is a subset of Sample 2 and identifies those executives who serve on 
multiple boards. There is only one observation per executive per year and retains the 
year in which the executive joined more than one board.  
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Table 10 
 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates From Survival Time Regression 
 
Dependent Variable is Join an Outside Board 
 
Coefficients Represent Odds Ratio For Sample 1  1,2 
 
    Model 1     Model 2 
Controls Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio 
Home Firm Size 1.44*** (.02)  1.36*** (.02) 
Executive Age 1.03*** (.00)  1.03*** (.00) 
Executive Exit 3.31*** (.09)    1.16 (.23) 
Home Company Exit     .00 (.39)     .03 (22.7) 
Officer Tenure 1.03*** (.00)  1.01*** (.00) 
Independent Variables      
Social Register    .75** (.06) 
Edu Prestige    1.11** (.03) 
Director    2.32*** (.09) 
CEO / Chair    3.03*** (.13) 
President / COO    1.43*** (.06) 
CEO to Chair    1.25* (.12) 
Promote Director    1.02 (.10) 
Promote CEO / Chair    .83* (.06) 
Promote President / COO    1.03 (.11) 
Home Firm Size * Executive Exit    1.25*** (.03) 
      
Log Likelihood -2303.07  -893.13 
Model chi-square 4663.08***  7482.95*** 
Pseudo R2 .503   .807 
      
n=57,776      
* p < .05     
** p < .01     
*** p < .001     
     
      
1  Odds ratios of less than 1 represent negative associations, while those  
    larger than 1 represent positive associations    
2 Values in parenthesis are standard errors 
     
Note: This equates to one observation for each executive for each year, subject to right-
censoring unless an executive died.  Sample 1 consists of executives identified in Dun 
and Bradstreet Corporate Reference Book of Management in 1990 and served as an 
officer at a 1990 Fortune 1000 firm. These executives (n=5,185) were tracked for 12 
years to identify all public outside directorship affiliations. 
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Table 11 
 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates From Survival Time Regression 
 
Coefficients Represent Odds Ratio For Sample 3  1,2 
 
Dependent Variable is Exit a Board 
 
            
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4 
Controls            
Executive Age 1.08***(.01)  1.06** (.01)  1.06** (.00)  1.07** (.00) 
Home Firm Size 1.03 (.02)  1.02 (.02)  1.02 (.02)  1.03 (.02) 
Officer Tenure 1.01* (.00)  1.01** (.00)  1.01** (.00)  1.00 (.00) 
Independent Variables          
Retired    .60*** (.05)       
Relay       1.79*** (.09)    
Retired * Relay          1.44*** (.10) 
            
Log Likelihood -2231.25  -2190.71  -2176.59  -2217.26 
Model chi-square 424.38***  505.47***  533.70***  452.36*** 
Pseudo R2 .087   .103   .109   .093 
 
n= 12,737            
* p < .05           
** p < .01           
*** p < .001           
           
            
1  Odds ratios of less than 1 represent negative associations, while those   
    larger than 1 represent positive associations       
2 Values in parenthesis are standard errors        
 
Note:  This sample data set consists of those executives who are listed as the top officer 
at their firm and who during the sample window served on at least 1 outside board. The 
unit of analysis is the top officer, outside board year. The data set is limited to top 
officers to model retirements and investigates those who leave outside directorship 
positions. Executives are often listed more than once 
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Table 12 
 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates From Survival Time Regression 
 
Coefficients Represent Odds Ratio For Sample 5  1,2 
 
Dependent Variable is Exit a Board 
 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
 Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio 
Controls               
Executive Age 1.16*** (.01)  1.16*** (.01)  1.15*** (.01)  1.16*** (.01)  1.16*** (.01) 
Out Firm Size 1.00 (.03)  1.00 (.03)  1.05 (.03)  1.00 (.03)  1.00 (.03) 
Home Firm Size 1.02 (.03)  1.02 (.03)  1.00 (.03)  1.02 (.03)  1.00 (.03) 
Home Firm ROA .99 (.00)  .99 (.00)  .99 (.00)  .99 (.00)  1.00 (.00) 
Out Firm ROA .99* (.01)  .99* (.01)  .98** (.01)  .99* (.01)  .99* (.01) 
Independent Variables               
Home Firm Prestige Change    .92 (.20)          
Out Firm Prestige Change    1.52** (.23)          
Relative Prestige    .99 (.08)          
Home Firm Succession       .38*** (.03)       
Out Firm Succession       1.23** (.09)       
Out Firm XCEO Stay Ch          1.56*** (.16)    
Out Firm XCEO Retired          1.01 (.12)    
Out Firm XCEO Stay Dir          1.15 (.13)    
Home Firm XCEO Dismissed             .92 (.11) 
Out Firm XCEO Dismissed             .92 (.12) 
               
Log Likelihood -1205.48  -1199.62  -1062.32  -1189.8  -1146.16 
Model chi-square 543.03***  546.74***  704.06***  562.73***  536.38*** 
Pseudo R2 .184   .186   .251   .191   .190 
               
n= 8,042               
* p < .05              
** p < .01              
*** p < .001              
1  Odds ratios of less than 1 represent negative associations, while those         
    larger than 1 represent positive associations            
2 Values in parenthesis are standard errors 
             
Note: This sample consists of only those officers who joined or exited the boards of other 
firms included in the original Fortune 1000 sample (n=9,704). This models board exits in 
the context of changes that occurred to the home firm and the outside firm. Executives 
may be listed more than once in this sample if they hold more than one outside board 
position on another Fortune 1000 company. However, there is only one observation for 
each executive, outside board, year affiliation 
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Table 13 
 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
Coefficients Represent Odds Ratio For Sample 6  1,2 
 
Dependent Variable is Join a Board 
 
   Model 1    Model 2     Model 3  
Controls Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio  
Home Firm Size 1.31*** (.02)  1.35*** (.02)  1.36*** (.02)  
Executive Age 1.06*** (.00)  1.05*** (.00)  1.05*** (.00)  
Company Exit .00 (.85)  .01 (3.66)  .03 (8.49)  
Officer Tenure 1.00 (.00)  1.00 (.00)  1.00 (.00)  
Independent Variables        
Dismissed    5.36*** (.43)     
Retired       .24*** (.01)  
Relay       1.65*** (.11)  
          
Log Likelihood 607.67  756.41  1020.66  
Model chi-square 650.95***  948.41***  1476.92***  
           
          
n= 8,042          
* p < .05         
** p < .01         
*** p < .001         
         
          
1  Odds ratios of less than 1 represent negative associations, while those  
    larger than 1 represent positive associations     
2 Values in parenthesis are standard errors      
 
Note: This data set consists of the top officer for each Fortune 1000 firm and investigates 
CEOs who join a board.  The top officer (CEO) was selected to provide consistency with 
prior executive succession research. The unit of analysis is the CEO, year. 
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Table 14 
 
Table of Gender by Outside Firm Type 
 
Frequency 
Percent 
Row Percent 
Column Percent
Outside Firm Type 
Gender Manufacturing Service
Male 
4493 
65.51 
66.23 
99.10 
2291 
33.41 
33.77 
98.58 
Female 
41 
.60 
55.41 
.90 
33 
.48 
44.59 
1.42 
Total 4534 2324 
 
 
Statistic    DF  Value   Prob. 
 
Chi-Square    1  3.83   n.s. 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square  1  3.67   n.s. 
n= 6,858 
 
Note: This dataset includes one observation per D&B executive, per outside board 
affiliation.  It is used to test hypotheses about the kinds of boards that executives join, 
and does not model likelihood functions of any kind.  Conceptually, it is a cross-
sectional dataset. 
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Table 15 
 
Table of Home Firm Type by Outside Firm Type
 
Frequency 
Percent 
Row Percent 
Column Percent 
Outside Firm Type 
Home Firm Type Manufacturing Service 
Manufacturing 
3664 
53.43 
69.41 
80.81 
1615 
23.55 
30.59 
69.49 
Service 
870 
12.69 
55.10 
19.19 
709 
10.34 
44.90 
30.51 
Total 4534 2324 
 
Statistic    DF  Value   Prob. 
 
Chi-Square    1  111.08   p<.001 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square  1  107.98   p<.001 
n= 6,858 
 
Note: This dataset includes one observation per D&B executive, per outside board 
affiliation.  It is used to test hypotheses about the kinds of boards that executives join, 
and does not model likelihood functions of any kind.  Conceptually, it is a cross-
sectional dataset. 
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Table 16 
 
Table of Home Firm Prestige and Outside Firm Prestige 
 
Frequency 
Percent 
Row Percent 
Column Percent 
Outside Firm Sales Rank Quartile 
Home Firm Sales Rank 
Quartile First Quartile 
Second 
Quartile 
Third 
Quartile 
Fourth 
Quartile 
First Quartile 
2971 
50.48 
55.40 
92.76 
1081 
18.37 
20.16 
89.56 
557 
9.46 
10.39 
90.13 
754 
12.81 
14.06 
87.98 
Second Quartile 
199 
3.38 
44.52 
6.21 
117 
1.99 
26.17 
9.69 
47 
.80 
10.51 
7.61 
84 
1.43 
18.79 
9.80 
Third Quartile 
31 
.53 
44.29 
.97 
9 
.15 
12.86 
.75 
14 
.24 
20.00 
2.27 
16 
.27 
22.86 
1.87 
Fourth Quartile 
2 
.03 
40.00 
.06 
0 
.00 
.00 
.00 
0 
.00 
.00 
.00 
3 
.05 
60.00 
.35 
Totals 3203 1207 618 857 
 
Statistic    DF  Value   Prob. 
 
Chi-Square    9  44.28   p<.001 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square  9  40.86   p<.001 
n= 5,885 
 
Note: This dataset includes one observation per D&B executive, per outside board 
affiliation.  It is used to test hypotheses about the kinds of boards that executives join, 
and does not model likelihood functions of any kind.  Conceptually, it is a cross-
sectional dataset.  
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Table 17 
  Table of Executive Educational Prestige by Outside Firm Prestige 
Frequency 
Percent 
Row Percent 
Column Percent 
Outside Firm Sales Rank Quartile 
Attended a 
Prestigious University First Quartile 
Second 
Quartile 
Third 
Quartile 
Fourth 
Quartile 
Yes 
1696 
35.52 
58.14 
46.35 
559 
8.41 
19.16 
40.10 
314 
4.73 
10.76 
42.72 
348 
5.24 
11.93 
40.61 
No 
1963 
29.54 
52.66 
53.65 
835 
12.57 
22.40 
59.90 
421 
6.34 
11.29 
57.28 
509 
7.66 
13.65 
59.39 
Statistic    DF  Value   Prob. 
Chi-Square    3  21.29   p<.001 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square  3  21.34   p<.001 
n= 6,645 
Table of Executive Family Prestige by Outside Firm Prestige 
Frequency 
Percent 
Row Percent 
Column Percent 
Outside Firm Sales Rank Quartile 
Member of 
Prestigious Family First Quartile 
Second 
Quartile 
Third 
Quartile 
Fourth 
Quartile 
Yes 
112 
1.69 
61.2 
3.06 
36 
.54 
19.67 
2.58 
17 
.26 
9.29 
2.31 
18 
.27 
9.84 
2.10 
No 
3547 
53.38 
54.89 
96.94 
1358 
20.44 
21.02 
97.42 
718 
10.81 
11.11 
97.69 
839 
12.63 
12.98 
97.90 
Statistic    DF  Value   Prob. 
Chi-Square    3  3.34   n.s. 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square  3  3.45   n.s. 
n= 6,645 
Note: This dataset includes one observation per D&B executive, per outside board 
affiliation.  Conceptually, it is a cross-sectional dataset.  
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Table 18 
 
Table of Executive Educational Prestige by Multiple Boards 
Statistic    DF  Value   Prob. 
Chi-Square    11  80.69   p<.001 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square  11  79.87   p<.001 
n= 5,131 
Table of Executive Family Prestige by Multiple Boards 
Frequency 
Percent 
Row Percent 
Column Percent 
Number of Outside Boards 
Member of Prestigious Family 0 or 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Yes 
52 
1.01 
57.14 
1.34 
13 
.25 
14.29 
2.79 
12 
.23 
13.19 
3.66 
7 
.14 
7.69 
3.24 
4 
.08 
4.40 
3.31 
2 
.04 
2.20 
3.03 
No 
3824 
74.53 
75.87 
98.66
453 
8.83 
8.99 
97.21
316 
6.16 
6.27 
96.34
209 
4.07 
4.15 
96.76 
117 
2.28 
2.32 
96.69 
64 
1.25 
1.27 
96.97
Statistic    DF  Value   Prob. 
Chi-Square    11  20.70   n.s. 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square  11  18.34   n.s. 
n= 5,131 
Note: The dataset for these observations includes one observation per Dun & Bradstreet 
executive depicting the maximum number of boards that each executive served on 
during the sample window.  
Frequency 
Percent 
Row Percent 
Column Percent 
Number of Outside Boards 
Attend a Prestigious University 0 or 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Yes 
1220 
23.78 
69.16 
31.48
196 
3.82 
11.11 
42.06
121 
2.36 
6.86 
36.89
109 
2.12 
6.18 
50.46
56 
1.09 
3.17 
46.28 
35 
.68 
1.98 
53.03
No 
2656 
51.76 
78.88 
68.52
270 
5.26 
8.02 
57.94
207 
4.03 
6.15 
63.11
107 
2.09 
3.18 
49.54
65 
1.27 
1.93 
53.72 
31 
  .60 
.92 
46.97
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Table 19 
 
Hypothesis Summary 
 
Hypothesis Prediction Join a Board Patterns of Service Exit a Board 
1a Home Firm Title +   
1b Serving as Inside Director +   
1c Home Firm Promotion mixed   
1d CEO Dismissal +   
2 Women on Boards  n.s.  
3a 
Manufacturing 
Executives on 
Manufacturing Boards 
 +  
3b Service Executives on Service Boards  -  
4a Prestige Education +   
4b 
Home Firm Prestige 
and Outside Firm 
Prestige 
 +  
4c Prestigious Family Connections n.s.   
4d 
Prestigious Family 
Connections and 
Outside Firm Prestige. 
 n.s.  
5a-1 Retirement   - 
5a-2 Retirement -   
5b Retirement and Relay Succession +   
5c Retirement and Remain on Home Firm Board +   
6 Prestige and Multiple Boards  mixed  
7 Prestige Declines   mixed 
8a 
Changes in Firm 
Internal power 
Structure (retirement) 
  n.s. 
8b CEO Firm Succession   mixed 
8c CEO disruptive Firm Succession   mixed 
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